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INTRODUCTION

OMEN'S quest for equality faces many obstacles. Perhaps
the most important is conceptual. What do we mean by
"equality for women?" How will we know when women have
achieved equality with men?
This Article examines the issue of equality for women within an
institution that is central to their fate and cruci al to their prospects:
marriage . As marriage rates decline an d divorce rates rise , 1 the institution of marriage has become the focus of a polarized debate

W

1 The div orce rate stands at about 50 % of marriages, but has declined slightly in the
past decade. See A rthur J. Norton & Louisa F. Miller. U .S. Dep't of Commerce,
Marriage , Divorce, and Remarriage in the 1990's, at 1 (1992). Marriage rates have
declined steadily over the past 25 years, and both men and women are marrying later.
For example, in 1970,88.4 men per 1000 over the age of 15 were married , but by 1988
that number had dropped to 57.4 men per 1000. See 3 U.S. Dep ' t of H ealth & Human Servs., Vital Statistics of th e United States 1988: Marriage and Divorce 8, 9 tbl.l7 (1996). Likewise, in 1975, 62.5% of 20- to 24-year-old women were married , but by
1990 that figure had dropped to 38.5%. See Norton & Miller, supra, at 3. For 25- to
29-year-old women, 87.2% were married in 1975, but only 69% were in 1990. See id.
Between 1970 and 1988, th e average age of first marriage for women rose fro m 20.6
to 23.7, and for men from 22.5 to 25.5. See U.S. D ep't of Health & Human Servs.,
supra, at 12 tbl.l -8. As matters stand, however, 90% of wo men are expected to
marry during thei r lifetimes. See No rton & Miller, supra, at 4.
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between, on the one hand, social conservatives who regard tradi2
tionai marriage as an unalloyed boon and social good, ;nd, on the
other, feminist critics who view marriage as a patriarchal strait3
jacket that is antagonistic to women's interests. This Article aims
to mediate betvveen these extremes, arguing that both camps are
right, but for different reasons. Marriage presents women with a
paradox. Women greatly value marriage because it significantly
increases their well-being within society. But the fundament al
structure of the institution of marriage makes it almost impossible
for women to re ap its benefits while maintaining their social
equality with men.
A review of the literature on the institution of marriage re veals a
striking imbalance: There is an enormous body of work on divorce
and marital failure, but relatively little on the anatomy of successful relationships. Some divorce scholars delve into marital dynamics in considering how some aspects of marital relationsespecially the division of labor, responsibility, and rev.rarcl-may
4
affect the positions of the partners when marriage fails. But there
is remarkably little sustained or systematic discussion of the reverse of that relationship: how extramarital prospects, or other
preexisting factors and partner attributes, might affect the allocation of effort and reward between spouses who are not contemplating divorce.

2 See, e.g., David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our lviost Urgent
Social Problem (1995); Maggie Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage: How We Destroy Lasting Love (1996); Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce C ulture ( 1997);
Karl Zinsmeister, Why the Traditional Family Will Never Become Obsolete, Am.
Enterprise, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 28; Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage
in America (David Popenoe, Jean Bethke Elshtain & David Blankenhorn eds., 1996).
3 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family
and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization
of ~.;farital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo.
L.J. 2127 (1994); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 Geo. L.J. 2227 (1994).
"See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, ''I Gave Him the
Best Years of My Life," 16 J. Legal Stud. 267 (1987); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory
of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem
of Divorce, 2 Roundtable 517 (1995); Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani,
The Role of Private Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41
U. Toronto L.J. 533 (1991). See generally Symposium on Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory, 82 Geo. L.J. 2119 (1994).
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The lack of a comprehensive framework for understanding dayto-day relations within marriage has also led to serious blind spots
in the analysis of women's fate within society as a whole. 5 A black
box lies at the center of the elaborate explanatory structure that
commentators and legal scholars have struggled to erect in the
quest to understand the sources of women's predicament and to
fashion policies that might improve their lot. By taking women's
marital position-most notably, their weight of domestic responsibility-for granted in analyzing women's social standing and economic status, scholars have avoided the need to provide a fully satisfying or searching theory of why families operate as they do.6
This Articl e aims to lift the lid on the black box of marital relations and take a sustained look inside. It argues that there are
good reasons-both empirical and theoretical-to believe that, on
average, men and women share unequally in the benefits of marriage. What precisely does it mean to say that men and women are
unequal within marriage? And what evidence supports this conclusion, once defined? This Article takes on these difficult questions using the tools and concepts of economic analysis. Part I examines the empirical literature that compares some aspects of the
benefits and burdens of marriage for men and women and concludes that men typically gain a larger share of what marriage has
to offer. Part II draws on game theory to model marriage as a bilateral, monopolistic bargaining relationship between rational ac-

Sociologists have been most active in attempting to formul ate theories to expl ain
obse rv ed marital roles a nd deci sionmaking, but they have failed to put forward a unified and comprehensive paradigm that fully accounts for existing patterns. See , e.g.,
Juli e Brines, Econ om ic Depend e ncy , Gender, a nd the Division of Labor at Home,
100 Am . J . Soc. 652 (1994) [h e re inafter Brines, Economic Dependency] ; Juli e Brines,
Th e Exchange Value of Housework, 5 Rationality & Soc'y 302 (1993); Paula England , A Feminist Crit ique of Rational-Choice Theories: Implications for Sociology,
20 Am. Sociologist 14 (1989); Paula England & George Farkas, Households, Employment, and Gender: A Social , Economic, a nd Demographic View (1986); Paula
England & Barbara Stanek Kilbourne, Markets, Marriages, and Other Mates: The
Problem of Power, in Beyond th e Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society 163
(Roger Friedland & A.F. Rob e rtson eds., 1990); George Farkas, Educati on, Wage
Rates, and the Division of Labor between Husband and Wife , 38 J. Marriage & Fam.
473 (1976).
6
See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals a nd Institution a l Choices, 96 Co lum. L. Rev. 2001,2002 (1996) (observing, without trying fully
to explain, that women take on a greater burd e n of domestic responsibilities) ; Cohen,
supra note 4, at 285; Williams, supra note 3, at 2229.
5
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tors in which husbands an d wives engage in a process of allocating
the benefits and burdens of married life under con ditions of conflict-that is, where spouses' interests do not perfectly coincide and
one partner's welfare can sometimes come at the other's expense.
After proposing various possibl e standards for egali tarian mari tal
relationships, Part II then adopts a working defi niti on of egalitarian marriage. The analysis predicts that, although egalitarian marri age is possible in some cases, it will be the exception rather than
the rule. Bargaining principl es suggest that th e deep structure of
marri age is indeed "patriarchal" in the following sense: Although
both partners benefit from marriage, men on average have more
power in the relationship. That is, men are in a position to "get
their way" more often and to ach ieve a higher degree of satisfaction of their preferences.
Parts II and III explore the sources of this power imbalance, examining both the structural feat ures of the institution and the manner in which those features interact with the traits and preferences
that men and women bring to marriage so as to strengthen men 's
bargaining position. Part IV reviews how the imbalance is worsened by a feedback process that parlays small and morally neutral
differences between men and women into more pronounced marital and social dispariti es. It also discusses how the failure to see
marriage as a paradigmatic barga ining relationship and to understand the dynamics of marital bargaining leads to fundamental misconceptions about the choices men and women make in m arriage
and in life. Specifically, the analysis demonstrates how, contrary to
common wisdom, women's supposedly greater "taste" and skill for
domestic and nurturing activities cannot fully explain observed patterns of behavior m divisions of labor and rewards of famil y life .
Rather, a complete und erstanding of marital dyn amics must take
into account the inevitabl e conflicts that arise in any bargaining
relationship between di stinct , albeit loving, individuals and the role
of power in resol ving those conflicts. And, any explanation of
men 's and women's "choices" must confront women's relative lack
of power to bargain for a different or a better deal.
Finally, Part V discusses possible solutions for bargaining imbalance between men and women in marriage. It discusses a number
of devices that might help to mitigate the degree of imbalance, but
concludes that all have their limitations and th eir price. Measures
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to chan 0ae the balance of 'Dower encounter formidable .practical obstacles grounded in the nature of m arriage as an exclusive, relational contract between parties who stand in differe nt positions at
the outset. Many measures will not work well in the current legal
climate of no-fault divorce, and introducing fault creates as many
problems for women's bargaining position as it solves. And some
correc tives may have problematic consequences because bargaining takes place in the shadow of markets-specifically, the labor
m arket and the marriage m arket. Atte mpts to change the balance
of power by regulating the marital relat ionship directly may have
the effect of deterring or delaying men's decision to marry or may
change the quality of mates women can ob tain. These side-effects
may undermine or partially offset efforts to achieve marital balance.
This Article also asks what the future holds for egalitarian marriage, fo r families, and especially for children within marriages in
·which men hold the balance of power an d women fill multiple
roles. T he number of married women with children entering the
workforce is rising steadily.i This trend has many positive effects
See Barbara R. Bergmann, The Economic Emergence of Women 22-24 & tbl.2-3
(1986); V ictor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Eco nomic Equality 77 (paperback ed.
1990); Daphne Spain & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Balancing Act: Motherhood, Marriage,
and Employment Among American Women 147 fig.6.2 (1996); C laudia D. Goldin,
The Role of World W ar II in the Rise of Women's E mployme nt, 81 Am. Econ. R e v.
741 (1 991).
!\lost marriages now have two worke rs, a nd most married wome n work just to prevent a n erosion of th e ir family 's sta nd ard of li vin g. T he eco no mists Ba rry B lu es ton e
and Ste phen Rose, using data fro m the Panel Stud y of Incom e Dynamics' exa mination of Mic higan famili es between 1967 and 1989, have calcul a ted that husband -wife
couples have increased their combin ed a nnual market work tim e a n av erage of a bout
684 hours, or four mo nths, of full-tim e wo rk for th at period. Barry Bluestone & Stephen Rose, Overworked a nd Un e mployed, Am. Prospect, Mar.- Apr. 1997 , a t 58, 66.
That means that " [t)h e typical du al- ea rn e r couple a t the e nd of the 1980s was sp e nding an additional day and [a] half on th e job every week." Id.
Most fam ilies did not gain economically from the increased e ffort, which came
la rgel y in the form of wives' time devoted to paid work. Indeed, most lost ground on
the measure of wage per ho ur of ma rket labor during that 20 year period. Families
with spouses without a college degree gain ed no more than 4% in real earnings from
the extra effort, even though they put in between 11 % an d 18 % more family ho urs of
paid work. See id. at 67 tbl. Thos e fa milies actua ll y experi e nce d b e tween a n 11%
and 18% decre ase in the "family" ho urly wage. See id. Only college educated couples, wh o worked 16.6% more hours during that period, saw a gain of 13.6 % in family
ilou!iy wage, a nd a 32.5% increase in total real earn in gs . See id ; see also Lawre nce
iA ishel , Jared Berns te in & John Schmitt, The State of Working Ame rica 1996-97, at
80-83 (1997) (noting wives' increasing contributi on to family inco me from 1970-1992);
7
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for women: It increases their security outside of marriage (i.e., af ter
divorce) and adds to their leverage within that relationship. T he
evidence indicates, howeve r, that the salutary effects of \Vome n 's
greater earning power are outweighed by other factors that impede
women 's ability to obtain a be tter deal within marriage. T he result,
paradoxically , may be tha t married women 's increased workforce
participation exacerbates the inequality in marital bargai ns.
\\/om en might bear th e bu rdens of both family life and breadwinning, while obtaining fewer of the benefits than were sometime s
fo rthcoming within more traditional relationships. M oreover, because women have genera lly served as children's princip al champions within marriage and have been their main source of at tention,
the increased burdens place d on working women due to their bargainin g weakness may we ll redound to children 's detriment. Finally , this Article suggests t hat the structural pe rsistence of rnarital
inequality despite progress in other arenas poses an increasingly
important threat to marriage as a social institution . A s women become more disillusioned with their position within marriage, increasing numbers are seeking to end their relationships and are
making fewer investments in them. This is also an unfortunate development for children and for society as a whole.

I. EGALITARIAN MARRIAGE: WHAT DOES
THE EVIDENCE TELL Us?

A. From Choices to Preferences
Any attempt to come up with a concept of equality within marriage must confront many of the same puzzles that plague attempts
to define social equality in general. The central dilemma can be
8
summarized: "equality of what?" For the purpose of assessing
marital equality, this Articl e employs a rational actor model an d
adopts a utility metric for measuring equality of welfare. 9 A lthough a utility-based concept might make some sense in t heory, it
is quite a different matter to detect deviations fro m the ide al in
id. at 93 (marshaling data to show that "in the 1980s famili e s work e d longer for less"
and that "husbands' earnings d eclines were offset by wives' increases in both hours
and earnings").
8 Am a rt ya Sen, Inequality R e ex a mined 1, 12 (1992); Ron a ld Dvvo rkin, Wh at is
Equalit y? (pts. 1-2), 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 185 , 283 (1981).
9
See infra Part II .
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practice . Accordi ng to economic theory, individual prefere nces
can only be inferre d by reasoning backward from what individuals
agree to do for a price or fro m the exchanges they are willing to acce pt. In the case of marri age, it is te mpting to explain away any
voluntary arrangements th at do not appe ar to comport with one
spouse's best interests with "fudge fact ors" of the necessary magnitude, such as altruism; interdependent utility functions; disparate
spousal preferences, tas tes , or skills; and other sources of intrinsic
"psychi c income." 10 T he same rationalizations are availabl e to expl ain ge neral patterns that are systematically sex-skewed. If
wom en usuall y specialize in housework and men in wagework, or if
women agree to move for the husband's job more often th an vice
versa , these patterns can be attribut ed to some combination of
economic and noneconomic satisfaction of each partner's selfinterest, where those elements are assumed to differ systematically
by sex in the population at large. What seems unequal can be rendered equal by positing hidden costs or benefits, or adjusting the
subjective value of the apparent terms of the exchange. The burden of proving inequality is on the observer. 11
10 See Thomas F. Co tte r, Lega l Pragmatism a nd the Law a nd Economics Moveme nt , 84 Geo. L.J. 207 1, 2118-19 (1996) (" [V]irtu ally any behavior-no matte r how
oste nsibly altruistic o r irration a l--can be vi ewe d as consiste nt with the mod el of rational utility maximi za tion."); J effrey L. Harri son, Piercin g Pare to Superio rity: Real
Peo pl e a nd the Ob liga tions of Lega l Theory , 39 Ariz. L. R ev. 1, 2 (1997) (noting that
"' psychi c income ,' o f which th ere is ev identl y a n unlimited supply " is needed to explain th ose ci rcum stances " in whi ch no rms a nd principles push people to do things
th a t see m to make no sense if se lf-i nte rest is the o nly goal"); Amartya K. Se n, Ration al Fools: A Critiqu e of the Behavioral Fo und a tions of Economics Th eo ry , 6 Phil.
& Pub. A ff. 317 , 335 -36 (1977) (obse rving th a t rational actor models th a t can be
ada pted to try to take into acco unt un sel fish mot ives and altruistic impulses r un the
risk of ex plainin g no thin g by exp la inin g all obse rved behavior as a manifes ta ti o n of
se lf-interes t).
11 Whil e economi sts have shi ed away from a nalyzing marital allocati o n both because of the theore ti cal and me th odo logical obs tacles and because of their dominant
interest in effici e ncy, sociologists ha ve not harbored similar rese rvations . In testing
th e assumption th a t marri age sho rt-changes women , researchers ha ve examined ,
a mong o th er thin gs , marital decisio nmaking; co ntrol over wealth, income, and finan ces; a nd priority a tt ached to each spouse 's job or career goa ls. See Robert 0 .
Blood, Jr. & Don a ld M. Wolfe, Husbands & Wiv es: The Dynamics of M arrie d Living (1960); see a lso Belinda Feh lb e rg, Sexua lly Transmitted Debt 77-85 (1997)
(rev iew ing the ex ten t of sharin g of a wi de vari e ty of resources a nd privil eges be tween
married co uples across cultures a nd findin g th a t " [i]nvariabl y, sociologi sts have conclud ed that wome n receive th e lesser share"); Mo nica Bie rn at & Camille B. Wortman, Sharing of Home Respon sibilities Between Professionally Employed Women
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B. The Work-Leisure Gap
The divorce literature suggests that one place to look for women
who are unequal within marriage might be the traditional roledivided relationship. Women who have invested in traditional domestic roles come away from divorce with far fewer resources than
their husbands, and they suffer a decline in economic well-being
12
and standard of living.
One might simply conclude that these
and Their Husbands, 60 J. Personality & Soc. Psycho!. 844 (1991) (noting the traditionally unequal distribution of childcarc responsibilities among professional couples
and wives' greater self-criticism of their own domestic performance); Philip Blumstein & Pepper Schwartz, Money and Ideology: Their Impact on Power and th e Division of Household Labor, in Gender, Family, and Economy: The Triple Overlap 261,
264-66 (Rae Lesser Blumberg ed., 1991) [hereinafter Gender, Family, and Economy]
(attempting to measure spouses' "decision-making power," "leadership power," and
"conciliation power," and to correlate these with spouses' market income); England,
supra note 5, at 24 (reporting on studies determining that husbands on balance more
often get their way); England & Kilbourne, supra note 5, at 165 (citing surveys concluding that husbands have more power than wives); Dair L. Gillespie, Who Has the
Power? The Marital Struggle, 33 J. Marriage & Fam. 445 (1971) (examining multiple
areas of marital decisionmaking and resolution of conflict); Gerald W. McDonald,
Family Power: The Assessment of a Decade of Theory and Research, 1970-79, 42 J.
Marriage & Fam. 841 (1980) (examining the sources of power in marital decisionmaking); Janice M. Steil & Karen Weltman, Marital Inequality: The Importance of
Resources, Personal Attributes, and Social Norms on Career Valuing and the Allocation of Domestic Responsibilities, 24 Sex Roles 161 (1991) (determining that men
overall have more say at home and less responsibility for children and the household). For a recent summary of studies relating to marital resource division, see
Janice M. Steil, Marital Equality: Its Relationship to the Well-Being of Husbands and
Wives 43-61 (1997).
Studies of financial arrangements among married couples suggest patterns of unequal control over spending, with men having greater unilateral discretion and decisionmaking power. For example, in one study in which most men were the primary,
although not the exclusive wage-earners, the majority of husbands had "an apparently unquestioned right to personal spending money," whereas wives rarely made
personal expenditures, and then not without consultation or consent. Carole B. Burgoyne, Money in Marriage: How Patterns of Allocation Both Reflect and Conceal
Power, 38 Soc. Rev. 634, 648 (1990). Another study of family finances reveals that
wives tend to be responsible for budgeting and spending only when "money is short
[and] managing and budgeting become chores rather than a source of power within
the household." Jan Pahl, The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality Within Marriage, 31 Soc. Rev. 237, 257 (1983). In both studies, the wife's marital
contribution did not generally translate into an equal control over spending or an
equal allocation of monetary resources to personal needs.
12 See Ellman, supra note 4, at 5.
See generally Lenore Weitzman, The Divorce
Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and
Children in America (1985) (examining the impact of economic decisions on spouses
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wives were getting less from marriage than their husbands because
when their marriages dissolve, they take away less. The postdivorce situation, however, does not necessarily imply an overall
inequality of welfare during the course of the marriage. The fac tor
of timing has to be t aken into account: T he conventional wife 's investm ents (i ntensive domestic and chi ldcare services) tend to be
made early in the relationship, with th e payoff (in economic secu13
rity provided by her husband) expected late. T he extrem e first
performer element of this type of relationship gives rise to the potenti al for opportuni stic de fe ction but does not necessarily show
that, in the absence of such defection, a traditional wife m a suer
cessru1
marnage gets Jess out orr tne marnage overa 11 .14
1

•

1

•

and children involved in a divorce). Although Weitzman's groundbre a king study has
come under a ttac k and he r data have bee n rean a lyzed, su bsequent studies support
her basic conclusion s. See G reg J. Duncan & Saul D. H offman, A Reconsideration of
the Economic Co nsequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 Demography 485, 489 tbl.2
(1985) (finding that wo men 's post-divorce inco me is 70 % of the ir pre-divorce incom e
while men 's post-divorce inco me is 93% of th e ir pre-divorce income ); Ross Finnie,
Women, Men , and th e Economic Co nsequ e nces of Divorce: Evidence from Canadian
Longitudinal Data, 30 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anthropology 205, 218 (1993) (finding that
women have post-divorce incomes that are 57% of their pre-divorce incomes while
men have post-divorce incomes th at are 82% of their pre-divorce incomes); Richard
R. Peterson, A Re-Evaluati o n of the Eco nomic Conseq uences of Divorce, 61 Am.
Soc. Rev. 528, 532 (1996) (finding that women 's standard of living fell 27% after divorce while men's standard of living increased 10 %).
13 See Co he n, supra note 4, at 287; Ellman, supra note 4, at 25-29; Trebilcock &
Keshvani, supra note 4, at 552-53.
"For a discussion of the first performer problem, see infra Section IV.C. An alternative way to see the traditional wife's greate r vulnerability after divorce as revealin g
so mething about her co mp ara tive we ll-being during marriage is to vi ew her as bearing a d isproportion ate risk of loss during the life of th e marriage. A tradition a l wife
lacks the quality and type of " in surance" against th e consequences of marital breakup
that her husban d typically e njoys. T his relative lack of insurance may detract from
her share of marital we ll-being. But the perception of imbalance in marital shares
that ste ms from fewer hedges against insecurity depends crucially on assumptions
about subjective prefere nces for ri sk and perceptions of probability of divorce, which
vary fr om person to person . Looking at th e ove rall risk of divorce will not do , be ca use husbands and wives may not (and probably do not) judge their own risk of divorce as equ iva lent to that o f the overall population. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert
E. Emery , W hen Eve ry Relation ship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Tim e of Marriage, 17 Law & Hum. Behav. 439, 443 (1993)
(indicating that 100 % of individua ls about to marry reject the likelihood of their own
divorce). Also, wome n may beli eve (not without justification) that their risk of divorce is at least partly within their own control so that they can take steps to reduce
or minimize their ow n risk. T he fact that many women may be wrong in their prospective assessme nt of thei r divorce risk suggests that many are in fact underinsured,
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In fact, the traditional marriage is probably the least likely to
provide persuasive evidence of marital inequality. The data on
marital use of time, for example , indicate that men and women in
traditional marriages, in which the division of labor is sharp, work
15
simil ar hours and enjoy roughly similar amounts of leisure time.
T his information provides li ttle basis for asserting that the spouses
in such relationships are not work ing equally hard on average, or
that they do not enjoy equiv alent well -being from the relationshi ps
overall. There is , of course , considerable individual variation from
couple to couple. But th e aggregate pattern makes it difficult ro
argue persuasively th at the division of labor in such families is sys··
tema tically unfair to one spo use, in the sense that one partner unceasingly gains at the expense of the other.
16
In contrast, the du al-earne r couple presents a more convincing
story of marital inequality. T here is good evidence of a systematic
difference in the total number of hours worked-in both the paid
and unpaid sectors- by each dual-earner spouse for the benefit of
the household unit. 17 The average wife in a dual-earner couple debut this is perhaps better conceptualize d as a form of market failure or information
deficit rather than as evidence of a lopsided allocation of marital well-being.
15 See Joseph H. Pleck, Working Wives!Working Husbands 30 tbl.2.1 (1985) (presenting
data showing that husband s and housewives do similar amounts of work) ; Maximiliane E . Szinovacz, Changing Family Roles and Inte ractions , in Women and the Fa mily: Two Decades of Chan ge 163, 175 (Beth B. Hess & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1984)
(sam e).
16 E mpirical studies of working spou ses have different criteria for inclusion o f
working couples into variou s ca tego ri es for purposes of comparison. See infra note
18. For the purposes of thi s Articl e , a "dual-earner couple" is rather arbitrarily defin ed as one in which each spouse wo rks for pay at least half-time (about 20 hours per
wee k or more). This cutoff is unlik e iy to leave out many couples in which both partners do some work for pay: Beca use of discontinuities in the labor market's demand
for part-time work (i.e., th e paucity of jobs requiring less th a n a half-time commitment), it is not unreaso nabl e to assume that most dual-earne r families consist o f
spouses working at least half-time. See Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, The
Economics of Women, Men , and Work 223 -24 (1986) (discussing problems with parttime e mployment opportunities); Rhona Mahony, Kidding Ourselves: Breadwinning,
Babies, and Bargaining Power 210-11 (1995) (discussing re asons why part-time e mpl oyment is rare); Spain & Bi anchi, supra note 7, at 84 fig.4.2, 88 tbl.4.4, 151 fig. 6.4,
152 tb1.6.4 (citing data indicatin g a steady increase in the number of employ ed
wom en, especially women empl oyed full-time); Maureen Perry-Jenkins & Karen
Folk, Class, Couples, and Conflict: E ffe cts of the Division of Labor on Assessme nts
of Marriage in Dual-Earn e r Fa mili es, 56 J. Marriage & Fam. 165 (1994) (reporting
th at th e majority of employe d wo men are employed full-tim e).
17 Work can be distin gui shed fro m leisure b y a " third-party " criterion, which defin es
';work " as the production of goods or services that could be provided by anoth er pe r-
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votes significantl y more time to work of one form or another
(domestic or wage work) than does her husband. T he diffe rence in
the number of hours spent working by members of du al-earner
couples has bee n dubbed by sociologists the "work-leisure gap. " 18
so n or econo mi c unit with o ut a ny ut ility loss to th e co nsume r of th ose goods a nd
se rvices. See Kath arine Sil baugh, T urni ng La bor into Love : Ho usewo rk a nd the Law,
91 Nw. U . L. Re v. 1, 11 ("A n acti vity is leisure ra ther th a n work if a perso n must do it
he rs elf to e nj oy it s be nefits." ). So "a pe rso n ca n eat a mea l a nd e nj oy its ben e fits
whe th e r she cooks it or whe th e r so meo ne e lse co o ks it fo r he r. A pe rso n ca nn o t e njo y th e be nefits o f rea ding a boo k unl ess she reads it he rse lf. T hu s coo king is wo rk ,
a nd read ing is le isure ." Id . It shoul d be app a re nt th a t some acti viti es (e .g., childca re)
mi x work with le isure in sup pl yin g bo th fun gible pro d uctive va lue a nd pe rform e rspecific co nsumpti o n value . See discuss io n of childcare, infra no te 117.
18
Th e re is a la rge body of e mpiri cal work tha t docume nts spouses' participation in
domes ti c la bor. Fo r som e of the most care ful findin gs in th e soc io logica l literature,
see Pl eck , supra no te 15. T he d ata cl e a rl y show tha t " wo me n pe rfo rm m o re hours o f
work th a n me n whe n paid a nd unpa id work is co mbin e d. " Silba ugh, supra no te 17, a t
12; see Sarah F e nstermak e r Be rk, T he Gend er Factory : T he Apportionm e nt of W ork
in Am e rica n H o use holds (1 985); Ma ri o n T o lbe rt Cole man, Th e Divisio n of Household La bor: Su ggestion s for Future E mpirica l Consid e ra tion and Theore tica l D e ve lopm e nt , in G e nder, Famil y, and Eco no my, supra no te 11 , at 245, 248-49; Sh ell e y
C overm a n, Expl aining Hu sb ands ' Pa rticipati o n in Domestic La bor, 26 Soc. Q. 81, 93
(1985) ; Myra Marx Ferree, T he G e nd e r Divisio n of La bor in T wo-Earn e r Marriages,
12 J . F a m. Issues 158, 158 (1 991 ); He idi I. H a rtmann, Th e F a mil y as the Locus o f
G end er, Class , a nd Politica l Struggle : Th e Exa mpl e of H o use work , 6 J. Women Culture & Soc'y 366, 379 (1981); Suza nn e Mode l, Hou se work by Husbands: Determinants a nd Implica ti o ns , in Two Paychecks: Li fe in Du a l-Earn e r Fa mili es 193 (Joa n
A ld ous e d ., 1982); Cathe rin e E . R oss, T he Di visio n o f La bor a t H o m e, 65 Soc. Forces
816, 830 (1987); Be th Ann e Shelto n, W ome n, Me n a nd T ime: Ge nder Diffe rences in
Paid Wo rk , Hou sework a nd Lei sure 112 (1992 ); J oa nn Van e k, Hou se ho ld W ork ,
Wage Work , and Sex ual Equalit y, in Wome n a nd H o use ho ld La bo r 275, 277 (Sara h
F e nste rm a ke r Be rk ed ., 1980) ; Sara Yogev, D o Professio nal Wome n H ave Egalita ria n Ma rital Rel a ti o nships? , 43 J. Ma rri age & Fa m. 865, 868 (1981 ).
The work-leisure gap va ri es wid e ly ( from a bo ut 7-30 ho urs pe r we ek) fro m study to
stud y, a nd depe nd s o n th e size and type o f p opul a ti o n exa min ed a nd th e me thods fo r
measurin g ho use hold responsibility. B ut th e gap is uniforml y observe d a nd always
favors th e husba nd. See Be rk, supra, a t 8 (me n do o nl y 15% o f housework); Pleck,
supra no te 15 , at 56 (wives spe nd 3 more ho urs per day o n "fa mil y work " ); Shelto n,
supra , a t 99 (15 ho urs pe r wee k o n ho use ho ld la bo r); Susa n M. Shaw , Ge nder a nd
Leisure: In equa lit y in th e D istributi on o f Leisure Tim e, 17 J . Leisure R es. 266, 274 (9
hours pe r week less leisure time for women ); Szinov acz, supra no te 15, a t 175 (3llz
hours pe r day) ; Yogev , supra, at 867 tbl.l (11 hours pe r wee k fo r wo me n with o ut
childre n a nd 30 ho urs pe r wee k fo r wome n with childre n). Most studies sho w th a t
men and wome n generally perform diffe rent typ es of tasks , with wome n do ing more
routin e, e veryday, " low-co ntrol" work that ca nnot be put off; me n tak e more spo radic, discre tion ary , or " hi gh-co ntro l" jo bs. See R osa lind C. Ba rn e tt & Ca ryl Rive rs,
She Works/H e Works: H ow Two-I nco me Fa mili es A re Ha ppie r, H e althi e r, and Be tte r-Off 179-82 (1996). In th e area of child ca re, wome n do more routin e physica l
work and care while me n do more play and educati o n. See Sco tt Coltra ne, Family
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Man 79 (1996). E ven whe n hu sbands· part icipat io n is re la ti ve ly hig h, women te nd to
re tain both co nt ro l over and respo nsibility for mak in g d o mestic d ecisio ns and in s urin g th a t ho use ho ld tasks are perfo rme d. See H e le n J. Mederer, Divi sio n of Labo r in
Two-Ea rn e r Homes: Task Accomplishme n t Ve rsus H o use ho ld Ma nage m e nt as C ri tica l Variab les in Percept io ns Abo ut Fam il y Work, 55 J. Marriage & Fam. 133 ( 1993).
Although the trend over th e past 25 years or so has been in th e direction of husbands·
ta kin g o n a gre ater sha re of domestic respo nsibility , thi s is large ly explained by are duction in the total numb e r of ho urs wo me n and familie s devote to children and domestic tasks rather than by an in crease in th e absolute a mo unt of time men devote to
th ese pursuits. See Fleck, su pra note 15, at 31; Shelton, s upra, a t 145 ; Silbaugh , supra
no te 17, at 9; see a lso Jo hn P . Rob in so n & Ge offrey Godbey, Time for Life: Th e Surpri sin g Ways Americans Use Their Time ( 1997) (a rg uin g th a t male a nd fem a le uses
of tim e a re co nve rgin g, but basing thi s co nclu sion o n data th at do no t foc us precise ly
o n mari ta l sta tus, e mplo yment of spouses o utside the ho me, or the presence of children).
There a re substantia l methodo logica l diffi culti es in ga th e ring housework data . See
J oa nn e Mill er & Howard H. Garriso n, Sex Roles: The Division of Labor at H o me
a nd in the Workplace, 8 Ann. Rev. Soc. 237, 239 (1982) , o n th e methodological difficulties with research. Fo r a rev iew of m ethodological techniqu es for data collecti o n
and th e ir problems, see Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 8 n.18 . Studies of household labor
have collected principally two types o f data: time budgets (a form of diary kept by th e
subject) and survey questionn a ires on the distribution of responsibility for variou s
house hold and childcare tasks. See Glenna Spitze, Women 's Employment and Family R e la tions: A Review , 50 J. Marriage & Fam. 595 ,600 (1 988) .
Some studies either includ e child care time or consid e r it se parately, while some exclude it altogether. A rev iew o f studi es of child-rearing practices revea ls that " fath ers
on ave rage are considerably less in vo lve d [with childre n] even when mothers are
working." Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. M nook in, Dividing the Child: Social
a nd Lega l Dilemmas of C ustody 26 ( 1992) (citing Micha e l E. Lamb et a!., A Biosocia l
Perspective on Paternal Behav io r a nd Involvem e nt , in Parenting Across th e
Lifespan-Biosocial Dim e nsio ns 111 (Jane B. Lancaster et a l. e els., 1987)).
Even when childcare tim e is excluded , employed wom e n spe nd considerably mo re
tim e o n domestic tasks than me n do, with time in housewo rk o utside of childcare correlated with number of childre n in th e household. See Shelton, supra, at 100 (each
ad ditio nal child costs women o n ave rage six more hours pe r wee k of housework , and
me n o ne more hour) . For exce ll e nt data on time in ho usework , as correlated wi th
pa id labor time , marital sta tu s, a nd number of childre n, showing that even women
e mpl oyed full-time (more than 40 ho urs per week) d o about twice as much housework as men, see id . at 63-88; see a lso id. at 96-99 (showing thro ugh regression an a lysis that gender is an ind epe nd e nt variable determinin g time spe nt doing housewo rk ,
eve n afte r controlling fo r numbe r of children , marital status , time in paid labor, e ducation, and occupational statu s, though earnings were no t included in the regressi o n
analysis). The gap carries thro ugh in the amount of tim e working men and wome n
spe nd caring for children. Eve n controlling for total hours o f pa id work and unpaid
ho usework (minus childcare), wom e n ha ve less leisure tim e than me n. See id. at 139.
Shelton attributes this gap to the extra tim e women spe nd o n childcare. Id.; see Berk,
supra, a t 7; Pleck, supra no te 15, a t 50-5 1; Biernat & Wortman , supra note 11 , at 855 58; Yogev, s upra, at 867 tbl.l.
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Although women on average engage in fewer hours of employment
and earn less than th eir husbands, ' ) many married wom en h ave
achieve d parity in num ber of hours and e arnings from market labor.2,; But th e '.;vork--leisure gap does not close significantly as
2
·,.vomen work more hours or earn m ore money. i Nor is it avoided
by women m any social cl ass. "= T hi s difference in the total work
1
In
" See Barnett & Rivers, supra note l 8. at 178: Vc.nek , su pra note 18, at 280.
1993 , a lmost half of moth ers with children Lmckr 17 worked iess th an fu ll-tim e, wi th
28% of wom en wi th children undr;r six wo rkin g full -time and ye a r round. See Spa in
& Bian chi, supra no te 7, at 147 .
"' Although wo men on average e arn less than th e ~r husbands , wor ki ng coupl es in
which the wife make s an equ al mo ne tary co ntr ib uti on are increasin gly common. In
1993, in a surv ey conducted by the Bureau o f Labor Sta ti stics, 48% of marri ed
•,vomen provided hal f or more o f the family iucom e, and fuli y 23% earned more than
their husband s. See Tamar Lewin, Women Are Becoming Equal Provid ers , N.Y.
T imes, May 11, 1995, at A27. Married wom en who worked full-time contributed an
av erage o f 41% of fa mily inco me. See id. Nine of ten women , whether employed or
not, said that care of people in their fa mili es was their respo nsibi lity. See id.
:' Studies o n thi s issue consi stently genera ted data showing th at women do most of
the do mestic work even whe n the wife 'NOrks for pay , and the ga p does not disappear
(although it narrows) wh en the wife ·s hou rs of pai d work and amount o f wage income
approach or equal that o f her husband. See G le nna Spitze, The Division of Task Responsibi lity in U.S. House hold s: Longitudinal A djustments to C hange, 64 Soc. Forces
689, 692-95 (reporting data from the Na ti o na l Lo ngitudinal S urveys of the Labor
Market Experiences of Young and Mature Women , compiled in the 1970s, showing
that "wo men who earn 20 to 40 percent of couple inco me have the same decrease in
tasks as those who earn ove r 40 pe rcent " ); see also Pleck, supra no te 15, at 55-57
(q uesti oning the empirica l re lationsh ip be twe en men's pai d work time and domes tic
work time) ; Shelton, supra note 18, at 107 (s how ing that time in domestic labor is not
signifi ca ntly re lated to the ratio of spo uses' ea rnings); Brines, Economic Dependency, supra note 5, at 682 ("[D]ependent husban ds do less ho usework the more they
depend o n their wives for inco me ."); Coverm a n, supra note 18, at 93 (surveying
stud ies that found that wives' e mplo yment status had no e ffect on hu sband s' domes tic
participation) ; Farkas, supra note 5, at 482 (finding that wag-=s were not a sa tisfactory
explanation of th e division of labor); Ferree, supra note 18, at 178-79 (noting th at a
one -to-one tradeoff of wages earned does no t expi::li n why women continue to do
most of the housework); Mary Clare Lennon & Sarah Rosenfield, Re lative Fairness
and the Division of Housework: The Importance of O ptions, 100 Am . J. Soc. 506,
511 -17 (1 994) (finding in a sample survey of 13,000 couples that , a lthough the women
in d ual-worker co uples earned an average of 43% of the family income, they perfo rmed an average of about 68% of the domestic work) ; Mode l, supra note 18, at 202
(finding only sli gh tly hi gher husban d part icipa tio n in co upl es with e qu al wages) ;
Ross, supra note 18, at 821 (reporting on studi es finding that "the ratio of husba nds'
[to wives '] ea rnin gs does not significantiy affect the household division of labor").
21
In fact, there is evidence that women with the most tim e-consuming and demandi ng jobs work the longest hour~; o vera ll. Because husband s' hours of domestic
labor appear consistently insensiti ve to wives' hours of work across the social spectrum, the hardest-working wo men tend to endure the largest work-leisure gap. Three
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time of spouses 1n dual-earner coup les gives nse to the notorious
"double day" or "second shift" for women wage-earners. 23 Thus,
the data indicate that in many homes th ere are periods when husbands are at leisure while wives work. The husband devotes the
time freed up by the wife 's efforts at home not to a form of prod uc-

stud ies show iopsided pattern s among professional coupi es . Do nna Hodgkins Berardo, Co nsta nce L. Sh c;han &. Ge rald Le slie, A Residu e of T r aditio n: J•:;bs, Caret:rs,
and Scouses' Tirne in Hou sework, ~~ 9 J. Marriage & f a m. 381 IJ987); Biernat &
Wortr;,an, su pra note 11; Re becca B. Bryson et aL, Th e ? rofessi·:::- ~ a l P~ir: Husband
and Wife Psyc hoiogists, 31 J. Am. Psycho i. 10 (1976).
D onna Hodgkins Berardo and co-authors de fine "d ua i-career' ' fa!Tlilies as those in
which " both spouses hav e high as pirations to achieve in the ">vori cl o f work " and ta ke
o n de manding professiona l or m anage ri a l jobs in which they are ca ll e d upon to perform tas ks that " a re high ly pro ductive or that carry great respo nsibility." Berardo,
Shehan & Leslie , supra, at 382. In non -career du al -worker fami li es, the jobs held by
th e spo uses te nd to be ro utin e, demand fixed hours of work, o r e ntail less ind ependen t responsibility. See J a ne C. Hood, Becoming a Two-Job Fam ily 183 (1 983)
(discussing the differe nces between '· 'dual-career" and " dual-worker" families, a nd
findin g that only about 10 % of dual-earner families fall into the forme r category).
Eq ua lity of earnings is more common among low-income, dual-worker families
than a mong high-income families: Women's percentage of to tal household earnings
generally increases as household income declines. See Spain & B ia nch i, supra note 7,
at 154 tbl.6. 5. Most couples with eq ua i earnings or job prestige are at the low-earni ng
end o f t he sca le. See Spitze, supra no te 21, at 695 ("[W]ives who are the primary
earner te nd to have low-earn ing h usba nd s ra ther th a n to be unusua !iy hi gh earners
themselves ." ); rv!ode !, supra no te 18 , a t 201-02 (finding that most equal-i ncome families we re in the low-income ra nge). No netheless, higher-e arn in g ("d ual-caree r")
wives spe nd somewhat kss tim e in domestic pursuits than lower-earn in g women who
work full-time ("dual-wo rke r" wives). Th a t pattern gen e r a ll y retlects dual-career
wiv es· spend ing less time in domestic work than others, not their husbands' spending
mo re. High-earning and well-educated wives still spend sign ificant ly more time doing
ho usework than their husbands. See Sh elton, supra note 18, at 70-72, 99 , 107 , 116.
Thus, "[t]he re is no evidence . .. that higher relative e arnings lead in creme ntall y to
higher levels of interpersonal power " as measured by the abi li ty to sh ift respo nsibilit y
for do mesti c labor to the male partner in the marriage . Spitze , supra note 21, at 695 .
R a the r, exis ting evi dence quite decisively indicates that wo me n rare ly succeed in
" buying their way o ut " of a n un eq ual share of domes ti c responsibility by increas ing.
th e ir work commitment o r earning power. See Berardo , Sh e han & Lesiie, supra, at
387; Biernat & Wortman, supra note 11, at 855-56; see a lso Yoge v, supra note 18, at
868 (finding that work we e ks of profess ional women with ch il d ren were 29.7 ho urs
lo nger than their husband s').
23 See Arlie Hochschild, T he Second Shift: Working Pa rents a nd t he Revoluti o n at
Home (1989); Shelton, supra note 18, at 108. Women with chi ldren experience the
greatest burden in the seco nd shift, since they perform the majmity of childcare and
housework, an d their housework burden increases with e ach a dditional child. See
She lto n, supra n ote 18, at 104.
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tion that benefits both parties ,21 but to leisure, a form of consumption that benefits mainly (if not solely) the consumer.
The work-leisure gap offers promise in the search for real-world
evidence of inequalities in the distribution of marital welfare. Leisure, or discretionary time, is one marital resource available for
distribution to individuals within the marital unit. Although leisure
may sometimes have productivity-en hancing side-effects, 25 it functions primarily as a pure consum ption good. As such, it carries
positive utility for the person who enjoys it. Individuals surely vary
in the degree to which they value leisure, but leisure is almost always considered valuable after a significant amount of p aid work,
which is the context in which the work-leisure gap among dualearner couples appears. 26 Moreover, leisure is not a public good.
Although couples can enjoy their leisure together (which can generate some extra joint utility in excess of each person's consumption value), each individual 's period of leisure is enjoyed separately
by that individual and can be enjoyed alone. 27 Because it is possible to exclude others from the enjoyment of one's discretionary
time, leisure can be unevenly distributed within families and
"hogged" by one or more family members. Furthermore, periods
of leisure can be measured and compared by applying an objective
metric (time). More leisure has greater value than less, although
the law of diminishing returns applies. 28 Finally, there is no reason
to believe that men's taste for leisure differs systematically from
women's. Although men and women might differ in their preferences for different types of work and individuals might differ in
their energy level and thus the intensity of their preferences for lei-

"See supra notes 18, 21, 22.
25 See infra note 186 for a discussion of the "rejuvenation" and "tlexibility" effects.
26
Most people derive some "consumption value" or intrinsic satisfaction from paid
work, with some-especially professionals with interesting or prestigious jobsenjoying a considerable amount. Th ese persons experience no sharp division between leisure and work because " free " time is often used for work-related activities.
See supra note 17. That pattern is almost certainly the exception rather than the rule
in the general population; the subjects in the work-leisure studies seemed to have little trouble distinguishing leisure time from work.
27
There may be a small vicarious component in the enjoyment of leisure, but, assuming equal love between the spouses, that component should be shared equally by
husbands and wives.
28
See infra note 188.
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sure, there is littl e evidence that either sex has a stronger desire for
leisure as such.
The existence of the work-leisure imbalance in dual-earner
families gives rise to two distinct questions. First, is the gap good
evidence of marital inequality? The gap certainly seems to suggest
sharp inequality, at least wi th respect to certain measurable components of intramarital effort an d reward. T he persistence of the
gap over the past seve ra l decades has prompted one prominent
scholar of family time use to com ment th at current arrangem ents
assign "the cost of increased economic benefits the whole family
enjoys thanks to the wife's employment to her alone." 29 Is th ere
reason to believe th at thi:::> scholar is correct-that women are
bearing more of the costs and enj oying fewer of the rewards of th e
family's collective efforts? Second, if the imbalance in the allocation of effort and reward within families is real, why does it occur
and why does it persist ? Vv'hy do women acquiesce in arrangements that entail absolute sacrifice for them compared to other
"deals" the family might adopt?
A number of stories can be told about the work-leisure gap that
are consistent with more or less equality between spouses and that
provide some explanation for women's voluntary acquiescence in
this arrangement. 3° For example, it is commonly supposed that the
wife will perform unpaid domestic services more efficiently-that
is, at least cost per unit of output. If that were the case, allocating
domestic responsibility mostly to the working wife might be Pareto-superior to a more eve n split, so long as the wife receives side-

J ose ph H. Pleck, Husba nds' Pa id Work and Family Ro les: C urre nt Research Iss ues,
in 3 Research in the Interweave of Soc ial Roles: Families a nd Jo bs 25 1, 284 (Hel e na
Z . Lopata & Joseph H . Pl eck eds., 1983). If the base lin e for comparison is the singl e
breadwinner famil y of 25 yea rs ago, th e evidence indi ca tes th a t the wife 's employme nt often does not iss ue in " in creased economic be ne fits" for th e family. See supra
not e 7 (explaining tha t mos t famili es ha ve not ga in ed rea l inco me through increased
ex tra hours of paid work , which have co me in the form of wiv es' paid employment).
Wome n 's " break even " contributi on to family earnin gs, however, must be offset by
th e cost of decreased tim e fo r do mestic work, whi ch mu st still be perform ed by
someone despite wome n's paid e mployment. Th e ev iden ce shows that it is wom e n
who a re bearing a disprop ort io na te amount of th e costs of maintaining house hold
services, with other family me mbe rs e njoying th e benefits of the maintenance o f
prior-or higher-incom e le ve ls thro ugh women's pa id e mpl oyme nt. For furth e r di scuss io n, see infra Section IY.A.2.
30 See infra Section IV .A .l.
29
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payments from the extra surplus her efforts generate that are large
enough both to cover her "extra " costs and to make her better off
than under an arrangement of more equal sharing of responsibility.31 But the bargaining model discussed in this Article shows that
this is not the only, nor indeed even the best , explanation for these
observed patterns. It is more likely that women go along with this
regime because they lack th e powe r to alter family life in their favor and to capture more of the gai ns of the ir efforts for themselves.
By this account, observed patterns are consistent wi th a marked
degree of inequality in th e welfare of members of intact fa milies.
II. A MODEL Of MARRI AGE : THE UNION O F
RATIONAL UT ILIT Y MAX IMIZE RS

A. The Generation and A llo cation of Resources in lvlarriage
Marriage can be modeled as a relationship between two people
that generates a series of inputs and outputs. The process of generating those elements is bound up with allocation of burdens and
rewards between mates and other family members. The model assumes that, in deciding how to allocate costs and benefits, household members behave as rational utility maximizers. They seek to
increase their own individual well-being or satisfaction-their
" psychic utility." 32

See infra Section IY.A.1 (discussion o f side-payme n ts) .
The concept of utility mak es use of a subje ct ive meas ure of overa ll well-being, in
which e ach party 's interests are de fin ed in terms o f psychological sta tes : " pleasure,
happin ess, desire, prefe ren ce sat isfacti o n, and th e lik e ." Al a n Wertheimer, E xploitati o n 207 (1 996) . On th e rational utility maximize r model, se e Cotte r, supra note 10,
at 2115 ; Harrison , supra note 10, a t 2; Jere my Wa ldron, C riticizing th e E conomic
An a lysis of Law, 99 Yal e L.J. 1441, 1441-42 ( 1990) (di stinguishing the " ration al
choice a pproach," which postulates " a type of human agent who seeks rationally to
maximize th e sa tisfaction of his own wants in a co ntex t where oth e rs are engaged in a
similar enterprise, against a finite stock of resources" from the "economic analysis of law''
which "seeks to characterize certain areas of law in te rms of the pursuit of efficiency " ).
Much of the a nalysis in this Article takes men 's and wo me n's prefe rences as exoge nous, or gi ve n. It also equ a tes welfa re o r well-be in g with th e maximization of utility ,
which in turn is understood as th e sati sfaction of " revealed prefere nces," while devoting little atte nti o n to th e large body o f research indi ca tin g th a t choice is subj ect to
cognitive distortion s th a t dev iate fr om ra ti ona lity. See, e .g., Judgm e nt U nd e r Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kahncm a n, Pa ul Slov ic & Amos Tvcrsky ed s.,
1982). T he concept of utility used here is quite capacio us, and can include the satisfaction
of second-order prefe rences such as the desi re to ad he re to moral ideal s and principles.
31

31
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Applying the principie of rational utility maximization to inchvi ctuals operating within the family, although a commonplace in the
economics literature, meets resistance from those who believe that
family life is not premised on self-regarding motives and that the
principles governing family and market are, or at least should be,
radically distinct. 33 But rational self-interest does not entail absolute selfishness: The model does not exclude altruism, love, or con34
cern for other familv members. It is not inconsistent with the oar"
'
tial de pendence of each spouse's individual well-being upon the
well-being of other fa mily members nor does it rule out a spouse 's
The adoption of a strcam!in ed model of rational cho ice is not meant to affirm its
validity. For exa mple, the analysis acknowledges that prefe rences bearing o n the
conduct of marriage appea r to interact with social conventions and expectati ons in
complex ways, see infra notes 161- 163 and accompanying text, but does not seck to
resolve th e question of whether those preferences are the product o f socia l experi ence or wheth er they are socially manipulable. The validity of the Article's main thesis-that women have less power to act o n their preferences than me n in marriage,
whatever th ose preferences may be and however th ey are formed-does not depend
critically on how welfare is defin ed or on whether preferences can be changed. Nor is
it undermined by taking a very broad vi ew of utility or "psychic income." See infra
note 35.
For further di sc uss ion , see Susan Moller Okin, Justice , Gender, and the Famil y 165
(1989) (sugges ting that the diffe rence be twee n men 's and women's remarriage prospects are "socially con structed " and hence malleabl e; Amartya K. Sen, Gend er and
Cooperative Co nflicts, in Persi stent Inequalities: Women and World Development
123, 148 (Irene Tinkered., 1990) (suggesting that women's greater invo lve ment in the
outsi de world may shape their ex pectati o ns of ho use hold divisions) ; L.W. Sumner,
Welfare, H appiness , and Ethics 66 ( 1996) (restating Sen's argument as the vi ew that
"[w]e lfare cannot consist in utility .. . beca use an individu a l's tastes, ambitions, a nd
aspirations are too malleable by processes of ind octrination , manipulation, and sociali zation"); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and th e Co nstituti o n, 84 Co lum.
L. Rev. 1689 (1984) (suggesting a preference-shaping function for law) ; Cass R Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 Co lum. L. Rev. 903 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms] (same); see a lso Heidi Li Fe ldman, H a rm and Money: Against
the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 1580-94 (1997)
(criticizing the notion that well-be ing or welfare is nothing more than subjectiv e , ex periential preference sa ti sfaction) ; Robe rt A. Poll ak, For Better or Worse: Th e Roles
of Power in Models of Distribution within Marriage, 84 Am. Econ . Rev. 148, 151
(1994) (discu ss ing prefe rences as endoge nous or exogenous to distribution a l bargaining mod els) .
33 See infra Section IV.B.l.d; infra note 228.
J.l Nor do es the concept of utility maximiza tion rule out pursuit of the full range of
nonmonetary and int angible goods that give marri age so much of its value. It a lso
allows consideration of th e various motives and sentiments that operate within the
marital sphere. See Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes 151 (1996) ("The interactions between husband s, wives, parents, and children are more likely to be motiva ted by
love, obligation, guilt, and a sense of duty than by self-interest narrowly interpreted .") .
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taki ng vicarious ple asure in the other's happiness or satisfaction. 35
But the model does assume less than perfect altruism and, hence, a
less than perfect coincidence between family members' interests.
Th is means that there will be conflict wi thin the relationship, not
necessaril y in the acti ve sense of harsh words and recrimination,
but in the sense that one spouse's well-be in g may sometimes come
at the other 's expense.36

;s Ano ther way to look at motiv ation within marri age is to posit that spouses a lwa ys
ac t o ut of se lf-interest, but th at se lf-interest is somc:t imes adva nced by the we ll-b eing
of the partner. because spo uses take vicarious rleasurc in th e others' satisfacti o n.
T ha t is, spo uses' utility fun cti o ns a re partiall y in te rdepe nde nt , a lthough th e degree of
int erd e pendence may vary wide ly a nd in co mplex ways, d e pe nding o n th e characte risti cs of the indi vidua ls a nd the d istribution of ma rita l surplus goods. See Cotte r, supra no te 10; Sen, supra no te 10.
" T hus , th e mode l rejects Gary Becker's construct o f th e "a ltruis tic head of ho useho ld ," which assumes away tradeoffs in well-bein g o f fa mil y me mbe rs by positing a
ho usehold leader who a uto ma ticall y tran sfers reso urces to othe r family me mbers to
induce th e m to maximize th e family's net utility. See Gary S. Becker, A Treatise o n
th e Family (1981) [h e rein after Becker, Treatise ]. In Becker's model, the fa mily acts
as a single decisionmak er, with the collective utility function e ffectively replacing th e
individual members' utility calculus as the dete rmin ants of be h a vior. See, e .g. , M a rilyn Ma nser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Ho use ho ld Decision-Making: A Barga ining Analysis, 21 Int ' l Eco n. R ev. 31, 31 (1980) (stating th a t a model such as
Becker's " assumes that th e two individuals who have formed, or are contemplating
forming a household , pool th e ir inco mes and max imize a neoclassical househ o ld utility function " ).
Becker 's " altrui stic hea d " has bee n ro undl y crit ici ze d in th e eco nomi cs lite ra ture
fo r failing to retl ect actua l fami ly dynamics, for pa pe rin g ove r real -life conflicts
a mong fa mily members, a nd for ignoring th e differe nces be twee n m e n's and women 's
fates within marriage. See Edward P. Lazear & Robe rt T. Michael, Allocation of Incom e within the Househ o ld 12 (1988) (noting that eco no mi c models that concentrate
on the family unit, not th e individual, divert atte nti o n away from the distributi onal
iss ues o f "what happe ns within th e family"); see also Ann Laq uer Estin , Love and
Ob li ga tion: Family Law a nd the Romance o f Eco no mi cs, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev .
989, 996 (1995 ) (noting th e te nd e ncy a mong e con o mi s t ~, in th e " abse nce of e mpirical
knowl edge about distributi o ns within the fa mil y," to " assume that a family 's reso urces are equally distributed a mon g its me mbe rs" ). See gene rall y Estin, supra
(explorin g the limits of eco no mic th eory as ap pli ed to fa mil y law); Beyond Economic
Ma n: Feminist Th eory a nd Economics (Mariann e A. Fe rb er & Julie A . Nelson eds.,
1993) (same); Marianne A. Ferbe r & Bonnie G. Birnb a um , The " New H o me Econo mics": Retrospects a nd Prospects, 4 J. Con sum e r Res. 19 (1977) (discussing proble ms with Becker's model of ho use hold economi cs); Lazear & Michael, supra, a t 1
("[F]rom casual and personal observation, on e kn ows th a t th e household does not
always distribute income or o ther reso urces eve nl y a mo ng its members .. .. Ye t th e
myth persists in economic mod e lin g of well-bein g a nd in ma ny social policy contexts
tha t once we kn ow th e leve l of resources ava ila b le to th e ho use hold , that is all we
need to know."). By sid es te pping ho use ho ld a ll oca ti o na l iss ues, Becker's mode l does
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B. Positive-Sum Marriage
A bedrock principle that can be derived from the rational selfinterest assumption is that couples will initially decide to marry
only whe n the marri age is a posit ive-sum or potentially Paretosuperior arrangemen t: Each spouse expects to be bet te r off married th an he or she would be single" or married to another available person. 38 M oreove r, each spouse m ust receive something over
and abo ve th e value of any positive in vestmen t that_the pe rson expends in maintaining the marriage-that is, each spo use in a viable
marriage must receive some form of compensation for his or her
contributi on to the relationship. Finally, couples stay married as long
as each partner is better off than he or she would be if divorced . ~
It foll ows that spouses will sti ck with a m arriag e on ly if it produces a marital surplus-in the form of potentially utility-enhancing
gains for each party-and only if each spouse receives som e share
of the surplus. 40 H ow much and what kind of marital surplus will
3

ha ve the virtu e o f avoiding the difficult co nce ptua l exe rcise of co mpa ring th e we llbe in g of fa mily membe rs, which h e lps acco unt fo r th e pa ucity o f a tte nti o n to a ll oca tio na l iss ues in the econo mics lite rature . See supra no tes 32-35 and accompa nying tex t.
37 See Becke r, supra no te 34, at 149 ("T he point of depa rture of my work on the
fa mily is th e assumpti o n th a t when me n a nd wom e n decid e to ma rry, o r hav e c hildren, or div o rce, they atte mpt to rai se th e ir welfare by co mparin g be ne fits and cos ts.
So they marr y when th ey expect to be bet te r off th a n if they re mai ned single, a nd
th ey divo rce if th a t is ex pected to in crease th e ir we lfa re."); Ga ry S. Becke r, A T heory
of Ma rri age (pt. 1) , 80 J. Po l. Eco n . 813, 8 14 ( 1972) ("(S]ince ma rriage is practica ll y
a lways volunta ry, ... th e th eory of prefere nces ca n be readily app li ed , a nd perso ns
marryin g . . . ca n be assum ed to exp ect to raise th e ir utility level a bove what it wo ul d
be were th e y to remain sin gle.") .
'" Since th e deci sion to ma rry ta kes pl ace o n a ma rriage ma rke t, peop le wi ll a lso
co nsider prospects fo r a lte rn a ti ve ma tches , including th e sea rch cos ts a nd di sco un ted
proba bil ity of making a comparable or superior marri age, in decidin g whe n and whet he r
to marry. See, e.g., G ary S. Becker, E lisabe th M. La ndes & R o be rt T. Mich ae l, A n
Economic A nalysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. Pol. Econ . 1141, 1147-52 (1977).
39 More specifically , each spo use 's willin gness to re ma in marri ed is co ntingent upo n
th e marriage's o fferin g mo re utility th a n th e a ltern a ti ves ava il a bl e upon givin g up the
re lationship , ne t of an y losses a nd tra nsacti o n cos ts occas io ned by di vorce.
In ord e r no t to compli ca te further a n alread y co mp li ca ted an alys is o f th e b as ic e leme nts of ma rita l bargaining, this Articl e la rgely igno res informati o n pro blems an d
informatio n costs, which fi gure promine ntl y in actual decisio ns to marry o r divorce, a nd
mu st be ta ke n in to acco unt in a ny trul y co mp le te a nalysis o f be hav ior in thi s a rea.
0
J Th e te rm " ma rita l surplu s" e ncom passes a ll utilit y-e nh ancin g e ffec ts that wo ul d
no t ex ist in the a bse nce of th e re lati o nship. See A ll a n M. Park ma n, No-Fau lt Di vo rce: W h a t W e nt Wr o ng? 27 (1 992) (" (T ]h e econo mi c anal ys is of the d ec isio n
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be produced? Decisions about the production side of marriage are
in extricably bound up with the consumption patterns of the unit.
Th at is because most marital deci sions have implications for the
distribution of both rewards and burdens to rnembers of the household. The payoffs that result from the division of th e marital assets
are determined by the allocation of productive responsibilities as
v:eil as by the assignment to family members of resources for conS'.nrption.41 Because inputs have costs, th e costs will be borne by
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th::;ugh some of the out puts available to the marriage (such as mar1-::et income generated during the life of ~ he re lati onship) are liquid
and easily divisible, outputs in the fo n n of unpaid a:nd in-kind
services are not so easily transfer able, but tend to redound to the
fixed benefit of the family members for ~w hom the services are performed. Thus, decisions concerning the specific contributions made
by real-life marital partners can carry important distributional con"...l..i.>,,....
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to marry focuses on the parties ' expectation that. __ marriage will expand the
'commodities' available to them compared with those available if they remained single."); see also Becker, Treatise, supra note 36, at 15-21 (discussing surplus generated
by specialization in the household). Marital partners invest reso urces in the form of
material and intangible asse ts (such as previously accumulated wealth and talent) and
productive labor at home and work. They reap gains in the form of increased utility
fro m public goods, "own" children, economies of scale , and a host of intan gible bene~
fi ts (such as love, emotional support, companionship, and vicarious pleasure in the
mher's well~being) that are available for enjoyment and consumption within the unit.
See Blau & Ferber, supra note 16, at 45~46 (discussing ad vantages of joint production
and consumption, including economies of scale, public goods, externalities-or interdependent utiiity functions-and economic benefits of fa mili es); Becker, su pra note
37, at 816 (noting that marriage produces marke t and nonmarket products, including
o;uch elemen ts as "the quality and quantity of chiidren , prestige, recreation, companionship, love, and health status"). Moreover, marriage appears to induce behavioral
changes (harder work, sobriety, savings and in vestment, risk- averse strategies) and
specialized activiti es and efforts that would not otherwise be expended. See Linda J.
Waite, Social Science Finds: "Marriage Matters," Responsive Co mmunity, Summer
1996, at 26. Finally, there is added utility from coord ination and cooperative effort in
activities of daily life.
";The " total utility" that a marriage can generate- th e sum of the utilities for the
partners-is not a fixed quantity, but is a function of the actions and decisions of the
par tn ers, which can vary over a wide range. So the size of the marital surp lus varies
with the decisions as to its distribution. See Yoram We iss , Th e Fo rmati on and Disso lution of Families: Why Marry? Who Marries Whom'~ And What Happe ns Upon
Marriage and Divorce? 15 (Aug. 1993) (unpublished man uscript, on file with the Virgin ia Law Review Association) ("In general, associated with each marriage, there is a
set of feasible actions. Each action yields an outcome which is the utility values
(payoffs) of the two partners.").
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seq uen ces fo r fam il y m embe rs , because t hey go a long way towards
12
de te rmining the all ocatio n of in -kind costs and be ne fi ts.'

C. vVhat Is Egalitarian Marriage ?
1. Urility as th e A1etric for Egalita rian lVIarriage
VV ithin the frarnework of th e ration al actor model , wh at counts
as an egali tari an m arri age? T he popul ar conception of an e gali tarian m arriage seem s to confor m most cl m ely to a partne <:"ship in
which the spouses pl ay quite sim il ar ro le s. ;' I would te rm this type
of role-sh aring relationship an "equalit aria n '' marri age (as opposed
,. .
\ B
.
+
. ,
,.
,
.
to em egan t anan o ne J.
u t a notiOn 01 mant a! cqual1ty tn at see.ks
more or less to m at ch roles and extern a lly observable contribu.tio ns
wit hout regard to talents, prefere nces, o r desi res , is too rigid-- an d
too narrow- to be usefu L If a couple " shares everything, " one
partner m ay stiil feel (quite sensibly) tha t he o r she is getting less

than a truly equal share. A more theoretically useful way to me asure input and output-and one that respects individual diffe rences

" 2 T he utility derived by a fa mily member from a produ ctive con tribution is the net
sum of th e se parabl e costs and be nefits to that person fro m engagin g in prod uction
an d consuming what is produced (which in cludes th e pl easure of prod ucing it) . For
example , if someon e prepares a mea l shared by everyon e in th e fa mily, the cook
bears th e costs of cook ing it alo ne whil e enjoyin g so me o f the ben e fits, wh ereas th e
oth ers enj oy the rewards of a good meal with out beari ng the costs . To be sure ,
costs and be ne fits ca n be rea rr anged so me what by mea ns o f "side-pay me nts" : th e
real location of oth er resources-i nci udi ng co nt rib uti o ns in kind an d money- to
''com pen sate" for a co ntributi o n. See infra notes 135-1 36 and acco mpan yi ng text
(no ting, among oth er things , th at the possibili ty fo r sid e-payments wiil be li mited by
practica l co nsid erati ons in many re latio nships) .
"-' O ne th in ks o f th e family in which the hu sban d an d wife make sim ilar in ve stmen ts
in their hum an mark et capital a nd in " marriage- spe cific capital": Both husba nd and
wife work at jobs of ro ughly similar status a nd de man ds , and bo th share in unpaid
work and respo nsibilit y at home in roughl y equ al measure. See H ood, supra no te 22,
at 9 (defining the egalitarian marriage as one in which th e " husband and wife share
ho use hold, income-producing, and decision-makin g ro les in rough ly e qual prop mtio ns"); Cynthi a Starn es, Di vorce and t he D isplaced Hom emak er: A Discou rse o n
Play in g with Dolls, Partnershi p B uyouts and Dissocia tion under No-Fa ul t, 60 U . Chi .
L Rev. 67, 126-27 (1993) (" In an egalitarian marriage, both spouses work full -tim e
and each pe rforms fifty perce nt of th e ho useh o ld chores and child care. ") ; see also
Lin da Haas, Role-Sharing Coup les: A Study of Ega litari an Marriages, 29 Fam. Re i.
289 (1980) (s tudyin g 31 role-sharing co upl es in Mad iso n, Wi sconsi n).
fo r a di scussion of a range of conceptions of marital equa lity , in part re fie ct in g
studie s of coup les ' own ide as of " e quality," see Steil , supra note 11 , at 59-71 .
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in utility functions for various assets and resources.w-makes use of
the concept of psychic utility, both negative and positive, that lies
at the heart of the rational actor model. The strength of this approach is that it is quite latitudinarian. It does not rule out the possibility that a quite even balance of psychic utility can prevail in
highly role -divided marriages-including those with a conventional
m ale breadwinner and female homemaker-as we ll as in relationships that conform more closely to the "equalitarian" model.
One problem with using utility as the currency for comparing
spouses' positions is that utility is difficult to compare intersubjectively, especially in situations, such as marriage, in which utility
funct ions can be expected to diverge. 45 It is possible to avoid
""See Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 223 ("Given differently shaped utility functions
for different goods, the utility derived from transactions will vary considerably .... ").
"'See supra note 10. The welfare of family members-either absolute or relativecannot be known without calculating utilities, but utilities are functions of preferences, and preferences are revealed only through "voluntary" choices. But choices
only tell us whether a person believes that his or her welfare will be improved by the
transition from one state to another among a limited range of options, and not
whether her welfare compares favorably or unfavorably with another person's. Put
another way, the fact that two people engage in an exchange that makes both better
off tells us nothing about whether one is better off than the other. See Lazear & Michael, supra note 36, at 5 ("The value to the recipient of a transfer may not be the
same as its value to the giver."); see also Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 79 (1981) ("The 'interpersonal comparison of utilities' is anathema to the modern
economist, and rightly so, because there is no metric for making such a comparison."); Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 222 (discussing the incommensurability of welfare); Harrison, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing the methodological limitations on interpersonal comparisons of utility); Sen, supra note 10, at 133, 14 7 (discussing
interpersonal comparisons); Waldron, supra note 32, at 1456-57 (distinguishing between two objections to interpersonal comparisons of utility: "ontological"-which
relates to the difficulty of finding a conceptual basis for expressing the difference between one person's well-being and another's-and "epistemic"-which concerns the
problem of being "sure that we have chosen the right convention of comparability"
and determining how "such a standard [is] to be applied in practice"). But see Robert A. Pollak, Welfare Comparisons and Situation Comparisons, 50 J. Econometrics
31 (1991) (suggesting that interpersonal utility comparisons are not incoherent and
are a useful construct in some areas of welfare economics).
Marriage presents perhaps the most difficult case for interpersonal utility comparisons. The economic aspect of marital exchange is only one facet of a relationship
with considerable noneconomic or intangible elements. Also, much of what family
members "consume" or enjoy consists of public goods or of goods and services (both
market and nonmarket) that generate consumption value for the producer. Family
members also experience considerable "vicarious" utility from other members' wellbeing. These factors contribute to the difficulty of measuring and comparing the efforts and rewards of each partner to the marital exchange. See Lazear & Michael,

1998]

Ega litarian Marriage

533

some-although not all-of the awkwardness of comparing utilities
by introducing a normalized concept that does not directly require
comparisons between persons: the utility each person would enjoy
within a rela tionship relative to the maximum potential welfare
avail able if all marital resources were allocated, and arrangements
made, according to that partner's wishes. T he benchmark notion
of maxi mum potential welfare or utility would correspond roughly
to th e idea of each person consistently "getting his or her way"
within the relati ons hip. The concept of "percentage relative utility " can be defined as the ratio of each spouse's actual utility relative to that person's maximum potential utili ty. Each person's percentage relative utility can then be compared without wor:rymg
about differing utility functions.

2. Rival Conceptions of Marital Equality
Assuming that utility is the basic metric, and making use when
appropriate of the concept of percentage relative utility to ease the
problem of interpersonal comparisons, is it possible to describe
marital arrangements that comport with an intuitive notion of what
an egalitarian marital relationship would look like? Some alternative conceptions follow.

a. A "Substantive " Concept of Equal Division of the Marital
Surplus
Each person's costs or inputs, measured as negative utility, are
return ed to him or her out of resources available to the marriage.
Beyond that, resources (tangible and intangible) are divided so that
each spouse achieves an equal net share of utility relative to that
person's maximal utility. T hat is, each spouse enjoys an equal percentage rel ative utility. 46
supra note 36, a t 19-21 (noting difficulties in measur ing intrafamily distributi on of income and resources).
6
" If th ere is a simple one-for-one tradeoff, or linear rel at ionship, then the egalitarian point will li e where each person receives half of his or he r personal max imum
possible utility- which corresponds to a 50 percent share of maximal utility for each.
Where the rel a tionship is not strictly linear-where, as in most viabl e marriages,
th e re are public goods for sharing, or where the spo uses ex perience vicarious utility
due to al truism or caring-each spouse can simultaneously satisfy a greater percentage of his or her desires consistent with th e o ther spo use receiving a similar
" normalized " a mount of utility . The greater the vicarious component (the more love
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b. A "Procedural" Co ncept of Equality
The metri c here is the input/payoff deal that would be negotiated if two people started from a hypoth etical initial position of
equal premarital baseline utility and identical negotiating skills, 47
with equal, and infe rior, outside alternatives available to each
(either no marriage at all, or an equal probability of an equally inferior altern ative marriage for each). Unde r those conditions, it is
not unreasonable to assume that the couple would agree to mak e
equal contributions or efforts on behalf of the marriage (as measured in th eir own negative subj ective utility) an d to take equal
shares of th e output rel ative to each person 's "best deal''-which
once again amo unts to equal percentage sh ares. Eve n if the
spouses agreed to unequa l inputs, they might still agree to an equal
split once costs are covered (i.e., after costs are compensated to
each contributor) which is equivalent to arrangement (a). 48

and sharin g), the happier each person can be, and the more each wi ll ge t of what he
or she wants. T he hi gher will be each pe rson's percentage re la tive utility consistent
with sa tisfyin g the egalitarian condition.
The definiti on of an ega litarian relation ship advanced here is similar to th at proposed by H. Peyton Young in his recent book, in which he d efines an ega litarian bargain as one in which th ere is an "allocati on of divisible property [such tha t] every
claiman t is in diffe re nt between his portion and th e same fraction of the entire property. " H. Peyton Young, Eq uity: In Theory a nd Practice 148 (1994). Since th e va lu e
of resources in our definition has already been translated into the metric of subjective
utility , an ega litarian bargain wou ld be one in which each person has gain ed the
"same fracti on" of the entire amo unt of utility available to him within the relation ship. T hi s wou ld appear to satisfy Young's indifference principle. This definition
also bears some resemblance to David Ga uthier's " minim ax rel a ti ve concess ion"
principle, which also seeks to equa lize th e gai ns of persons engaging in a bargaini ng
re lationship relative to the most favo rable o utcome availabl e to each. Dav id Gau th ier , Morals by Agreemen t 136-56 (1986).
7
" See infra notes 145-151 and accompanyin g text.
-IS For why the ideal rational co uple could be predicted to agree to a n equal split
once cos ts are covered , see infra notes 140-143 and accompanying tex t; see also
Douglas G. Baird, Robe rt H. Gertner & Ra nd al C. Picker, Ga me Theory and the
Law 224 (1994) (sugge sting that bargainers will spl it profits eq ually abse nt complicating factors) .
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c. An "Equal Gain" Concept of Equality

Each spouse gains the same utility (as a percentage of the maxi mum net utility) over premarital (i.e., unmarried) baseline utilities,
49
whe re that baseline might be equal or unequal.
'vVhich of these rival suggestions-which may 'Nell fail to exhaust
the possible list-best comports with our idea of egalitarian marriage? There is no need to make a definiti ve choice am ong the
suggeste d options, because the major conclusions of this Art icle
appiy to all : By whatever measure we select, most marriages are
ine ga litarian.
This conclusion derives from applying bargaining theory principles to egalitarian conceptions of marriage as outlined above . T he
egalitarian models gauge marital equality on the basis of each
spouse's utility inputs and outputs within a closed and private
world of marital relations. They attempt to capture an ideal of
reciprocity in which spouses match (subjective) effort with effort
and (subjective) reward with reward. But bargaining theory
teaches that the allocation of marital contribution and benefit will
often deviate from equality as we define it. D istributions will be
influenced in large part by factors other than and external to those
that inform our intuitive concept of an egalitarian relationship,
which looks to the value spouses give to and take from one another.
vVhat are the factors that determine allocation and why do they
matter? One is markets, which cast a shadow in which couples live
and interact. This Article shows how markets for work and markets for mates put pressure on spouses to deviate from egalitarian
conditions within marriage. The other key element is the deep
structure of marriage. As explained below, marriage can be viewed
as a bilateral and monopolistic bargaining game in which parties
are relegated to self-help for the enforcement of any agreements
within the ongoing relationship. External markets interact with
that structure to constrain the deals struck by spouses with different preferences, tastes, and desires. Those constraints operate to
undermine marital equality.
To illuminate these points, this Article adopts concept (a) above
as a working definition of an egalitarian marriage. 50 Although this

'

9

See infra Section JI.D.3.a (discussing baseline premarital well-being).
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definition has its flaws ,5 ' it neverth eless provides a useful basis for
unpacking, identifying, and examining the host of forces that cause
intramarital arrangements to deviate from the chosen, egalitarian
baseline in directions that favor men or women, and what the social
consequences of th e devi ati ons might be.
In applyin g th e working definition, this Article will also adopt,
for the purpose of exposition, the simplifying assumption that the
utility inputs expended prior to marri age by th e spouses to generate their initi al contributi ons to marri ed life are roughly similar, at
least at the point of entering the rel ationship.52 Although that assumption will obviously not apply to some real marriages (in that,
for exa mpl e , one person may have put more "psychic" effort into
self-development or into the accumulation of assets brought to the
marriage than the othe r) , it is probably a safe one for th e great
majority of middle-class marriages in which personal, financi al, and
educational endowments more or less match at the outset. 53 Thus,
the paradigmatic marriage is the marriage of persons who are
roughly equally-and also moderately-endowed in attractiveness,
education, wealth, property, and other resources and attributes that

This concept-e qual perce ntage shares ne t of effort expended-allows for transiently lopsided ga ins and inves tments. Tra nsie nt imbal a nces often represe nt the
most efficient strategy and should no t be consid e re d inegalita rian as long as th e allocations balance o ut during th e life o f the relatio nship , whatever its duration .
51 The mod e l is overly simple beca use it fa il s to take account of the fact that each
spouse's well-being is a functi on of changes in marginal utility that res ult fr om particul a r allocational shifts. But th e marginal utility gains or losse s from a particular
alloca tional choi ce ca nnot be considered in iso lat ion. Rath e r, utility effects are contextual and path depe ndent. The value of marita l decisions for each spouse depends
on the way things currently are, which in turn depe nds on prior decision s. For exampl e, the effect on each partn e r of th e birth of a child dep end s o n the pre se nce of other
childre n and how their care has been arranged.
52 As noted, compensation to each spouse for his or her effort expende d on behalf
of th e union is tak e n into acco unt in defining ega litarian marriage. Th e eq ua lity-ofinputs assumption mea ns that, as a practical ma tter, spouses have expe nded roughly
equal premarital effort (generating equal nega tive utility) in accumulating assets or
cultivating end owme nts that a re put to work to create valu e within the marriage.
Those elements would include, for e xample, effo rts expend ed on developing earning
powe r through educa tion or on accumulating ta ngible assets a nd property. See infra
Section IV.B.2 (discussing probl e ms that arise from the calcul a tion of inputs and outputs to marriage , and the puzzle of how to treat " pre marita l en dowments").
53 This is especia ll y true rece ntly , due to th e ri se of educational assortative mating.
See infra note 286.
50
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are import ant within marriage . Our mod e l is J ane and Jim-the
secretary marri ed to the telepho ne linem an, the nurse married to
th e middl e man ager, or the computer repairm an m arried to the
college-educated housewife . How will these couples work out their
marit al relation s?
D. Ma rriage as a Bargaining Carne

T he idea that marriage can be modeled as a bargaining game is
not new. Scholars from various fields ha ve recognized th at game
the ory potentially provides an intellectuall y satisfyin g fram ework
for address ing th e problems of allocation with in marriage, althou gh
non e have und e rtak en a sustained and syste m atic an alysis of the
implications of the model for various aspects of domestic life, law,
or public policy. 55 In addition, economists have created a number
of theoretical and quantitative models of marit al or familial relations as a form of bargaining game. 56 Those mod els provide the basic framework for the discussion here.
This would appear to be a dubious assumption , given th e sa lience in the popula r
imagi nation o f th e we ll-h eeled, powerful older man ma rryin g the toothsome younger
wom a n of mo re modest means . But ma rriages in this mod e are almost certainly a
small minority of a ll unions in the population as a whole. Leav ing aside th e far right
tail of th e curve, where very wealthy or high status marri ageabl e men are to be
found , the differences in reso urces, attributes, a nd inves tments as be tween the sexes
at the time of the typ ical marriage a re probably not pronounced. There is, however,
one ca veat: A pote ntial source of a small but pe rhaps no t insignifica nt diffe re ntial in
e nd owments in th e popul a ti o n as a whol e is th e age gap between hu sba nds and wiv es.
The fact th a t o ld e r persons tend to be b e tter educa te d a nd to have accumulated mo re
mark e t and other types of capital may give husba nds a slight edge. Se e infra no te 104.
55
T he most sustai ned effort to take the mod e l seriously as ap pli ed to ma rriage is
Rh o na Mah o ny's pop ul a r book. Mahony, supra note 16. A few lega l scholars have
also brought game-theoretic insights to bear o n som e aspects of family relations.
Most not ably , see Caro l M. R ose, W o men and Pro pe rty: Gainin g and Losin g
Ground, 78 Ya. L. Rev . 421 (1 992); Margaret F. Brini g & Steven M. Crafto n, Marriage a nd Opportunism, 23 J. Legal Stud. 869 (1994); June Ca rbon e & Margaret F.
Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Id eology, Economic C ha nge, a nd Divorce R eform , 65 Tul. L. Rev. 953 (1991); Cohe n, supra note 4; Gilli a n K. Hadfield , Household s at W o rk: Beyo nd Labor Ma rket Policies to Rem ed y th e Gender Gap, 82 G eo.
L.J . 89 (1993). Commenta tors in o ther disciplin es have also mad e so me use of bargaining principles in the context of broade r discussion s of family and gend e r issu es.
Se e, e.g., Okin, supra note 32; Bergmann, supra note 7, a t 266-74; England & Farkas,
supra note 5, at 53-54; J . Richard Udry, Marital Alternatives an d Marital Disrupti o n,
43 J. Marri age & Fam. 889 (1981 ).
56 See, e.g., Theodore C. Bergstrom, Eco nomics in a Fa mil y Way , 34 J . Eco n. Lite rature 1903 (1996); PaulS. Carlin , Intra-Family Bargaining and Time Allocation, 7 R es.
).1
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1. The Exclusivity and Pooling Conditions: Marriage as
Bilateral Monopoly
T he bargaining model views a marital relationship as a bilateral
monopoly that defines an arena of exclusive contribution as well as
exclusive dealing. vVit h respect to contribution and reward , it is
necessary to define what the spouses bargain over. This Article assumes a "worldly goods" 57 or " pooling" condition under whi ch each
partner brings into the relationship, and places on the table for
bargaining, everything each possesses at the time of marriage an d
eve rything generated through that person's presence or effo rts
during the life of the marriage. Nothing of value is initially he ld
back or earmarked for exclusive use. 58 T he parties' contri butions
Population Econ. 215 (1991): Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and
Distribution in Marriage, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1996, at 139 [hereinafter Lundberg &
Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution]; Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Poll a k, Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 132 (1994) [hereinafter
Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models]; Shelly Lundberg & Robert
A. Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. Pol. Econ.
988 (1993) [hereinafter Lundberg & Pollak, Separate Spheres]; Manser & Brown, supra note 36; Marjorie B. McElroy, The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained
H ouse ho ld Behavior, 25 J. Hum. Resources 559 (1990); Marjorie B. McElroy & Mary
Jean Horney, Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the
Theory of Demand, 22 Int'l. Econ. Rev. 333 (1981); Robert A. Pollak, A Transaction
Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23 J. Econ. Literature 581 (1985);
Sharon C. Rochford, Symmetrically Pairwise-Bargained Allocations in an Assignment Market, 34 J. Econ. Theory 262 (1984); Sen, supra note 32, at 134-40.
57 The "nothing held back" idea is neatly captured in this phrase, which appears in
the Church of England marriage vows: "With this ring I thee wed, with my body I
thee worship, and with all my worldly goods I thee endow .... " Book of Common
Prayer (1886).
58
Although strong conventions ordinarily create the expectation that members of a
couple will throw all preexisting assets in the marital pot and make available all premarital as well as intramarital fruits of each partner's efforts for potential allocation
within the family unit, this initial "pooling" or "worldly goods" condition does not
always obtain in every marriage. For example, wealthy persons may sequester or
otherwise set aside assets or wealth in a manner that makes those resources effectively unavailable to the other spouse and thus takes them permanently out of the
pool of marital resources available for bargaining and allocation. For simplicity,
however, this discussion adopts the pooling condition as a normative baseline.
The pooling condition should not be confused with household members' enjoying
any particular share of resources including resources the other partner brings in. As
discussed below, the share that each household member actually enjoys is the product
of the outcome of a bargaining process that may allocate marital value in ways that
increase welfare quite unevenly. For example, there is good evidence that men,
women, and children do not always share equally in the wages that a breadwinner
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include vario us resources and e ndowments th at would exist regardl ess of the marriage (s uch as monetary income or m ech anical
ability)' 9 as weli as elements that are generated by virtue of the relationship. T he latter elements comprise th e marital surp lus. Each
spouse's in come, for exam ple, is not surplus to the partner who
earns it. But maritai surplus can be ge nerated when each spouse
enjoys public goods purchased with the other's income. or provides
se rvices or em otional sati sfaction in exchange fo r a share of the
60
other~s income.
T hese resources, and the costs of generating them, must be allocated among spouses during the life of the marriage. 61 T he co uple
bargains over an array of choices concerning the bala nce of costs
and payoffs for each spouse, deciding together who will make particul ar kinds of effort and who \vi ll enjoy certain rewards. The size
and composition of the pool, and the payoffs to each spouse, are
obviously not fixed, but depend on each partner's individu al and

brings into th e house hold , a nd that sharing patte rns vary am o ng coupl es. See, e.g.,
Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 44 & n.l62; see also supra note 11 (citing findings by Pahl
and Burgoyne that a wife's control over spending and allocation of mon etary reso urces to p erso nal needs is not dictated by her marital contribution).
59
Ta ngibl e resources are not all that spouses may contribute to the rel ationship.
They may also bring along such (initially) intangible asse ts as th eir d e ve loped human
ca pi ta l, ea rning powe r, fin a ncial acume n, capacity to love, tal e nt for childrearing,
fa mil y conn ections, ex tend ed family 's security a nd conviviality, b ea uty, a nd win so men ess. T hose personal attributes or ab ilities are th e n put to work within the rel ationship to ge ne ra te more va lu e, which includes but is not limited to " ma rital surplus"
(which comprises the enhanced value th a t exists solely by virtue of the marriage) .
T hose resources are then available fo r rea llocation among famil y me mbers. For further di scussio n of initi al attributes of e nd owments, see infra Sectio n IY.B.2.
wIt should be appa rent that th e total "marital pool" as defin ed here is large r than
the marital surplus, since th e pool ex ists prior to any compensation for costs a nd includ es some ele me nts that partners would ge nerate or enjoy whether they were ma rried or not. Marital assets in the pool are available for surplus-generating inv estment
(such as, for ex ample, investing in a family business or in profess ion a l activiti es), for
the creation of common goods, or for direct redistribution amon g famil y membe rs.
61 A llocati ons are assumed to be mad e between married couples.
The in terests o f
othe r famil y me mbers (most importantly, children) are ass umed to be represente d by
their parents within this mode l (although that representa tion is not perfect, si nce th e
ov erl ap between pa re nts' a nd childre n's interests-as with th e interests of spousesis not com pl e te). In economic mode ling of the famil y, children are ofte n see n as
adding to the marital surplu s: Th ey ge nerate valu e as a "produ ctive" ou tput or, alte rna tively, add to the "consumption " value of the ir parents. See Becker, Treati se, supra note 36, at 7-8.
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coordinated choices and ac tions. ~ There may be many different
ways to arrange a family 's affairs to effect a division-including an
egalitarian divi sion-with only some being the most efficient (i.e. ,
generating the greatest possible total utility for all). In effect , there
is always the possibility of expanding or contracting the pool of total resources ava ilable for distribution.
T he marital bargainin g process covers all sorts of issues and
choices that extend we ll beyond the balance of productive effort
and leisure, and the couple's use of time. Decisions relating to
where to live; where and how much to work; what to buy; how
much to spend, save, or invest; th e priority given to the husband's
and wife's careers; the conduct of sexual rel ations; the choice of
fri ends; interactions wit h extended family ; disciplining chil dren ;
and myriad oth er matters are up for grabs within a relationship and
are resolved on a daily basis in a continuous process of adjustment
and readjustment , negotiation and compromise. 63 The resolution of
those issues determines both the scope and composition of the
marital pool and the marital surplus, as well as the well-being of
each spouse.
The marital bargain also includes an exclusivity condition: Partners agree to go only to one another for certain types of resources
and services. For the life of the marriage, certain "market" opportunities will necessarily be forsaken. The couple must decide on an
allocation of most marital resources without direct recourse to a
market pricing mechanism. These exchanges take place "offmarket" ; there is one buyer and one seller for a host of services and
commodities. In deciding, for example, who shall get to take the
children to the grocery store on Saturday and who shall play golf,
o: For example, one partner may, through unil a te;al action-such as sexual infidelity-dramatically decrease th e size of the marital surplus by simultaneously d estroying marital capital and depriving the other spouse of much of the value of the marriage. See infra Section IV .A.3 (discussing sexual and fidelity issues).
63 See Ira Mark Ellman , Should The Theory of Alimony Include Nonfinancial
Losses and Motivations?, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 259, 292-302 (giving examples of complex marital compromises and " exchanges "); Carl E. Schneid er, Rethinking Alimony:
Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 197, 207, 211-13 (same).
Caution is also in order because th e marital balance has a significant temporal compon ent, which makes it difficult to keep accounts by taking a snapshot of some finite
period. As suggested, see supra no tes 12-14 and accompanying text, the relationship
must be assessed over its e ntire duration before it can be sa id with confidence that
th ere is a shortfall for one spouse or the other.
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partne rs do not ordin ari ly go o ut on th e gen eral or "spot" market
and suggest "'purch ase prices" to strangers to procure famil y services. 6~ Ra ther , the un derstanding is that the tasks and rewards will
be allocated within the fa mily circle. In such circumstances, " price
determin ation [is] ill -described by standard economic the ory." 65
E ac h person must bargain with the other to decide who gets what.
Finally, the en for cement of such a bargain is left to the parties.
Courts will not e nforce agreements between spouses intramaritally ,66 so t here is no sta nd ing legal mechanism for remedyi ng a
breach of such an agreeme nt so long as the partnership remains a
going concern. Ra th er, re course is had only to inform al enforcement mechanisms, such as reta liation or other form s of self-help,
which are largely-al though not exclusivell 7- confi ned within the
family unit.
2. Marriage as a Sp lit-the-Pie Game

U nde r the rational choice paradigm, a couple marries if marriage offers a Pareto-superior result: Both parties must be no worse
off by virtue of the uni on . But "embedded in all institutional arrangements that provide the opportunity for mutual gain is a bargaining game over relative shares." 68 The allocational possibilities
that characterize marriage can be modeled as a two-person bargaining game of "split-t he-pie." The key to the game is that a failure to settle on a mutu ally agreeable allocation will result in a re duction in welfare (a reduced payoff) for each bargainer. Without

wAs noted, see in fra notes 129 & 188, some families have recourse to th e "cash soluti o n" (that is, hirin g house ho ld help) for a po rtion of fa mily se rvices, but those
fami lies are q uite unu sual. There are ma ny key marital functions fo r which no marke t substitute can be fo und or where such a substitution (e .g., sexual serv ices) would
defy the core cond iti o ns of th e re lationship or be inimical to it.
65 Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 227 (1989).
66 See Saul Levmore, Love It o r Leave It: Property Rules , Liability Rules , a nd Exclusivity of Remedi es in Partn ership and Marriage , 58 Law & Conte mp. Probs. 221 ,
225 (1995) ; Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 29 (discussing the legal taboo against intrama rital enforce me nt of antenuptia l agreements); see also Cha rl es J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, Principl es of Relati o nal Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981) (di scussing
relational contracts ge nerally).
67
Social disapprova l a nd othe r inform al sanctions may p lay some, a lbeit a now diminishing, role. Fo r a discuss ion of info rmal socia l norms, see infra Secti o ns V.C,
V. F.
1>8 Jules L. Co lema n, Mark ets, Morals a nd the Law 272 (1988).
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agreeme nt , bot h part ners lose . T his risk creates an incenti ve to
come to a mutually satisfying agr,::e ment \Vithin th e relationship ."')
The condit ion that both partners must gain by agreement establishes the central const rain t for a fe asibl e bargain: T h e possible set
of rational allocations 1:vit hin the barg aining relatio nshi p is limi ted
by the alternat ives availab le to each participant in the bargainedfor agre ement. Although proposed gc:u-ne -theoretic b argaining mod els of m arriage differ in some parti culars , they sh are the fe ature
th at the bargain struck will be ~; orne fu nction of th e consequ ences
70
for each party of failing to reach &.gre eme nt.
T he a lte rn atives
await ing the p arti es in th e a bse nce of a bargained -for agreement
are vario usly knovv·n in game th eDry parlance as t he "fallback a l71
ternative ," "thre at point," " threat ad vantage ," "next best al terna73
72
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best alternative is det e rmined by the situation each par ty confronts
in the abse nce of a negotiated agree m ent, a nd ca n include the o ption of forg oing any tr ansactio n at all or of transacting with anothe r
party. T h e value of each party's "threat point" (as determined by
the n ext b est alternative ) teflects the potential value o f an agreement for each p arty, which in turn det ermines each p arty 's
" reservation p rice ." T h a t price is equal to "the minimum thre shold
value that h e or sh e is prepared to accept fo r entering into an
agreem e nt. A party gains fro m a transaction when he or she re~-
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' Baird, Ge rtner & Pick e r, s upra note 48, at 220; Ras muse n, supra no te 65, at 228 .
Th e ana logy between marriage and "spli t-the-pie " is no t perfect, beca use th e latter
assumes fun gible, con tinuo us, and infini te!y d ivisible shares, an d in ma rriage th e re
may be so me discontin uit ies of d ivision. Suc h disconti nuities, a nd o th er fe atures o f
marri age such as the dom ina nce of publ ic goods, may sometimes ma ke it quite di fficult to bargain freely over "sid e-pay ments" to recti fy imbal ances of sh ares that may
result , fo r examp le, from adoptin g a more efficient but lopsi de d a llocatio n of productive e ffo rt. See in fr a Secti o n IV.A .l.
0
' See Poilak, supra note 56, at 600 (reviewing proposed bargaining models of marriage) .
71 Wertheimer, supra no te 32, at 67.
"See Poll ak, supra note 56, at 600. Th ere is some sema ntic co nfusi o n in th e li terature over wheth er the person with the better set of a ltern ati ves to an agreeme nt has a
"high threat point" or a " low th reat poin t. " I have chose n, as more intuitively so und,
to describe th e party with better outs ide a ltern ativ es as having a "high threat point."
But see tv1aho ny, supra note 16, a t 44 (sugges ting that th e party to a marriage who
has more altern atives-usually the man-has a lower th rea t point).
n See, e.g., Ma hony , supra note 16, at 43; Hmvard Raiffa, The Art a nd Scien ce of
Nego ti ation 45 (1982); Werthei mer, supra note 32, at 211.
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' . prtce:.
. "74 cac h party ' s rese rvatiOn
.
ceiVes more tn an 1: h e rese:rvauon
price in turn fi xes the magnitude of the bargaining surplus, which
consists of the resources available for allocation between the parties through bargaining once each party's reservation price is met.
Eac h party's bes! alternative to an agreement is one of th e
fac tors that bear on each party's bargaining power. The term
"bargaining power," although often use d, is rarely understood or
precisely defined.75 In barga ining among rational, self-interested
utility maximizers, bargaining povJez· has a fo rmal aspect and a behavioral one. Formally, threat points de termine the limits of the
negotiation set-the range of ut ili ty payoffs that each bargainer
could rati onally accept 'Nithin th•:: bargaining :relationship. 7" That
range is governed by a simple principie: If a party can do better
outside the bargain than by striking a deal, he or she will not agree
to a deal. A lthough the threat points se t limits, they do not, in
themselves, uniquely determine the precise arrangement within the
negotiation set that will be selected by the parties. T hat selection is
a matter for the two parties to work out, and a division will be arrived at through some kind of negotiating process for dividing up
the bargaining surplus. The refore, predicting or specifying the
likely marital bargain and the respective payoffs to the players
would require knowing something about the spouses' individual alternatives to stri king a deal (the threat points), as well as something about their bargaining abilities and the determinants of the
bargaining process.
•

1

.

T'

7
" Wertheimer, supra note 32 , at 211 (footnote omi tted); see a lso Ra iffa, supra note
73, a t 45 (applying the reservation price).
:; See Wertheimer, supra note 32, a t 64-68 (d isc ussi ng confus ion surroundin g
" barga inin g power") . The rer m is ge nuinely useful in the context of off-market , monopolistic bargainin g games. Its meaning is far more amb iguous in the context of
marke t transactions, wh ere the terms of exchange a nd price are more closely fi xed by
aggrega te supply and demand. See . e .g., Daniel J. Ch e pa itis, T he National Labor
Relations Act, Non-Parall eled Com petition, and ~vlark et Power, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 769
(1997) (attempting to explore the co ncept of ''market power" in the labor mark et).
76 See Pollak, supra note 56, at 600. That negotiat ion se t can inclu de both Paretooptimal and non-Pareto-op tim a l arrangeme nts be twee n the parties. See Ma ho ny,
supra note 16, at 38-48 (discussing suboptimal o r " inefficient" marital deals).
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3. "Threat Points" in !Vlarriage
What determines the threat point of the partners to a marriage?
The two competing game-theoretic models in the literature assume
two different fallback positions that confront the couple if they fail
to acquiesce in a mutually agreea ble arrangem ent for the conduct
of the marriage. Both fallback positi ons rep rese nt a loss of potential marital surplus and a reduction in the size of the pie or th e pool
available for distribution.
O ne possible fallback option for non agreement is the breakup of
the relationship--divorce. 77 That outcome ri sks loss for both parties of all benefits of the marriage. Another possibie outcome is an
uncoordinated or discordant living arrangement in which the partners are at odds, but remain married and conti nue to live to78
gether-the "harsh words and burnt toast" alternative. The parties are worse off than if they agreed on how to coordinate their
efforts, but may be better off than if they divorced. If they would
be better off "at war" than apart, the threat points that effectively
determine the parties' conduct are intramarital.
Since both partners to a potentially positive-sum marriage will
lose if the marriage either dissolves through divorce, or degenerates into domestic strife, the partners have some incentive to come
to an allocational agreement. Their incentives may not be the
same, however. There is reason to believe that, on average, the
fallback positions may differ significantly for husband and wife .
Specifically, there is evidence suggesting that men will on average
have better alternatives to a marital agreement-both inside and
outside of marriage-than women.
a. Exit Options
The alternatives to getting married to a particular person are to
remain single or to marry someone else. The alternatives to remaining married are to become single or marry again. In the words
of one economist of family bargaining, the value of these alternatives is determined by the "extrahousehold environmental parameters" encompassing "every variable that affects how well each famSee Bergstrom, supra no te 56, at 1924.
Id . at 1926; see also Lundberg & Pollak, Separate Sphe res, s upra note 56, at 1007
(discussing intramarital and extramarital threat point mode ls).
77
78
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ily member could do in the next best alternative outside of the
family."n Variables include subjective preferences for being married or unmarried; the resources each member controls individually
(most notably, market earnings and we alth); social and community
ties and support; the sexual consequences of being unmarried; the
costs or harms to third parties-most notably children-from divorce and how concerned the partner is about these harms; the
amount of sunk cost or lost investment entailed by divorce; the social stigma and status consequences attache d to being single or divorced; the legal rules that determine property divisions, alimony,
and child support following the termination of marriage; and taxes
and transfers conditioned on marital status (such as A id to Famili es
with Dependent Children ("AFDC") an d other welfare payments).
Related to all these elements is how a person who contemplates divorce would fare in the remarriage market .
Many of these variables operate in favor of men. Setting aside
remarriage prospects, there is reason to suppose that single women
may be less happy than single men within the unmarried state.
That is, single women's baseline level of well-being may, on average, be lower than single men's. First, assuming an otherwise
similar intensity of desire to marry, even young women at the peak
of marriageability cannot afford to wait as long to get married, because their marriageability declines more rapidly than men's. 80
Thus, the cost of each additional period of being single is greater
for women than men. This temporal factor alone introduces a difference in men's and women 's average demand for marriage.
There are yet other reasons why women may, on average, be less
satisfied being single than men. l\1any of the services that men
once sought within marriage-"everything from sex to food preparation to old-age insurance" 81 as well as, in some cases, the production of "own" offspring82-are readily available outside of marriage
or can be purchased on the open market. On the other hand, what
McElroy, supra note 56, at 578.
See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
81 Shirley P. Burggraf, The Feminine Economy and Economic Man: Reviving th e
Rol e of Family in the Post-Industrial Age 4 (1997).
82 See Becker, Treatise, supra note 36, at 28-29 (di sc ussing th e importance of producing one's "own children" as a benefit of marria ge); see also infra note 338
(discussing the demographics of out-of-wedlock birth rates and their relationship to
me n 's extramarital well-being and willingness to marry).
79
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women traditionally seek within marriage-emotional security, financi al support, prestige, power, and a fa ther's authori tative helo
and financial "sponsorship" for their children-are hard for wome ~
to obtain outside of marriage and generally cannot be purchased."3
Moreover, factors like sex-specific differences in the costs and
benefits of sexual variety or exclusivity may elevate men 's baseline
well-being relative to women's outside of marri age, at least under
current social conditions. 8 Women's distaste for being single may
also stem from women's need for a "protector": Singl e wo men may
feel more threatened, vulnerable, lonely, or socially despised than
single men.'' Finally, labor market factors are influential. Women
generally make less money t han men , although there is evidence
that the gap is closing rapidly for unmarried chil dless -.,vomen as
compared to men in comparable jobs. 86 'Women's occupational
choices differ from men 's, which can result in somewhat lower
earnings. Finally, discrimination against women in the job market
may place important limits on women's earnings and career prospects compared to men 's. T hus, women may start out less well off
on the primary marriage market.
Women, notoriously, also do less well by divorce. Their labor
market value is often impaired by marriage. Women generally make
greater idiosyncratic, marriage-specific investments than men, and
those investments often come at the expense of labor market opportunity costs. 87 Women also face direct loss of their marital investments, which function as sunk costs if a marriage dissolves."8
Their preference for the custody of children imposes addition al fi .j

51
Bu t see infra Sec ti o n V.E.3 for a discussion of the role AFDC p lays in substitutin g for a husband 's income and serv ices.
""See infra Section IV.A.3 (discussing men 's a nd women's a ttitud es and tastes with
respect to fidelity a nd sex) ; infra note 338 (discussi ng rece nt cha nges in th e a vai lab ility of " respectable" premarital sex) .
' 5 See, e.g., Robe rta S. Sigel, Ambition and Accommodation: How Women View
Gend er Relations 43-89 (1996) (surveying wome n 's feelings of seco nd-cl ass cit ize nship , which so me women may believe marriage will all eviate).
" See June Ellenoff O 'Neill , The Cause and Significance of th e Declining Ge nd er
Gap in Pay, in Ne ith er Victim Nor Ene my 1, 7-8 (Rita J . Simon ed. , 1995 ).
87
See Cohen, supra note 4; Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 4; see also in fra note
186 (discussing why women tend to start out making greater investments in domesticity).
ss Women tend to specialize in nurturing and family work , whereas ·'men typically
make fe wer relationship-specific investments th a n wo men , accumu iating in stead reso urces which are as useful outsid e as within the ir current relatio nship. " E ngland &
Farkas, supra note 5, a t 55.
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nancial burdens_sv l'v1en, in contrast, customarily make a grea.ter in-·
vestment in labor market capital, which is portable in the event of
divorce. But, even if the sex differential in active marriage-specific
investment could be completely eliminated-which is unl ikely in
911
the face of other sources of men's superior bargaining power men would still come out ahead. Given their relatively short reproductive lives, women bear a sex-specific "passive" opportunity
cost that their husbands do not.
This leads us to perhaps the most significant difference in men's
and women's fate outside of marriage, which lies in their currency
on the remarriage market. On the assumption that marriage to a
suitable partner generates surplus value for the pair to share over
and above what each spouse can generate alone, remarriage to
such a partner is by definition a more desirable option than remaining single. Indeed, the ability to remarry confers a bargaining
advantage precisely because the opportunity to remarry can be
very valuable. Remarriage has the potential to be a positive-sum
game-that is, to produce a surplus for distribution to the participants. When there is a positive-sum game, everyone wants to play.
But not everyone gets to play. A woman's attractiveness and
appeal to the opposite sex declines rapidly with age, causing a precipitous falling off of her remarriageability. 91 If her investment of
her youth in her husband fails to yield future payoffs (because, for
example , a marriage fails), that resource is effectively depleted. 92

See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 979 (1979).
"''See infra Sections III. C-D for a discussion of the interaction of roles ar;d bargaining power.
91 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 278-87.
Divorce scholars have noted that "women
lose value in the marriage market more rapidly than do men." Id. at 284. Ira Ellman
notes that "[t]he more precipitous decline in the woman's sexual appeal" with age is
exace rbated by its corollary, which is the age differential in marital partnerships.
Ellman, supra note 4, at 43. He further observes that this "relatively universal and
apparently intractable" male preference for marrying younger women is an important
''noneconomic factor" (which nevertheless has economic consequences) that tends to
exacerbate women's preexisting disadvantage upon divorce. Id. That factor operates
to deprive many women of the benefits of remarriage.
" As Lloyd Cohen puts it, the wife experiences a "stochastic fall in value" during
the life of the marriage, both because much of her active investment typically takes
place during the early years of a relationship and because her passive currency on the
remarriage market declines more rapidly. Cohen, supra note 4, at 288; Mahony, supra note 16, at 19-22.
'
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In contrast, her husband's appeal is re latively un affected by age,
and is even enhanced somewhat by the human capital and earning
power he accumulates during marri age.~
The loss of value of women on the marriage mark et as a function
of age is driven by the social customs of male hypogamy (that is,
men marrying down in age, education, and earnings) and femal e
hypergamy (marrying up). T hese practices seem to be fueled by
observed male preferences for marriage to young or younger
women , and their aversion to partners of greater status, ed ucation,
and am bition. ~~ Female preferences may also play a role. Women
seem not to mind marrying older men, and may positively prefe r
men of higher status and earnings.
But perhaps the most important factor drivin g remarriage patterns is the rel atively shorter reproductive life of women compared
to men. As women age, their capacity to bear additional children
declines rapidly, whereas men can become fathers well into old
age. Many prospective husbands, regardless of age , greatly value a
woman's fertility. ~ T his tends to diminish women 's value on the
remarriage market relative to similarly aged men's, and goes a long
way towards explaining observed patterns of male hypogamy. The
importance to the creation of unequal marital bargaining power of
the difference in rem arriage prospects grounded in the short reproductive life of women should not be underestim ated. This pattern is ultimately driven by ineluctable biological facts.
Since the factors that disadvanta ge women all correlate with age,
the end result is that divorced women on average find it harder
than men to replace their mates, and these difficulties increase
3

5

o; See Cohen , supra note 4, a t 286-87; Ellm a n, supra note 4, at 43 .
" See Co hen , supra note 4 , at 281 (citing Jessie Bernard , Th e F uture of Marriage
158 (1972)).
95
Ind eed, it is possible to co nstru ct a n econ o mic mode l that derives observed divisions o f house ho ld lab or so lely from male -femal e differences in reproducti ve
lifespan. The mode l posits a marri age mark et of fecund wo me n an d fe rtil e men , a nd
a post-divorce remarriage market in which all men a nd all previously unmarri ed
women (but no divorced women), ca n rem arry and have children. Th e model predicts th a t rational men an d wome n wi ll in ves t differentially in m a rket a nd domesti c
hum a n capital, respective ly, based on the co nstraints introdu ced by these marri age mark et ass umpti o ns alone. See Aloysius Siow, Differe ntial Fec undity, Markets a nd
G end er Roles, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 334 (1998).
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sharply with advancing age.% Finding a replacement is made even
more difficult by the likelihood that a woman will bring another
man 's children into her new family. 97 In contrast, the man's legacy
from his first marriage-his earning capacity-is valuable "both in
the marriage market and the commercial world. " A man can "take
much of the gain realized from his first marriage into a second and
he can more easily find a replacement mate. ,~s
Prospects for men and women outside of marriage are important
to marital bargaining because the dissolution of the entire marital
bargain as a going concern (i.e., divorce) always looms as a possible
consequence of failure to agree. The relative importance of the divorce threat alternative to coming to mutual agreement, as compared to what partners face under conditions of marita l discord, is
difficult to assess, but surely depends in part on the costs of divorce . The current social and legal climate creates few external
barriers to divorce, and provides for minimal redistribution among
spouses following a marriage's dissolution. 99 T he stigma of divorce

96
Although remarriage is popular among both sexes, data gathered in the late 1980s
indicate that the remarriage rate for women aged 35-44 is about two-thirds the rate
for men, with the ratio dropping to less than one-half for women over 45. Barbara
Foley Wilson & Sally Cuningham Clarke, Remarriages: A Demographic Profile, 13 J.
Fam. Issues 123, 126 tbl.2 (1992); see also Weitzman, supra note 12, at 204 (reporting
that divorced women under 30 have a 75% chance of remarriage, but women over 40
have only a 28% chance of remarriage).
Two other factors also affect the remarriage prospects of women. First, women
with children remarry at a lower rate than women without children, regardless of age
of divorce. Children have no effect on remarriage for men. See Larry Bumpass,
James Sweet & Teresa Castro Martin, Changing Patterns of Remarriage, 52 J. Marriage & f am. 747, 751-52 (1990); Helen P. Koo, C.M. Suchindran & Janet D. Griffith,
The Effects of Children on Divorce and Re-Marriage: A Multivariate Analysis of
Life Table Probabilities, 38 Population Stud. 451 (1984 ). Second, education is inversely correlated with the incidence of remarriage among divorced women. This
relationship of education to remarriage does not obtain for men. See 3 National Ctr.
for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Vital Statistics of the
United States, Marriage and Divorce, 1988, at 41 tbl.l-32 ( 1996).
97
See England & Farkas, supra note 5, at 57-58; see also supra note 96 (noting evidence that children depress a divorced woman's chance of remarriage).
"'Ellman, supra note 4, at 44.
9
" Only two states require both spouses' consent to obtain divorce for breakdown of
the marriage, and in 40 states one spouse may obtain a divorce over the other's objection after a separation of one year or less. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Ya. L. Rev. 9, 17 n.23 (1990). The role
of fault, if any, in the award of alimony and the division of property is more complex
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has all but disappeared, at least insofar as it carries concrete occupational or fin anci al consequences. 100 To be sure, there are lost
sun k costs ancl uansaction costs from divorce for b oth parties,
which operate as inte rnal restraints on di vorce for many couples.10 1
But if staying married loses its intrinsic value to o ne partner- if
one partner faces an intramarital payoff that lies below his or her
reservation price- the law itself imposes few additional costs on
exiting the marriage. Thus, marital bargaining is inform ed by the
substantial possibili ty tha t the marriage will not last.
Because the ease or difficulty of obtaining a div o rce is in large
part (although not excl usively) a function of the law of domestic
relations, all marit al bargai ning can be said to take place " in the
shadow of the law. " 102 But because the law creates a right of easy
exit, and in many cases leaves both partners more or iess where
they stood at th e time the marriage dissolved, the law is perhaps
better described as a window. Through that window, two markets
cast their shadows upon bargainers: the labor market (which de termines who can earn how much on his or her own) and the m ar-

and varied. See Ira Mark E llman , The Place of Fault in a M ode rn Div orce Law , 28
Ariz. S t. L.J. 773,781 -82 (1996).
Although the law of do mestic re la tions does effec t some red istributi on of marita l
assets, it does no t generally adopt the conventional contract meas ures- suc h as res titution , expecta ncy, or re li ance dam ages-th a t govern the a ll ocat io n of assets fo ll owing an ordinar y contrac t breach. T hus, post-divorce redi stributi ve me as ures a re
mode st, at be; t, and routinely fall short of eq ualizing the parti es' welfare following
divorce. See E llman, supra note 4, a t 49-53; Est in , supra note 4, at 559-60; T rebilcoc k
& Kevshan i, supra note 4, at 551-60. Alimo ny is uncomm o n a nd temporar y, see
Scott, supra, at 18, a nd altho ugh th e law prov ides for th e divi sion o f m a rit al property,
there is little tangible prope rty in most marri ages. The most impo rtant ma rital assets
(such as hum an capital) are rarely rea llocated. See T rebilcock & Kes hvani, supra
note 4, at 552-53; Wei tzman , supra note 12, at 269-78, 289-309; W illi am s, supra no te
3, at. 2250; see a lso Jana B. Singer, A limon y a nd Effici e ncy: Th e Ge nd ere d Costs a nd
Benefits of th e Eco nomi c Justification for Alimony, 82 Ge o. L.J. 2423, 2454-56 (1 994)
(proposing inco me sharing alternativ es) .
lLXl See infra Sec tio n V .F (d iscussi ng the soc ial sti gma surroundin g div orce).
10 1
T hese includ e accumul ate d marriage-specific in vestments, harm to children, costs
from liquidation , re locati o n, reord ering of affairs, the psychological distress of breakup,
in security, search for a new spo use , and the violation o f re ligio us or ot he r be liefs
about the perm anence of marriage.
102
Cf. Mnookin & Kornh a user, supra not e 89 (sugges ting how barga ining a t div o rce
takes place "in the shadow of the law") .
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riage market (1.vhich determines who will have the benefits of a
new spouse) . 111 ,
Because men generally have better options in these markets
than women, the value of the right to exit from a marriage is on av,. men tncm
'
f or women.104 T'ms
. means t h.at where
.
erage greater ror
failure to agree incre ases the probability of divorce, men stand to
lose less from disagree m ent than v.;omen. Not only is men 's extramarital exit threat generally higher than wom en's, but the difference grmvs over t[m:::. A nd such would be the case even if men and
women equalized patterns of wage and non-w age human capital
investme nt and earning power, even if they di d not have different
preferences for children, and eve n if they did not have different absolute or comparative advan tages (whether natural or acquired) in
domestic and nondomestic pursuits. Because remarriage is quite
valuable both financially and emotionally, all that would be required to generate a quite significant inequality in exit options is a
difference in men 's and women's currency on the marriage market
with advancing age. That difference is a longstanding feature of
the social landscape.
103
With respect to the marriage market, the American marriage system has been
described as involving an individual's " permanent availability" as a spouse, a system
in which "every adult can be thought of as permanently available as a marital partner, regardless of the fact th at the individual is presently married ." Udry, supra note
55 , at 889 (citing the work of Bernard Farber). Thus , each person
con tinuous iy compa r[ es] his or her marital bargain with other marital bargains
which he or she might be able to negotiate with other persons, and with his or
her potential benefits from not being married at all. If an individual's prese nt
ma rital partnership is strikingly less favorable than the a lternatives, he or she
will opt for one of th e a lte rnatives if the cost of the exchange (barrier) does not
ob literate the advantage to be obtained.
Id.
'[).1 Patterns of hyper- and hypogamy, which are more pronounced on the remarriage
market, can give rise to systematic differentials in the labor market position of husbands and wives even in the abse nce of population-wide differences in men's and
women 's labor market prospects. T he dual tendencies of women to marry somewh a t
old er me n and men to marry so mewhat younger women lead s to a systematic average
gap in the ages of husband s an d wives, a gap that can create a systematic differential
in couples' earning power. See E llman, supra note 4, at 43-44 . As a general ru le,
persons with longer job marke t experie nce earn more, and older persons tend to have
longer te nure on the job. T his means that the combination of male hypogamy and
female hype rgamy carries with it a chronic initial gap in earn in g power as betwee n
couples, which would persi st even if th e average differences in wages and earnings for
men and women in the economy we re wiped out. This intracouple gap, even if modest, exacerba te s the effect of the remarriage differential. See supra note 54.
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b. Intramarital Oprions
Ultimately, the difference in men's and women's exit options is
always relevant to bargaining because divorce defines the absolute
outer limits of the scope for bargaining within an ongoing marIiage.1115 Nevertheless, the immediate importance of "divorce bounds"
to the actual bargaining process and the parties' bargaining power
is minimized in the case where both parties anticipate that even
forced togetherness is better than divorce. In that case, the threat
point that actually matters to the couple and that vvill most immediately influence t hei r conduct, is an intramarital one.
Just as with the ex it threat, men's intramarital threat point can
be expected to exceed women's. The "burnt toast and harsh words"
model of marital interaction recognizes that there are times in
every marriage when spouses will both be better off if they agree
106
on a coordinated course of action. In many cases, failure to agree
105 Sec Lundberg

& Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56, at 154
("Individual rationality ensures that no individual will accept less than he or she
would receive in the next best alternative and implies that the divorce bounds apply
to all bargaining models, both cooperative and noncooperative.").
106
This situation corresponds to a game-theoretic model of marriage created by
Lundberg and Pollak, which they term the "separate spheres" model. Lundberg &
Pollak, Separate Spheres, supra note 56. In that model, the threat point for an
agreed-upon bargain-that is, the situation that would prevail in the absence of an
agreed-upon allocation-is not divorce but a "noncooperative ... equilibrium within
marriage." Id. at 992-93. The choices available to the spouses in the absence of
agreement are given the game-theoretic designation of "noncooperative" situations.
Id. The stable arrangements within this set-of which there are many-are designated "noncooperative equilibria." The bargain that is struck within the negotiation
set created by the noncooperative equilibria (which function as threat points) is
termed a "cooperative" agreement, and the model is designated a "cooperative
model." Id. at 1007. The same authors have also created an alternative and so-called
"noncooperative" model of marriage, which is a dynamic model predicting the outcome of repeated, costly offers and counteroffers by husband and wife who control
different resources within marriage. See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56, at 150; Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models, supra note 56; see also Baird, Gertner & Picker, supra note 48, at 221 (describing
dynamic or Rubinstein bargaining games).
The terminology that Lundberg and Pollak employ in their papers is unfortunate.
The designations "cooperative" and "noncooperative" as they apply to gametheoretic agreements are terms of art referring to agreements that are, respectively,
binding (i.e. externally enforceable) or nonbinding. See Rasmusen, supra note 65, at
29. As Lundberg and Pollak themselves acknowledge, however, it is probably inaccurate to refer to marital agreements as "cooperative" agreements in this sense, because there are no legal or other formal mechanisms for enforcing agreements during
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will result in a less efficient arrangement than could otherwise be
achieved by coordin ation of effort, as when failure to settle on one
family dinnertime resu lts in cold food for some family members.
In other cases, failure to achi eve a " meeting of the minds" on a
mutual course of action will lead to a breakdown in th e trust necessary to coordinate a sequence of contributions. That trust would
ordinarily lead each party to put fo rward optimizing " best efforts"
in anticipation of agreed- upon reciprocation. w' W ithout coordination, some lesser degree of effort will be fo rthcomin g, which will
shrink the size of total output available to share.
In the absence of agre ement, the intram arital threat point model
assumes that one spouse decides how to go about his or her business without the oth e r's consent , with each spouse independently
choosing a "level of her private good and the public good that she
supplies to maximize her own utility, subject to her budget constraint."108 In this discordant or "uncoordinated" state, each spouse
strategizes to inflict the most misery on the partner (as a spur to
reaching agreement of some type) while doing the least damage to
himself or herself in the process. The game-theoretic models sugthe life of the marriage. There are only informal social sanctions and self-help. Lundberg & Pollak, Noncooperative Bargaining Models, supra note 56, at 133 (recognizing
that marriage is best model ed as a noncooperative bargaining game). To reduce terminological confusion, the situation that prevails in the absence of mutual agre ement-the " harsh words and burnt to as t" situation-will be termed in this paper the
" uncoordinated " or di sharmonious marriage , and th e bargain that would be struck
against the background threat of such possible disagree me nt is termed the "coordinated
agreement." Coordinated agreements, even though technically noncooperative
(because externally unenforceable) nevertheless may be more efficient than uncoordinated behaviors, becau se they bring gains from mutu ally orchestra ted actions.
107
See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 66, at 1116-19 (discussing a " best efforts"
convention as an informal way to optimize output in a long-term re lati o nal contract) .
108
Lundberg & Pollak , Bargaining and Distribution , supra note 56, at 148. As
Lundberg and Pollak write:
Within an existing ma rriage, a noncooperative [that is, uncoordinated) equilibrium corresponds to a utility-maximizing strategy in which each spouse takes
the other spouse's strategy as given . . . . What di stinguishes a no ncooperative
marriage from a pair of independ e ntly optimizing individual s? Joint consumption economies are an important so urce of gains to marriage, a nd even noncooperative family me mbers enjoy the benefits of household public goods .... As
one might expect, public goods are undersuppli ed in this noncooperative equilibrium, and there are potential gain s to cooperation. Additional gains can be
expected if coordin a tion of individual contributions is req uired for efficient
household producti on .
Lundberg & Pollak, Separa te Spheres, supra note 56, at 993.
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gest that there are many ways that spouses can arrange th eir affairs
in the absence of marital harmony (th at is, there are "multiple
equilibria" for marital discord), depe nding on initial conditions or
conventions. 109 Since many marital activities involve public goods
and have secondary effects on the other spouse , each spouse inevitably benefits (or suffe rs) to a certain degree from the other's
choices during the period of marital di scord. As the examples
above and discussion belmv shmv, however, the surplus loss from
failure to coordinate may not fall equali y on each partner.
Wh ere both spouses are better off within the range of " uncoordinated equilibri a" 110 th::m th ey would be if the marriage fell
apart, then marital bargai ning towards agreement ·will take place in
the shadow of noncoordination or "marital warfare." The best alternative to agreement, which determines the negotiation se t and
the actual bargaining surplus, \vi ll not be divorce, but how miserable or well off each person wi ll be in the uncoordinated state.
That in turn , will depend on how much deprivation and distress
each spouse can inflict on the other without hurting himself or herself too much.
Do women suffer more from marital incoordination? T he answer is not as clearcut as in the simple divorce threat-point model.
As an initial matter, the spouse with more domestic responsibility
stands to lose more because that party cannot withdraw his or her

10
" Lundberg and Pollak suggest that the range o f intramarital threat points prese nt ed
by th e specter of an uncoordinated or warring ho use hold may be heavily affected by
social conventions regarding appropriate sex ro les. Whe n family cooperati on, coo rdination, and communica ti o n brea k down, people may fall back on well-w orn roles in
determining how to conduct themseives. See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargai ning and
D istribution, supra no te 56, at 150-52. As the a uth ors state, " [t]he existe nce of multiple equilibria in re peated no ncoope ra ti ve games and the need to ch oose among them
suggest how history and culture might affect distribution within marriage." Id. at 151.
Because there may be a "self- evident way to play" that is dictated b y socia l co nventio ns regarding " th e rights and responsibiliti es o f husbands and wives," what will ofte n e merge without explici t bargaining or agreemen t is a division o f labor based on
traditional rol es. Id. One gla ring variation o n m arital disharmony is, of course, domestic violence, which can drastically lowe r the threat point of a woma n 's fail ure to
acq uiesce in her husba nd 's wishes.
110
The effect on actual bargaining of the un coordi na ted equilibria represented by
the potential for marital disharmony is com pli cated by the fac t that th e re are multiple
uncoordinated equilibrium conditions poss ib le. T hu s, whereas there is only one-or
th eoretically o nl y one-divorce threat point, there are multiple intramarital equilibri um threat points ge nera tin g d iffe re nt potential negotiation se ts.
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services (which generally produce public goods) without hurting
himself or herself along with the other partner. The person who
contri butes cash or other tangible assets is in a better position to
withhold benefits from the marit al pool than the person who per111
for ms in-kind labor for the unit.
The diffe rence , of course, is a
matter of degree: Some domestic work is severabl e, just as "some
rn one tary wealth must be shared in the fo rm of housing" and other
..
' 112
p LLh l1c goods.
But these observati ons are not completely satisfying because
they require assuming a di vision of labor as a starting point or
background condition for deciding which bargainer stands to lose
rnore . Ideally, the bargain in g analysis should te ll us how duties and
benefits will be split. Its goal is to explain observed patterns of aliocation, not to assume them. 'What determines the level of goods
an d services that each spouse wi ll supp ly within the context of
forced togetherness? Specifically, is there reason to believe that
one party (the wife) might spontaneously supply the greater
amount of public-goods producing domestic service, which then
redounds to the benefit of her partner? Although the person who
does more domestic work is less likely to withdraw that contribution in an uncoordinated situation than the person who contributes
other resources, we still do not know why, in the absence of a bargained-for assignment, the wife will be performing the majority of
those tasks. The answer could lie in a different preference structure concerning the costs and benefits of domestic labor for men
and women.
c. The Parable of Neat and Slob

To explain how observed patterns come about, assume there are
two lav,r students-Neat and Slob-who are assigned as roommates. Suppose each would incur extreme financial liability for
breaking the lease; it is so costly for each to get rid of the other
(i. e., " divorce") that neither considers it. Neat cares more about
cleanliness than Slob. Neat either is less averse to (that is, experi'''As one scholar of housewo rk has observed, the benefits of whatever housework
is performed will, as a practical matter, be shared. That is because it often is not feasib le to perform housework for oneself without providin g a be nefit to all members of
the household. See Silbaugh , supra note 17, at 34.
11
~ See id. at 35 .
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ences less nega tive utility from) cleanin g the apartment , or derives
greater positive utility from having a clean place to live , or both.
Slob hates cleaning more-or cares less about having a clean
apa rtm ent-than Ne at. H e nevertheless prefers a clean apartment
to a dirty one and will clean it himself if it gets sufficiently dirty.
The apartment is cleaned by an outsider on the weeken d, but it
gets progressively dirtier as the week wears on. Their respective
preferences are such th at Neat will clean th e apartment on Tuesday, but Slob will not clean until Thursday. Ne at and Slob neither
coordi nate the ir efforts nor bargain over allocation of labor. As a
res ult , Neat cleans th e apartment every Tuesday, and Slob, who
studies whi le Nea t cleans, reaps the benefits of the publ ic good of
the cl ean ap artment.
If Ne at and Slob are "forced" to live together and share public
goods, their strictly rational and individually optimizing behavior
will result in ve ry lopsided costs and benefits to each member of
the pair. If Neat gets fed up and decides to try bargaining with
Slob-that is, tries to get Slob to take a larger share of the responsibility-the bargain he can hope to strike will be a function of how
badly off Slob anticipates being if no agreement is reached. If they
do manage to forge a compromise that shifts some work to Slob,
Neat will be better off than before, and Slob will be worse off.
Since Slob does not realistically anticipate being worse off in the
absence of agreement than with one (because it is unlikely that
Neat will make good on a thre at to underperform), Neat will
probably not get very far in his attempt to shift some responsibility
to Slob.
The Parable of Neat and Slob shows how the marital game of
"split-the-pie" can be transformed into a variation on th e game of
"chick en. " 113 H ere, each player is worst off if the task (cl eaning) is
not performed at all. A nd each is best off if the other pl ayer, and
not he, performs it. Each prefers a compromise to doing all the
work himself, but each prefers not doing it to a compromise. Slob's
advantage can be attributed to the asymmetry of the hypothetical
payoffs, which results from different costs and benefits to the parties either from performing the task or from enjoyin g the fruits of

' 13

See Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 73-74 (describin g th e chicken game).
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As the game is played out, the person with the most to
lose from mut ual nonperformance will more ofte n end up performing the task , and the other person will free ride on the other's
willi ngness to bear the costs.
O f course, this exampl e is oversimplifie d, for it assumes rational
actors wh o will not make good on threats that prove costly in a single round of a game. In reality, if Slob were a spouse he would
have a somewh at greater incentive to agree on a compromise, beca use in marriage partners usually suffe r addi ti ona l costs from
prolonged discord and lack of coordination , and intransigence on
one issue can spill over in to negoti ations on oth ers. A lso, as discussed bei ow, real -life bargainers might make good on disadva nt ageo us thre ats because there mi ght be plausible long-term strategic
reasons for doing so. 11 ) Neverthe less, the basic principle illustrated
by the exampl e is quite pertinent: W here di vorce is not a credible
threat on the part of either spouse, the one who stands to lose more
fro m the loss of a public good will suffer more in the absence of an
express agreement. The spouse who can better tolerate an undersupply of a public good has less to lose from refusing to compromise.
It is quite possible that women care more about the sorts of public goods that are supplied to a marriage through unpaid domestic
labor. For example, women may place a higher value on order and
quality in domestic matters, may find domestic disorder more irksome, or may find the effort needed to bring about a high level of
domestic order less onerous (because they mind doing housework
less, they are more accustomed to doing it , or it carries less of a
stigma for thern). 11 6 Women 's standards of childcare may also dif-

'" A possible array of asy mm etr ic payoffs to Neat and Slob is:

SLOB:
NE AT:

STU DY
WORK
3, 8
STUDY
-3, 0

WORK
8, 4
12, 2

For each roommate , the payoff is lowest whe n both study a nd no o ne works . It
rises for eac h person to th e maximum through the se qu e nce of (1) doing th e work
alone, (2) sharing the work , and (3) having the oth er person do it. Neat gets a smaller
payoff th an Slob if the work is undone, but a larger payoff in all other situ a ti o ns.
" 5 See infra note 153 (discussing failure to cooperate despite poten ti al mutual ga ins) .
11 ' A number of fem inist comm e ntators have recogn ized the critical roie of a marital
dynamic tha t corresponds to a chicken game in th e allocati on of famil y responsibility.
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fer fr om men's-for example, in their views of hmv much parental
care childre n ::.houl d get. The wish for children to have parental
care is analogous to the desire for a clean apartment: The desire is
to have it don e, prefe rably at least cost to oneseif. A bsent that
condition, hmve·-,;er, it still proves worthwhile to do it oneself an d
bear th<: cost. 117 This is not inconsistent 'Nith the fa ct that men en- - -- -

---- --- ---- -- --

Sec , e.g .. Pat PA ai~l ctr di , "The

- - - - - - -- --

Politics of House \vork , in Sisterhood {s Po\ve rful: An

Anthology o f VJriti ngs from th e Women's Liberation i'vfovement 447, 449 (Robin
Morgan c d., 197 0). J oan \Vi ilian1 s describes a ty pical marital sce nario in the fo llo wing te rms:
ls it iE> portc:n[ to you to have a clean house? It's n o :_ ~o me : you cl ea n it if it' s
import<wt tc: yu~J . ''{011 think it's importan t to pick the chddren up fro m sc hooi ,
go to th e H allowe en parade , be home before 7:00 p.m., sp en d e xtra time with
th e child;·c;-, d uri ng vaca tions, be a roo m pare nt, get invo lve d witl1 rhe PTA 7 1
don' t. But if yc• u fee l yo u must, then by all m e ans do so .
Wilii ams , supra no te 3, at 2240 (footnotes om itted) . Williams also quotes o ne male
comment ator who points out that "[o]verinvol ve m e nt with chi ldren may ope rate to
d iscourage many husbands from fully shari ng because they do not accept the ideology of cl ose at tenti o n to children." ld. at 2240 n.56 (quoting S.M. Mi ll er, The Mak in g
of a Confuse d Mi dd le-A ged Husband , in Me n & Masculinity 44, 50 (Joseph H . Pleck
& Jack Sawyer e ds., 1974)).
117
The issue of how women in particular and parents in general regard unpaid do-mestic responsibi lities is far more complex for chi ldcare than fo r other domestic
tasks. Most people would not ordinarily perform routine housework for its own sake,
but on ly for its productive payoff. In contrast, the care of children has significant
components of both work a nd leisure or, a lternatively, of production a nd consumption value . See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 12.
Women may diffe r o n av erage from me n both in the degree to which they regard
childcare as intrinsically enjoyable and in the degree to which they want their childre n to have more tim e wit h a parent as opposed to a nonparent (without necessarily
wanting to prov id e it personally-as in , "I wish you would spend more time with the
children, dear " ) . Bo th pre ferences-which are quite distinct, but are often conflated-will affect women' s choices within a circumscribed set of options, but the
choices that depend on the consumption value of childcare wi ll not be influence d by
bargaining st;·ength or by t he bargaining partner's choices. Childcare will be willingly
supplied by the co nsume r as long as its consumption value holds out, comp a red to the
benefits of other uses o f time .
The component that predominates in chi ldcare-whether work or le isure-can depe nd both on the circumstances in which childcare is performed, the specific ch ildcare
tasks at iss ue , and the peculiar preferences and tastes of the person caring for children . On the first o f t hese, it has been noted that women and m en care for children
in different co nte xts, with women tending "to overlap the time during which th ey supervise childre n with shopping, laundry, or fo o d prepara tion, while men te nd to su pervise chi ld ren as th e ir sole use of time." ld. at 12. T here is evidence that men 's
childcare tim e is predominateiy spent in play, while women ta ke on a disproportionate share of routine care . Se e P led: , supra no te 29, at 261. Entertaining, teaching,
and playing with chi ldre n wo uld appear to have more "co nsumpti o n" value than
d ressing, bathing, feeding, a nd changing them, although it is unclear whethe r the
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for child. Nor is it inconsistent vvith viOmen exp eriencing most
housework and much childcare as work- '.;vhere " work " is defined
as an activity that, despite producing valuable benefits, one would
orefer,
if given a choice, to have .performed bv" someone else. Nev,
ertheless, the prediction that women will do more of the vvork that
gen e r ates significant " positive" externalities for the fami ly effectively creates divergent intramari.tal threat points, which will ne cesthat couvles
will strike . 1:s
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THE BARGAINING Iv10DEL AND EGAUTA P. IAN IVLI\RRU\ G E

This Article has identified several vvays in which \VOlTJ.en ' s threat
Do
ints 'vvithin marriage
might
differ on averag:e from men' s. In
•
.
0
short, men are generally better off premaritally, extramarital ly , and
intramaritally. In light of the general observation that men te nd to
have better alternati•;es to mari tal agreement t han women, what
does bargaining theory have to say about the prospects for egalitarian marriage?
To answer this question , one must return to the observation that
the marital bargain is a function both of threat points (which fix the
negotiation set and the size of the bargaining surplus) and the
process of negotiation (which de termines the allocation of the bargaining surplus) . The most fundamental insight of the bargaining
mode l is that the alternatives to agreement that are availa b le to
e ach partner limit how good a bargain the other partner can obtain;
~

sexes differ in their assessments of these activities . F inally, it may be the case th at
men o n average get less intrinsic satisfacti o n (or consumptio n value) fro m ca ring for
child ren, or that the pos itive margina l utility of the activity drops off more rapidly for
men tha n for wome n, so th a t the crossover from leisure to work happens soone r for
men. T hus, men ma y find a given amount of childca re res ponsibility more onero us
than women.
118
T here is yet another reason why wo men may be more reluctant than me n to
withdraw the ir contribution to the marriage und e r conditions of •n arital discord, regardl ess of t he nature o f th at contribution. When both spo uses are be tter off at odd s
than divorced, the wife is li ke ly to be more cauti o us in choosing her strategy becau se
the husband 's di vorce utility wi ll li e closer to his dish armonious intramari ta! utility
than will th e wife's . That is because the husband ' s exit thre at poi nt will on av erage
be hi gher than the wife's, an d this higher ex tram a rital utility might tend to "crowd,"
or more close ly shadow, the husband's int ra marital utilit y in th e event marital relations break down . If that is the case, the wife might be more wa ry abou t adopting a
strategy that infli cts too much unhap p in ess on her husband, because sh e mi ght
"overshoot" and dri ve him away.

,
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those alternati ves set a lower limit on the share each spouse will rationally accept. This conclusion follows from the simple assumption that each bargainer see ks to maximize his or her own utility. 11 9
If we make the further assumption th at the marriages that are contracted will run the full gamut of potential mutually advanta geous
relationships, then we can show that there will be some number of
marital deal s that wil l be inegalitari an. There will be some , however, that have at least the potential for equal division. A mong
those in whi ch equ al ity is at least a possibili ty, we can identify the
conditions that tend to be conducive to equal, or more e qual, allocations of we ll-being within marriage. Finally, we can apply additional princip les th at govern the act ual conduct of bargaining to
predict that , even am ong those relationships with the potential for
equality, egalitarian deals will probably be the exception rather
than the rule.

A. Is Egalitarian Marriage Possible?
To derive these conclusions, it is helpful to consider a more fa miliar commercial analogy of a typical long-term bargaining relationship. Imagine an agreement between a firm (say, IBIYI) and a
supplier (designated S). After initially shopping aroun d on the
market, IBM and S agree to deal with each other because e ach
considers the arrangement the best presently available. T he units
invested or brought to the relationship by each partner represent,
in effect, all its worldly goods. All holdings and efforts are plowed
back and ma de available for dividing between the partners. Assume that, as in marriage, there are no legal means for enforcing
any deal for a division of proceeds, and assume that each unit of
output brings an identical amount of utility to each party when distributed as a payoff to that party. Thus, units of output (utility) in-

119
lt should be obvious that if most marital partners can do as we ll or be tte r, a ft e r
accounting for transaction costs and sunk costs , by switching partners-th a t is, wh e n
"divorce bounds" a re tight , see Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining a nd Distribution , supra note 56, at 153-54-then there is little scope for ba rga ining within ma rri age. But
bargaining mod e ls of marriage " are motivated by the assumpti o n that , in at leas t
some marriages, surpluses are large e nough that their distribution is worth mod eling." Id. at 154.
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crease each partner's welfare to the same degree . (This ass umpti on
effectively makes util ity payoffs equivalent to percentage shares.
Ass ume IBM and S have similar pre-de al "endowments," and
both agree to invest 30 units of effort and/or assets in the rel ationship- so th eir initi al negotia ted inputs are the same. T he dea l is
expe cted to generate a profi t net of the 60 unit in vestment of 300
units (from 360 units tota l output). T he parties en ter th e re lationship with th e knowledge th at IBM has the potenti a l to enter into an
altern ative de al wit h anoth er company, S-1, whi ch offers IBM a net
payoff (in excess of input) of 200 units. S, on the ot he r hand , face s
a maxi mu m anticipated n et payoff of 50 from an alternative deal
with a company call ed MS.
Negotiati ons conducted according to our egalitari an workin g
definition- where both partners are equally well-off, net o f costs,
relative to a mon opoly on th e pie-would produce a deal in whi ch
the partners were left wit h equal payoffs net of investment. In this
example , wh ere inputs are equal, those payoffs are equivalent to an
equal split of the profits from the deal. E ach partner gets 150 uni ts.
(It is assumed for this discussion that each partner has already re couped its 30 unit investment out of total proceeds.)
The problem with the " egalitarian" solution, however, is that it is
not a feasibl e one for this relationship. IBM would never rationally
agree to such a divisi on , because it could do better elsewhere. If
such a "solu tion " to any bargaining problem were dem anded, IB M
would seek out the partner from whom it could anticip ate a share
of 200. 121 IB M must re ceive at least 200+ units net payoff to make
the deal worthwhile. For purposes of the ensuing discussion, the
type of bargain in which an egalitarian division is not one to which
both partners could rationally agree wi ll be designated as a relationship that is n ever egalitarian (" NE "). See Figure 1.

to

12° Fo r a di sc ussion o f egal ita ri a n ma rri age as equal pe rce nt age shares, see supra
Se cti o ns II. C.2. a , l I. C.2.c.
12 1 Similarly, if IBM we re offe red less th a n 200 units by S as an induce me nt to e nte r
into th e re lat io nship in th e first pl ace, IB M would declin e. Of co urse , th e sha re IB M
would receiv e fro m an altern a ti ve dea l is to so me degree specul a tiv e, since that dea l
would also presumabl y be subject to the co nditi o n that a ny all ocation th a t is agree d
upon be fo re the fac t is un e nfo rceab le. It is ass um ed th at IBM has sized up th e situ ati o n-includin g anticipa ted to tal payo ffs to itself an d th e quality of S-1 's respe cti ve
o utsid e o pti o ns- an d fee ls re la tive ly certa in that the pay off from the o ut side de al will
be grea te r th a n that produced by an ega lita ri a n di visio n wit h S.
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Figure 1. "NE" Bargain
un et
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The only realistic bargaining options for IBM and S ar~ those
that take into account the alternatives available to the partners
outside the relationship-the potential partnerships between IBM
and S-1, and S and I\t1S. Because IBM and Scan receive outsi de ,
net of investment, 200 units and 50 units respectively, that is the
minimum each can be expected to accept from the current bargain.
Once the two have received their minimum demands, there are 50
units up for grabs (300 - (200 +50)). That is the bargaining su.rplus.
Assuming that the units are infinitely divisible, there is theoretically a limitless number of ways to split the 50 units between the
parties, each of which would allow the parties to maintain the relationship consistent with rational self-interest. None of those, how-
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ever, coincide with the egalitarian division, Y.lhich requires each to
receive 150 units.
Suppose the bargaining surplus were to be split equally; each
party would receive 25 additional units. 122 IBM would take away a
net payoff of 225 (200 + 25), and S would net 75 (50+ 25) . That division diverges quite markedlv fro m the egalitarian relationshin
described above. That divergence is a function of the size of the
bargaining surplus-that is, the amount of joint gains available for
division after each partner has received its reservation payoff. The
better the outside alternatives for one partner or the other-the
closer the alternatives approach the maximum possi ble payoff for
each within the relations hip-the smal ler the bargaining surplus.
For purposes of the example, however, it is important to see that it
is not the fact that one partner has invested more in the relat ionship that is driving the inequality (since each partner's investment
is the same). Rather, it is that something better than an egalitarian
payoff awaits one partner outside the relationship. That party's superior prospects are the sole obstacle to equality in this relationship.
But, holding the outside alternatives constant, the bigger the size
of the pie-corresponding to the pool for allocation-the bigger
the bargaining surplus. The importance of the size of the piewhich corresponds here to the partnership proceeds-to the possibility for an egalitarian split is illustrated by modifying the example. Assume now that the deal generates a joint net payoff of 600
units, instead of 300. If the alternatives available to IBM and S on
th e market remain constant, then the egalitarian rule of division
outlined above would generate a different result. Under an egalitarian rule of division, both partners receive total payoffs, net of
their 30 unit investment, of 300 units. In contrast with the examDle
above, this egalitarian split might satisfy both partners. Each will
receive more than its expected alternative payoff (200 for IB M,
and 50 for S). To be sure, the egalitarian deal described here would
not coincide with an equal split of the bargaining surplus-the latter
~

~

~

~

l

1
" This would correspond to the so-called Nash bargaining solution to " splitting th e
pie" consisting of the 300 unit payoff. See Rasmusen , supra note 65, at 229-31
(d iscuss ing Nash bargai ning so lutions to the split-the-pie game, in which parti es take
a n equ al portion of the bargai ning surplus); see also McElroy & Horney , supra note
56 (calculating a Nash so luti o n to a cooperative bargaining game of household allocation); infra Section !II.C (discussing Nash ba rgaining solution).
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arrangement would necessarily be better for IBM, the partner with
the best outside alternative .123 The importa nt point for now, however, is that the existence of a large enough profit, which has the
effect here of generating a bigger bargaining surplus, allows fo r the
possibility of conducting an egali tarian rela tion ship consistent with
both partners' ra tional self-inte rest. Such a rela tionship will be
designated as p o tentially egalitarian (" PE"). See Figure 2.
Figure 2. "PE" Bargain
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abc= bargaining surplus
d =N as h division of surplus
UF =ega lit arian utility for IBM or S
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1 ~ 3 If th e bargaining surplus of 350, wh ich is calcu lated by subtractin g th e sum total
of the value of each party 's outside a ltern ati ves from the 600 unit tota l procee ds, or
600- (200 + 50), were to be split equally (y ie ldin g 175), then IBM wo uld enjoy a ne t
pay off fro m th e de al of 375 (200 + 175) and S would enjoy 225 (50+ 175).
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B. Factors Affecting the Potential for Equality
Because maint aining such a relationship would benefit both parties, it can be predicted that there will be a conside ra ble number of
NE marriages- those within which equality of percentage shares of
welfare is impossible because inconsistent with one person's (typically, the husband 's) ra ti onal conse nt to continue vvithin th e relationship. But there wi ll also be many PE relationships-th ose in
whic h an egalitarian allocation is possible.
Wh at can be said abo ut PE marriages? Those are relationships
in which there are enough resources avai lable fo r sharing between
the spouses to permit each to receive equ al perce ntage utility, or to
get the ir way to the same extent, without making the relationship
less desirable (n et of transaction costs) than alt ernatives available
to either party.
A simplified paradigm using parameters relevant to marital division suggests that the potential for equality is greatest where the
woman 's or man 's contribution (or marriage-specific investment)
in the present marriage is small, or the man's specific investment in
any alternative to the marriage is large relative to the investment in
the current marriage and the man's expected payoff outside the
124
marriage is small.

2
' " Ass umin g units of utility are norm a lized inte rpe rsonally , thi s wo uld mea n that
th e marital surplus (MS), which is the sum of payoffs net of costs, mu st be grea ter
th a n twice as much as th e ne xt bes t altern a tive for th e spouse with th e best alterna tive to an agree me nt , ass umed he re to be the husba nd . Th a t bes t a lte rnative is des ignated as TH (or husb a nd 's threat point). There fo re: MS/2 > TH .
MS is assum ed to be some function of the wife's incom e l(W) , th e husband's income I(H ), a nd all o th e r resources ge nera ted within o r co ntributed to the ma rriage
(R) , ne t of each partn er's contributi o n, whi ch is the total utility expend ed to ge ner ate
all monetary a nd nonm o ne tary reso urces a nd oth er potenti a l be nefits accruing to the
unit. Those co ntributi ons are designated as C(W) (wife 's co ntributi on) and C( H)
(husband's). T he latte r factors are ass um ed to have nega tive va lu e . Fo r simplicity,
children 's efforts are ignored , and th eir va lu e and cons um pt io n includ ed in R. The
husba nd's threa t point is assumed to be a functi o n o f hi s income I( H) and hi s e xpected utility fro m div orce-th e best alte rn ative awa itin g him o utsid e the marri age.
Tha t a ltern a tive is rep rese nted by some cumulative fun ctio n of the hu sba nd 's income
plus a ny additi o nal expected payoff outsid e the marriage, A(H) (w hi ch takes into acco unt the probability of remarriage, and its attend a nt ben efits), minu s a term represent ing th e to tal effo rt th e husba nd must expe nd o utsid e of ma rriage, CA (H). A PE
marriage, th e n, is one in wh ich :

MS (I(W), I(H) , R, C(H) , C(W)) > 2TH (I(H), A(H), CA (H)).
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In general, any large divergence in the spouses' p rospects outside the marriage, fro111 whatever source, m akes equality in marriage less likely . For example, the paradigm reveals t h a t the difference between spouses' e arned incomes affects the p ossibility of an
egalitarian marriage. T he more the hu sband's income exceeds the
\-vife 's, the less lik ely is the possibility of an eg ali tarian allocation .
As the husban d' s earnings rise rel ative to the wife's, his e xtram arital position relative to hers improves. T o be sure , the husband's
high earnings tends to en large th e pool of assets to bargain ove r,
which favors equality. But that e ffect .,:vill be offse t by the e levation of th e husb and's relative exit thre at , which te nds to move the
egalitari an point outside of the negotiation set. /~\,S the wife 's income rises to t he level of the husband's, the \vife 's exit advantage is
bolstered , which decreases the size of the bargaining surplus. 125 But
thi s reduction makes it more likely that an egalitarian allocation
\vill fall within the feasible ne goti ation set. In sum, for a fixed
amount of total income, and a fixed size of the m arit al pie, there is
more room for e quality as incomes converge. Concomitantly, the
more unequal the incomes (in favor of the husband), the smaller
the possibility, ceteris paribus, of an equal split.
A ll else, however, is not always equal. In the equ ation , the size
of the marital surplus also affe cts t he possi bi lity for an egali tari an
split. The marital surplus includes those resources t hat owe their
existence to the marriage. The size of the m arital surplus is determined by the amount of resources available for allocation within
the marri age, and the amount of resources avail able fo r divi sion affects the possibility of equal division, as the IBI'v'1/S example demo nstrates. H olding constant the panics' threat points or al ternatives to agreement, a larger marital surplus translates into a larger
bargaining surplus. The larger the pool of resources available for
division , the greater the possibility of equal division.

l\1S increases as I(W), I(H) , a nd R ri se a nd C(H) a nd C(W) fal l. TH incre ases as I(H)
and A (H) rise an d CA(H) falls. This ind ica tes tha t th e possibility o f an ega litarian
ma rriage is more likely when the fo ll owing fac tors are large: R, I( W), and CA.(H). It
is less lik ely when th e following factors are large: l(H), C( W), C(H) , a nd A(H).
125 Bargaini ng theory predicts that eq ual spousal incomes, all e lse being equal, wi ll
desta biiizc marriage by reducin g the space for possi bl e bargaining. T hi s e ffect would
be ind epend e nt of the a bso lute leve l of income for each. See Lundberg & Poll ak,
Bargaining and D istributi o n, supra note 56, a t 148.
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In considering the factors that affect the potential for marital
equality, it is helpful to divide marriages into two types, recognizing that the latter includes a variety of relationships: traditional
marriages and dual-earner marriages. Traditional marriages are
uniform at least insofar as the spouses take on conventional sex
roles; the husband is the breadwinner, and the wife works solely in
the domestic sphere. In dual-earner marriages, on the other hand ,
the husband and vvife both \Vork for pay. Dual-earner marriages
are quite varied, with the continuum anchore d by re lationships in
which both spouses earn roughly comparable incom e~j and spend
roug hly commuable amounts of time at oaid work.
\-Vhich tvoe of marriaop-e is more likel-y to be corrro atible vvith
egalitarianism? The answer is not at all obvious. For traditional
marriages, there are two conflicting sets of factors at ·;vork. The
sharp disparity in earned income tends to raise the husband's
threat point relative to the wife's, pushing the negotiation set away
from equality. Offsetting that asymmetry, however, are factors
that tend to increase the net marital surplus, or the utility for sharing among family members.
One important factor determining the size of the surplus is the
degree of concern that each spouse has for the other and, thus, the
degree of vicarious utility each spouse gains from the other's satisfaction. The performance of an unpaid service can generate benefits of various kinds. If the spouse who performs a task (say,
cooking a meal) gets vicarious satisfaction from the other's enjoyment (which is above and beyond any consumption value from
eating the food) then the total utility generated by a particular
quantity of effort will rise, and this will add to the marital surplus.
Increasing the marital surplus increases the marital pool (or size of
the pie), which increases the possibility, ceteris paribus, for an equal
split of relative satisfaction. This indicates that· the possibility for
equality may be enhanced by active love , caring, and altruism
within marriage. Moreover, the more the cook enjoys cooking, the
greater the contribution to the net marital surplus, because the effort costs the cook less. 126 Either way, the possibility of equality is
increased.
0
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1 ~ 6 ln the foregoing calculation, this reduces the value of C(W) for the cook, rather
than directly adding to the value of R. See supra note 124.

568

Virgin ia L aw Review

[Vol. 84:509

Today, wom en are not forced to adopt th e ro le of traditional
'>vife. T hey have a spectrum of choices. It follows th at women who
elect conventional roles m ay comprise a self-selected an d unreprese nt ative sampl e of all women. Women who stay home may thus
have a greater than average taste fo r domestic work or may deri ve
.m ore than average satisfaction from nurturing or fro m rendering
direct services to others. At a given level of service provided for
fam il y membe rs , a woma n of this type may experience a higher
level of well-being, and comparatively less of her well-being wil l
come at other fam ily m embers' expense . Putting marit al carin g to
work through domesticity may decrease the degree to wh ich o ne
spouse's utility is directly traded off wit h the oth er's. 127
'" As the econ omi st Yoram Weiss puts it, altruism can have th e e ffect of " red uc[ing]
th e ra nge of di sag ree ment. T ha t is, the parti es, if they had powe r to d e te rmine th e
o utco me unilatera ll y, will choose actions which are relative ly cl ose." We iss, supra
note 41 ,a t19.
It is possible to ove rstate th e difference betwee n wome n who choose to work for
pay and those who choose to work exclusively at home. On e can specul ate that there
has bee n an evoluti o n over time in the "utility profile" of wo men who cho ose to stay
home full-time to care for their children. See, e.g., Danielle Critte nden , Turning Back
th e Clock , Women 's Q. , Autumn 1996, at 6, 6-7 (comparing th e " old traditionalist"who pl aces greater e mphasis on ho usekeeping and caterin g to husbands-to th e " new
traditi onali st"-who is primarily focused on attentive childrearing). O ne at-home
moth er, in descri bin g her motiva tio n for staying home, has asse rted th a t at-home
moms " loo k upon ho usework th e same way everyo ne else does: as a ted io us necessity. O ur real job ... is caring fo r a nd teaching o ur children." Pa ulin e A. Co nnole,
Le tte r to th e E ditor, Mot her, Not Housekeepe r, Wash . Post, J a n. 29, 1997, at A20.
T his sugges ts th at most var ia ti o n among wome n will currentl y be obse rved , no t in
utili ty fun ction s for ho memakin g tasks, but in preferences for tim e with childre n a nd
views about th e im portance of in te nsive parental attention .
T here are other reasons to exercise cauti on in advancin g ge nerali zations about
working and stay-a t-h o me wo me n. The taste for domesticity is o nly o ne co mpo nent
of th e decision whe ther to work for pay. That decision is also influe nced by such factors
as th e market wage a woman ca n co mmand (which is in turn ba se d on educa ti o nal ,
geograp hic, and eco nomic factor s) and the direct and opportunity costs of going out
to wor k (such as tra nsportation, childcare, taxes, clothing, possib le decreased quality
o f house hold prod uctio n, and psychic costs of separation from children) . Moreov er,
th e so-ca ll ed "barga inin g sque eze," see infra Secti o n IY. C, describes the pe rpet ua tio n
of ro le d ivisio ns th at does not de pend on pro nounced differe nces in pre fe re nces, but
req ui res o nly that th ere be some sma ll initi al in equality in res ponsibility fo r ho usehold work. As th at analysis reveals, women 's choices may be as imperfect a guide to
th e magn itude of th eir differe nces with each ot her as they are to their differences
with men, because choices are a co mplex functi o n of many factors th at includ e th e
power to " ge t o ne's way ." No ne theless, wh ere economic and socia l facto rs bea rin g
on the cos ts and payoffs of work are similar, differe nt wo men wi ll still make differe nt
choices. These co uld turn on variations in th e " taste for do mes ticity " or fo r caring
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Of course, a working woman serves her family by earning income and may get considerable consumption value from her work,
just as the housewife does from hers. This would appear to complicate a comparison between the payoffs different women receive
from the range of services they provide their families. By definition, however, some considerable part of the yield from paid work
is not part of marital surplus. Although marriage makes possible
the purchase of public goods and enjoyment of economies of scale,
most of the paid work would presum ab ly be done, and the income
enjoyed by the earner, regardless of marital status. 128
Some comparison is possible, however, because even in dualearner families domestic services must somehow be performed.
The foregoing analysis provides reason to believe that domestic
services provided in dual-earner fa milies generate less utility than
equivalent services within traditional households. That is not just
because the dual-earner provider-usually the wife-probably gets
less consumption value and less vicarious pleasure from providing
domestic services than a housewife. It is also because the services
are provided under conditions that may increase their cost of production, and probably decrease their quality. 129 The housewife's
work carried on within a private sphere, as compared to the taste for the kinds of
work available for pay.
Finally, to assert that housewives may get greater enjoyment from "doing for others"
than working women is not to imply that dual-earner marriages lack love or caring.
Rather, the difference may lie in the choices of how, and to what degree, to "put love
to work" in direct service to others. Many husbands who do not do any housework
surely consider themselves "loving." The ways in which they choose to exercise their
caring tendencies-if at all-will be affected by other tastes and preferences, as these
play out under bargaining constraints and in the face of more or less material scarcity.
See infra note 133.
128 Marriage may induce spouses-especially men-to work harder and earn more.
That increment in earnings will count as part of the surplus. See Linda J. Waite,
Does Marriage Matter?, Presidential Address to the Population Association of
America 6 (Apr. 8, 1995) (transcript on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing the increased earnings of married men); Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Children, J. Econ. Persp., Winter
1998, at 137, 143 (describing as "well-established" the fact that married men earn
more than single men); Waite, supra note 40, at 28-30 (noting, in addition to other
benefits, the higher household wealth among most married individuals, compared to
unmarried ones).
129
Because the housewife spends more time overall on housework, she may be able
to generate gains from specialization for each additional hour of work and provide a
higher quality product for a given amount of effort. For dual-earner spouses who
must perform domestic tasks in off-work hours, the specialization function is far
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first and last ho urs of effort go into providing household services.
Domestic services provided by wage e arners require gre ate r effort,
and cost more, because that effort is added to many hours of paid
effort. 110 Moreover, the housewife 's first and last hours of effort go
into direct service to others, and they bring her vicarious pleasure.
Even if the working wife enjoys doing for others as much as the
house wife, fewer of her tot al working hours are spent in hands-on
ca rinbo or nurturinbo activities. Conseouentlv, she g: ets less of the extra vicarious satisfaction from her effor ts (al
though t hi s effect may
'
be mitigated somewhat by the housewife 's dimini shin g returns in
vicarious satisfaction with each hour of work) . F inally, the pace
and pressure of domestic work are gre ater for \vage earners, who
may atte mpt to compl ete each task in a shorter :p eriod of time.
of dinne r, squeezed
into
T he fr antic \Vorking wife's preoaration
>
'
half an hour, may come at greater cost (and produce a less tasty
meal) th an the housewife's two hours spent in unhurried preparation. In sum, a housewife/breadwinner arrangemen t, other factors
being equal , may produce a larger marital pie than a comparable
dual-earner arrangement by wringing larger positive utility gains
from the sum total of activities (wage plus non-wage production)
that all households must conduct. 13 1
~

.L

..1

..........

~

~

shallower, and the qu ality of the prod uct is probably reduce d. This is anothe r way of
say ing, as Gary Becker has asserted , that ho usewiv es are more efficient producers of
do mes tic services th an members of working couples. See Becker, Trea tise, su pra
note 36, at 21-32.
This docs not e xclud e th e possibility, as alread y discussed, se e supra note 64, that
the most effi cient arrangement for some co upl es--especi ally the high earne rs-is to
hire house hold help. One of the criticisms of Gary Becke r's economics of th e ho useho ld is tha t he takes too littl e acco unt of the ga ins from specializati o n by women
through the hiring of paid help and contracting o ut of services. See Be rgma nn , supra
note 7, at 260 (d iscussi ng the " cash-paying" solution); Margaret F . Brinig, Comment
o n Jan a Singer's Alimony an d Efficiency, 82 Geo. L.J. 2461, 2471 (1994) (notin g that
Becker and o th ers " assume it is not ' efficie nt' to hire som eone e lse to do th e wash or
cle an the house") .
D>j The more that responsibility is exclusive ly pl aced o n one member of the co uple,
the steeper the increase in costs for an eq ual amount of work. See infra note 188
(discussing diminishing returns on work and leisure as each person moves towards
re lative monopoly on each).
"' The main objection to this conclusion would ste m from the observation that the
dua l-e arner wife's efforts in the market also contribute to th e we ll-bei ng of ot hers:
S he earns mo ney that can be invested in public goods or other items for fam il y members. But that is just a direct measure of the production value of her work . Work ing
to provide goods fo r the e nj oy ment of o nesel f an d ot he rs , and gett ing vicario us
pleasure from others ' e nj oym e nt of those goods (or serv ices provided in lie u of them )
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If traditional role-divided couples do indeed come out somewhat
ahead, as speculated, in generating utility from comparable effort,
132
Gary Becker's "altruistic head of household" model is turned on
its head. To the extent there may be greater gains to traditional
households, it is the altruism of the household caretaker-usually a
133
woman-that makes those marginal gains possible.
That larger
pie will tend to offset the in equaiity-producing influence of the disparity between incomes. It does not follow, however, that the cause
of egalitarian marriage would be advanced by moving women back
into the home since the eq ualizing effect is only partly dependent
on the mechanics of division of labor. It is also a function of the
idiosvncratic
oreferences
and tastes of those who feel comfortable
.
'

are conceptually distinct. The latter can be added to the former, but need not be.
Still, a working wife may take "extra" vicarious pride in providing materially for her
family, in a way that may at least partly offset the loss of vicarious pleasure in forgone
nurturing work.
'"See supra note 36 (discussing Becker's model).
";This discussion does not entail the conclusion, nor does it require the assumption, that women generally are more altruistic than men, or that housewives are more
altruistic than working women. (It also does not rule out, however, that both propositions might be true.) See infra Section IV.B.l (discussing lessons of bargaining theory). It is necessary to distinguish here between altruism as a general trait (which is
the tendency or capacity to enjoy contributing to others' well-being) and the specific
ways in which altruism is actually brought to bear. The gender role conventions surrounding the conduct of marital relations; women's possibly average greater taste for
domestic activities and hands-on, unmediated caretaking; and the power balance created by the bargaining relationship may ail combine to push women of altruistic bent
to express their altruism through direct service to family members-what is commonly referred to as "nurturing." The point is that nurturing is not the same as altruism. Rather, nurturing is one form that altruism can take.
Performing domestic services and being responsible for caring for others within the
family is still costly for the caretaker, man or woman. It thus generates some negative utility. The person with more power in the family (generally the husband) will
thus do less caretaking, even if that person is more altruistic than the average person
an d even if more altruistic than his or her spouse. Second, altruistic persons may
choose very different avenues for expressing their concern for others, depending on
interests and tastes that have nothing to do with altruism as such. (Ralph Nader
could be said to be altruistic, but he might not make a very good housewife.) Expressing altruism through domesticity may carry different appeal for the average man
and woman, and thus the private domestic realm may in fact provide fewer opportunities to men than to women to act on t heir altruism in preferred ways.
Finally, there are strong social conventions that make domestic activity generally
more costly to men than women. See infra Section IV.A.l. The existence of these
factors explains why the fact that family caretakers are usually women is not necessarily inconsistent with the proposition that men and women are equaliy altruistic.
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in traditional female roles. Increasing the number of housewives
who hate domesticity will not generally make marriage more equal.
The foregoing discussion reveals a broader point: The more love ,
the more the possibility for equality. When spouses care about
each other, there is more overlap in th eir utility functions. One
spouse's satisfaction automatically increases the other's happiness,
at least to some extent. Where there is little altru ism and little satisfaction in the other person's happiness, the spouses move closer
to a zero-sum game in which one person 's gain is t he other's loss.
The most effici ent marriages may be those in which there is not
just caring, but active caring. In such relationships, there is an even
more pronounced divergence from strict linearity in the trad eoff of
utilities because one or both spouses find happin ess engaging in activities that directly increase the well-b eing of th e other. This increases the effective size of the marital surplus. And the greater
the surplus, the greater the room for equality as compared to arelationship marked by a more linear zero-sum tradeoff. Active
caring can sometimes transform an NE deal into a PE one. See
Figure 3.

573

Egalitarian Marriage

1998]
Figure 3.

g

a

1
I
I
!

- ~ ----- - --

1
I

----------------

:b

e

----,---

f

1
I

U(h)%

I

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I

T(w)

U(w)%
T(h) and T(w) =threat points of husband and wife
U(h) and U(w) =utility of husband and wife
abc= bargaining surplus for zero-sum deal
gbf =bargaining surplus for non-zero-sum deal
e =egalitarian split for non-zero-sum deal (which lies
within negotiation set for that deal, gbf)
h =egalitarian split for zero-sum deal (which lies
outside negotiation set for that deal, abc)

Two other factors merit further discussion, as they affect the
possibility for an equal split of resources between the parties. The
first is monetary income. As has already been suggested, the greater
the income, the greater the quantity of marital resources available
134
for division between the parties. More income buys more goods,

1'"'

See supra Section lll.B.
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both public and private, whi ch add to ut ility :for both parties. But
apart from the effe cts em the size of the pie, greater wealth also increases the practical potential for side-payments: Because not all
assets are ti ed up in shared public goods, some of the surplus generated by one spouse's extra efforts can be kicked back in monetary form for that spouse's di scretionary use. 135 Because having t\vo
earners tends to make coup les fina ncially better off, the income
fac tor will tend to foster equality among dual -earner couples
(especially the more affluent ), th us offse tting sornewhat the surplus-enhancing effects of role division." 6
The final point to be gle aned frorn the bargaining paradi gm is
the importance of the cost of outside alternatives re lative to the
cost of the current marriage f:::>r the spouse with the best al tern atives, -which is assumed to be the husband . If remarriage is an important alternative, this suggests that the prospects for egalitarian
marriage are minimized if the marriage market is dominated by
women who demand few marriage-specific investments from
men-as when, for example, men are generally expected to take on
a small share of domestic responsibility and can devote themselves
to paid work and leisure. 137 If most women demand little marriagespecific investment-whether from adherence to convention, poor
bargaining power, or just plain pe rson al preference-then it becomes more difficult for a few women to hold out for a lot more
from men without pushing these men closer to their threat point or
beyond and past their reservation price . This suggests that each
woman's marital bargain can never be entirely independent of the
marriage that other women are wiiling to make. VVives must bargain in the shadow of the market in a doubl e sense-not just with
the knowledge of the availability of potential rivals for their husSee supra note 42 (discussi ng sid e-payme nts).
The foregoing disc ussion should not suggest that having both spouses work for
pay could nev er be the more efficien t arrangement overall. See Beck er, supra note
34, at 15 1 (acknowledging that both spouses working for pay may be an optimal arra ngeme nt as "families [beco me] smaller, divorce more common , and ea rning opportunities for wome n improve[)"); see also Brinig, supra note 129, at 2469-73 (crea ting a
model to demonstrate how a dual-ea rner arrangement cou ld be the most effici e nt for
some co uples).
137
Under the re lationship descri bed by th e equation supra note 124, the chance fo r
an egalita rian split decreases when CA (H) (a term that include s the husband 's alternative marriage -speci fic in put) beco mes smali absolutely and 3ma ll rela tive to C(H)
(which in cludes a componen t of the husban d 's current marriage-specific input).
135

1)&
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C. The Influence of the Bargaining ProceS,\'

Up to this point, the discussion has foc used on whether and
v;hen egalitarian marriage is possible. We can predict that some
rational, self-interested individuals v1ill contract marriages that are
unequal-those relationships ;,vill never be egalita.ricm (NE). But
what of the remaining unions ? B argaining theory teaches that just
because an egalitarian split is possible does n ot mean it 'Hill occur.
T he discussion in this Section is concerned with the likelihood that
equality will be realized and with the conditions ftlat '.vill tend to
foster or impe de it.
If we take as given each party's reservation price and thus the
negotiation set (that is, the possible set o f bargains that are consistent with rational self-interest), what determines which bargain
within that range will be struck? Game theorists have attempted to
identify the factors that in fluence the actual allocation of shares in
situations that require "splitting a pie." In predicting the outcome
of real-life bargaining, idealized games can only take one so far.
There is a large experimental literature suggesting that bargainers
often deviate from the behaviors predicted from models based on
perfect rationality and complete information. Social scientists have
used empirical data to add richness to t heir models in an attempt to
139
predict what re al people will do.
Because there are so many psych ological variables, analysis of the bargaining process has remained speculative and inexact.
The earliest models of how utilities ·would be divid ed within a
feasible negotiation set were static and highly theoretical: They did
not attempt to play out an actual bargaining sequence of alternatm See infra Sections V.C-D, V.E.2 (discussing the relationship between marital
bargaining and "deals" available on the marriage mar ket).
139 See, e.g., Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, Cognition and Rationality in
Negotiation (1991); Raiffa, supra note 73, at 44-65; Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 22743 (summarizing attempts to model real-life, dynamic bargai ning process); Martin
Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences 395-98 (1982); Colin F. Camerer, Progress in Behavioral Game Theory, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1997, at 166; Alvin E. Roth,
Bargaining Experiments, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics 253 (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (summarizing research on bargainers' behavior in
various simulated bargaining games).
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ing offers and counteroffers, but rather sought solutions that satisfied certain simple conditions and were stable in that no player
would have a rational incentive to deviate from his choices. The
most famous of these is the Nash bargaining solution. Under that
scenario, two players called upon to split a pie will divide the bargaining surplus-as delimit ed by each bargainer's threat point or
140
reservation price-down the middle, so that each has an equal share.
The equal-split-of-bargaining-surplus solution, although a theo141
retical construct not meant as a "predictive exercise," has enorm ous intuitive an d normative appeai as a "solution" to a vast
range of bargaining problems. It is al so useful for unders tan ding
th e concept of bargaining power, and the factors th at influence it .
Bargaining power is reflected in one party's ability to procure a
particular share of the bargained-for resources. Bargaining power
is in part a function of threat advantage-which determines the
feasible negotiation set-but it is also a function of a party's ability
to maneuver the other into accepting a proposed position within
the negotiation set. While there is no a priori reason to believe
that real-life bargaining will result in parties' adopting the Nash
solution-an equal split of the bargaining surplus-that solution
can be used as the starting point for gauging th e influence of factors that might give parties an advantage in real-world bargaining.142 It is not implausible to assume that an equal split of the bar-

1
" '' See supra note 122 (outlining a Nash solution for the IBM/S game); Baird, Gertner & Picker, supra note 48, at 21-23; Rasmusen, s upra not e 65 , at 229 (" Nash 's objective was to pick ax ioms that would characterize the agree ment th e two players
would anticipate makin g with each other. "); Shubik , supra note 139, at 200, 240
(defining a Nash equilibrium point for noncoopera tiv e ga mes a nd co mp a ring a Nash
solution to those of two alternative models). The idealized Nas h barga inin g so luti on
was o rigin ally proposed for the so -call ed cooperative bargaining ga me. A coo perative game, as already noted, see supra note 106, is o ne in which th e parties can make
e nforceab le and binding agreements as to payoffs (or in which a payoff divi sion is
impose d by fiat " from above"), as opposed to a noncoopera tive bargaining ga me in
which any agreement is not binding in the se nse that th ere is no externa ll y imposed
penalty for defecting from it. Many of the principles discussed here in, however, apply also to noncooperativ e bargains-those enforced so lely through se lf-he lp.
1 1
" Sen, su pra note 32, at 133 n.14.
1
"' Alan Wertheimer describes the Nash soluti on as one to which rational actors
would conse nt in a bargaining problem that is " fu lly d escribed by a set of possib le
outcomes in terms of the agent's utiliti es and by a 'threat point' or no transaction alternative. " Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 218-19 n.24. He exp la ins that "[ t)he rational bargaining view of fair tra nsactions is not a pure procedural vi ew .... To the
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gaining surplus should result if the parties possess perfect information and if all the factors that might affect the conduct of the bargaining are in balance as between them. In this sanitized setup, the
allocation of the cooperative surplus will be a straightforward reflection of the "relative strength of the parties' threat adv antages. " ~ Put another way, starting from a theoretical position of
an equal division of a bargaining surplus in a typical split-the-pie
game, the ability of one party to persuade the other to deviate from
that position is likely to reflect some bargaining advantage other
than that conferred simply by the lower limit on what each bargainer will rationally accept.
In the PE case, the egalitarian split li es within the feasible negotiation set. As the IBM/S example illustrates, an equal split of the
bargaining surplus will not precisely coincide with an egalitarian
division of overall payoffs if the parties' threa t points differ at all.
The Nash solution will favor the person with the better outside alternatives. See Figure 4.
1

3

contrary. It attempts to identify the terms on which fully ration a l parties would
agree." Id . at 218-19 n.24. The conception, howeve r, has a proced ural analogue: It
can be used to describ e a bargain that would be struck if th e influence of factors that
might confer procedural advantages-including strategic or psychological advantages that
affect the nego tiating process-are either absent or are evenly match ed on both sides.
The Nash bargainin g solution does not re prese nt the only attempt to provid e a determinate answer to the bargaining " division probl e m" for rational actors. See Jules
L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 37 (1992) (distinguishing the division problem from
the compliance probl e m in constructing schemes for ration a l cooperation). For example, David Gauthier maintain s that rational bargainers should , or would, abide by
the principle of "minimax relative concess ion, " which seeks to minimize the difference in utility as between th e bargain ers relative to each person's best bargain.
Gauthier, supra note 46, at 137; see also Werth ei mer, no te 32, at 219 (describing
Gauthier's theory). Whether thi s theory is predictive or normative, however, is not
entirely cl ea r. The Nash solution can be viewed as predictive only in the most ideal
sense. It predicts th e bargain th a t would result if a ll factors that affec t bargaining behavior and bargaining strength (except threa t point) are taken out of the equation or
are se t equal on both sides. In effect, it tells us what would happ e n if a perso n bargained with his Dopp elgiinger.
1') Coleman, supra no te 142, at 273.
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d =Nas h solution
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Thus , if the parties have different threat points but otherwise do
not differ on traits and elements that confer actual bargaining advantage, they still will not have an egalitarian marriage. T he outcome of their bargaining process will be point d (equal division of
bargaining surplus utility), rather than point e (equal p ercentage
net utility). The greater the divergence in their threat points, the
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more the actual bargain struck will devi ate from the egalitarian
idea1. 1.w
These observations suggest that even if men and women bargained the same way wi thin a potentially egalitarian relationship,
the benefits of marriage would on average go disproportionately to
men. T his effect would be due solely to factors that enhance men's
extrama rital and intramarita l threat advantage: most importantiy,
men's higher extr amarital uti lity, better remarri age prospects, and
longer reproductive life; less impo rtan tly, their gre ater earning
power and their somewhat different preference set for providing
and enjoying domesti c and child-oriented "public goods." These
factors alone explain the lion's share of men 's bargaining advantage.
But there is reason to believe that the realities of the negotiating
process only worsen the imbal ance. A num ber of strategic and
psychological factors have the potential to affect negotiating skills
or to confer bargaining advantage. It has been suggested that
women and men are not equally effective negotiators because they
may differ systematically in various ways that determine the ability
to strike a favorable bargain within the parameters that fix the
negotiation set. These include "toughness, patience, perceptiveness,"145 risk averseness,146 tolerance for conflict , aggressiveness,
147
"taste for cooperation," the differential concerns raised by the
'"' As Figure 3 illustrates (convex frontier), th e less complete the tradeoff in the
party's we ll-be ing (i.e ., th e mo re " caring"), the closer the Na sh solu tio n will b e to th e
egalitar ia n ideal. This illu stra tes the principle th a t love tends to pro mote equality.
'" 5 See Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 64.
'"" T here is a striking paucity of research supportin g th e freque ntly encountered assertion that men and women differ in their preferences for ri sk. A mong the behavioral ev id ence that is comm on ly cited is male predomin ance in th e incidence of criminal
behavior, a uto accidents, accid e nta l death, and substance abu se. See, e.g., Bureau of
Justice Statist ics , U .S. Dep ' t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
1996, a t 380 tbl.4 .8 (Kath lee n Mag uire & Ann L Pastore eds., 1997) (presenting sex
ratio of arrests for criminal offe nses); Nati o nal Highway Traffic Safe ty Admin. , U. S.
Dep' t of Tra nsp., Traffic Safety Facts, 1994, at 95 fig.23 (1995) (presenting data on
sex ratio of in vo lve men t in motor vehicle accidents).
7
'" Co mm e ntators have a tte mpt ed to capture women's purportedly inferior nego tia tin g ability in various ways, o nly some of which go more narrowly to negotiating
ab ility as characterized here in. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 55; see also England, supra
note 5, at 25 (asserting th at women more often operate on a "con necti ve model" that
"ta kes both one 's own a nd a con nected other's utility as roughly of eq ua l importance,
regard less of who is in a stronge r bargaining position, " wh e reas men more often
"see[) self-interested behavior as natural, and take[} advant age of being in a ' powe ro ve r' bargai ning position whe n it occurs" ); England & Kilbo urn e , supra note 5, a t
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presence of "hostages" (such as children), ~ the av ailability and
willingness to use cre dible commitment strate gies or first-mover
advantages, 149 the sense of entitlement and notion of fairness ,15( and
the time-dependent costs of disagreement. 151
These factors are quite diverse and have disparate roles in the
bargaining process. Moreover, there are a number of possibl e ways
to conceotualize these elements and their effects on the conduct of
bargaini~g and its outcome.152 This is not th e place for a comprehensive analysis of all factors that could possibly affect the conduct
or oargaming. For the purposes of this Article, the best way to
analyze the problem of weakness in the negotiating process is to
focus on some of the general elements that might affect th e psychology of bargaining over the allocation of resources within the
bargaining set. The psychology of marital bargaining is critically
affected by three closely related phenomena that determine how
hard each partner will press his or her bargain: (1) the relative potency of defection threats, (2) the sense of entitlement, and (3) the
endowment effect. In one way or another, these factors reflect
how marital bargaining takes place in the shadow of the market.
Each brings to bear the influence of extramarital market conditions
and values upon the conduct of negotiations within the private, offmarket rel ationship of marriage.
1 8

1

171-78 (discussing men 's and women's possib le difference in perception and use of
power); Mahony, supra note 16, at 34 (arguing that the widely held perception that
women have a stronger desire for cooperation puts women at a bargaining disadvantage); Rose, supra no te 55, at 423 (discussing how percep tion s of women's taste for
coo peratio n may help put th e m at a disadva ntage in acquiring property).
1
"" See England & Kilbourn e, supra note 5, at 172-73; Mnookin & Ko rnhau se r, supra note 89, at 966-68; Rose, s upra note 55, at 445.
1 9
" See Mahony, supra note 16, at 48-51 (noting that the marital partner with the
hi gher stat us or the more d e manding job can more pr::rsuas ivel y assert the difficulty
of taking on domestic responsibilities); see also Baird, Gertner & Pickner, supra note
48, at 43 (discussing first mov e r advantage in dynamic models of barga ining games);
Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 35 (same).
15" See infra no te 164 and accompanying text.
151
An o ther important fact or that can influence bargaining is access to information
abo ut payoffs and prefe rences. For discussion of the importance of informa tion in
the conduct of bargaining, see Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining, in Psychological Perspectives on Justice:
Theory and Applications 155 ( Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds. , 1993) .
152
For exampl e, some may be viewed not as going precisely to bargaining "strategy, "
but rather as affecting the utility value of th e outcome of the bargai n itse lf. See supra
note 147; infra Section IY.B .2 .
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T he first factor-the relative potency of defection threatsdepends on the parties' respective alternatives to an agreement. In
addition to fixing the parties' reservati on prices, the altern atives
also have a distinct effect on the psychology of bargainin g: T he
party with the best alternatives has the more credible thre at of
wal king away if the other party fails to cooperate. That is true
even if both parties stand to gain from the proposed agreem ent ,
and thus wo uld not ra ti onally abandon it. 153 The resu lt of thi s strategic advan tage is that the party with th e less desirabl e o utside optio ns wil l ofte n be more reluctant to drive a hard bargain or more
willing to m ake concessions, for fear th at the other party will call
the deal ofC 54 If a wife has more to lose from marit al discord or
3
"
As lo ng as both parti es stand to ga in by agreeing rather than fa ilin g to agree on a
bargain, a ra ti o nal actor 's threat of defection or no ncoo perati o n is not strictly cred ible, eve n if th a t party has compa rativ ely less to lose . See Gauthi e r, supra note 46 , a t
185; Sen , supra note 32 , a t 135 & n.21 (no ting that " th e re a re some very basic d iffi culties with a ny theory of threats, since it has to deal with situa tions after the bargaining
has fail ed" whe n "the threa tener has no o bvious inte rest in carrying o ut the threa t").
Neve rth e less , differe nt threat points can be expected to influ e nce the conduct a nd
o utcom e of actual barga ining because th e danger of failure to reach a n agreem e nt is
no t illu so ry in real life . As Alan W e rth e imer points o ut, " there is no reaso n to assume th a t just because bo th parties will gain from a ny di visio n of th e social surplus,
they will find th e ir way to such an ag ree ment, just as th e re is no reaso n to assume
that beca use both parti es will gain fr o m th e coopera tive solution to the prison er 's el ile mma , th ey will both coope rate." We rth e imer, supra note 32, at 237. One reason a
positive-sum deal may no t go throu gh is that refu sa l to coo pe ra te can be part of a
larger successful strategy; ca rryin g o ut ho ldout threats he lps parti es e nha nce th e ir
credibility a nd discourages the other party 's taking ad va nt age in ite rative barga ining
sit uati o ns. Thus a strategy that is a sho rt-te rm loser may be a long-t e rm winner. See
Coleman, supra note 142, at 273; Robert H. Frank, Pass ions Within Reaso n: T he
Strategic Role of th e Emotions, in 2 Applied Behavioural Eco no mics 769, 774
(S hlom o Maital e d., 1988). But regardl ess of whether it confers tactica l advantage ,
" breakdown" is always possible betwee n rea l peo pl e, who are not a lways strictl y rational. Thus, the " breakdow n positi o n" can be expected to influ e nce the conduct of
bargainin g. See Sen, supra note 32, at 135 ("Th e brea kdown position indic ates the
person [sic] vulnerability o r strength ... . If, in the case of a breakd o wn , one pe rson is
go ing to e nd up in more of a mess . .. , th a t is goin g to weaken that person's ability to
secure a favorable outcome. " ); see also He nry Sid gwick , The Me th ods o f Ethi cs 288
(7th ed. 1962) (" [I]n barga inin g th e less willing has th e ad va ntage .'' ).
'" Thi s ana lys is appli es wh e re the re leva nt " threa t point" is intra ma rital no ncoope ration as well as aband o nment of th e marriage. As a lready noted, see supra Sections II.D .3 .b-c, men's intra marital threa t point tend s to be high er th an women's. In
cases where the husba nd 's intramarital threat utility excee ds hi s extrama rita l threat
adva ntage , th e intram arita l threat adva ntage will be especially hi g h. In such cases,
however, we can expect that the ma n's divorce threat advantage wi ll more closely
shadow his intramarital threat utility . That is , th e distance be twee n the av e rage
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upon another important sense in which bargaining takes place in
the market's shadow: Parties may import market values into the
bargaining process by allowing external criteria to influence the
perception of appropriate bargaining concessions and demands.
The market influences how parties value contributions that are of
different types and thus are difficult to compare, if only because
the market provides a ready measure of value. vVhat does not
come from the competitive market will appear less valuable than a
contribution that is market-priced. Thus, the person whose contribution is in-kind and off-market-that is, the person whose contributions come largely in the form of direct and marriage-specific
services to the family circle-will be deemed to contribute less than
the pe rson whose contribution comes largely in the form of money
or ot h er tang1"bl e assets. 160

60
'
A number of commentators have attributed the devaluation of women's contributions to the family economy to the tendency to discount "off-market" or
"unpriced" contributions and to exaggerate the worth attached to contributions in
the marketplace. Barbara Bergmann has described the importation of "a market
idea of fairness into family life," whereby a family member with higher earnings will
"buy himself out of spending certain hours doing housework," regardless of other
measures of contribution or value. Bergmann, supra note 7, at 271. Amartya Sen
calls the strong tendency to discount the value of nonmarket internal contributions in
favor of more easily measurable (and externally priced) contributions from the marketplace the "perceived contribution response." Sen, supra note 32, at 137. He adds
that
[t]he nature of "perceived contribution" to family opulence has to be distinguished from the amount of time expended in working inside and outside the
home. Indeed , in terms of "time allocation studies," women often seem to do
astonishingly large amounts of work even when the so-called "economic" contribution is perceived to be relatively modest. The perception bias tends to relate to the size of the direct money earning rather than to the amount of time
and effort expended ....
I d. at 139-40 (citations omitted). Sen describes how notions of "e xchange entitlement," which are pegged to market value, produce the result that women are unable
"'to see [their] work as a value-producing work."' Id. at 144 (quoting Maria Mies,
Lacemakers in Narsapur: Indian Housewives Produce for the World Market 173-74
(1982)). A greater market role can boost bargaining power by giving a woman "(1) a
better breakdown position, (2) possibly a clearer perception of her individuality and
well-being, and (3) a higher 'perceived contribution' to the family's economic position." Id. Finally, Shirley Burggraf describes the market invisibility of a woman's
customary contribution to the family, which comes largely in the form of opportunity
cost and value added to children. That invisibility fuels a pervasive tendency to take
women's domestic contributions for granted and to discount their value. See
Burggraf, supra note 81, at 16.
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Finally, marital negoti ations are heavily influenced by an "endowm ent effect," which pegs the exchange value of bargainers' of161
fers to a preexisting status quo.
In this respect, women are hurt
by the fact that bargaining rarely takes place on a clean slate. In
th e ge neric, idealized split-the-pie game, parties come to the tabl e
without a history of preexisting al locations and without preconceptions about the shares to which they are entitl ed. Rea l-life marital
bargaining deviates from this ideal by taking place in the shadow of
powerful cultural expectations for men and women in marriage.
The conventional role divisions in marriage-in which men invest
more heavily in market labor while women take on more domestic
responsibility-make the worth of each spouse's contribution depend on a baseline in which the spouses ei ther perceive themselves
as possessing a presumptive en titlement or as seeking to acquire
such an entitlement.
T he bargaining process then proceeds
through a set of exchanges in which spouses propose concessions or
demands that may alter the conventional baseline. If men see
themselves as entitled to certain services, and women see themselves as duty-bound to provide them, then any woman who seeks
to shift responsibility for those services onto her husband must
purchase that shift through larger concessions than would be necessary from a neutral baseline. Likewise, men will demand greater
concessions before they will consent to take that responsibility
upon themselves. 162 Moreover, because individuals are generally

101 See Cotter, supra note 10, at 2113 ("An endowment effec t is sa id to arise when
th e price I would demand to se ll so mething already in my possession is greater than
the price I would be willing to pay to acq uire that same thing if I did not already hav e
it. "); see also id. at n.188 (citing so urces in the experimental social science literature
concerning the psychology o f e nd owme nt effects); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altrui sm, a nd Market Illusion s: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. Rev.
1309, 1358-61 (1986) (noting th e implications of endowment effect research for th e
economic a nalyses of law) ; He rbe rt Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment
Effect, 20 J . Legal Stud. 225 (1991) (suggesting applications of th e e ndowment effect
to th e formulation of law and policy); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law ,
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179-81 (1997) (discussing behavioral manifestations of " loss
aversion" as a form of endowment effect); Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and
th e Offer/Asking Price Gap, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 663 (1994) (discussing the implications
of the endowment effect for entitl emen t allocation policies).
161 See Sigel, supra note 85, at 190 (commenting that "men expect to receive at hom e
but to give at work ... [wh ereas) th e woman also gives at work, [but) she has to give
at home as well"). Focus gro ups conducted by Sigel among 650 dual-earner famili es
provide ev idence of a significant endowment effect influencing men 's perception of
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observed to have different preferences for the risks of gains and
losses, the endowment effect, like the quality of fallback options,
can also influence the adamancy with which negotiating partners
press their case. In experimental situations, "players are more
willing to risk disagreement when bargaining over possible losses
than when bargaining over possible gains." 163 Since greater sharing
of a wife's traditional responsibiiities represen ts a loss for the husband relative to the baseline, he is likely to re sist concessions more
firmly than his wife (who stands to gain) will in sist upon them.
In practice, these three effects- "threat potency," entitlement,
an d endowment-all result in a wife's efforts counting for less than
a husb and's in any bargaining situation. The person who believes
he has brought "more" into the relationship will think he deserves
a better deal and will push for one. Even if contributions are objectively similar (for example, in representing an equal investment
of time), the person who is viewed as bringing "less," feeling unworthy, will grant larger concessions or refrain from demanding
more. Thus, a shared perception of the lesser worth of a woman's
efforts-whether in the labor market or at home-will generally
lead women to reduce their bargaining demands and men to increase theirs, causing women to lose out in situations that turn on
hard bargaining. If "a wife's hour is not worth as much as a husband's hour, her dollar is not worth as much as his, her education
and training count for less, and her attitudes carry less weight when
164
spouses are negotiating," it is hardly surprising that women will
working women 's contributions to the family. In general, men focused on the costs of
their wives going out to work, a nd saw th e extra incom e generated by their wives'
emp loyment as a mixed blessing. Id. at 163-64. This perception depend ed on men
comparing their dual-earner existence to a more traditional baseline arrangement.
The e ndowment effect created by that base line allowed husbands to see th eir wives'
income as earne d at considerably greater sacrifice to the family than th e ir own and to
discount the value of that income accordingly. Thus, although husbands viewed their
wives' earnings "as helping provide for the comfort of the family," id. at 164, and admitted "enjoy[ing] the higher standard-of-living their wives' employment facilitate[ d],"
id. , they mention ed many drawbacks. Among these were decreased wifely attention ,
decline in quality o f services, loss of the prestige and pride in the exclusive breadwinner role, and (for the more affluent) a loss of si mplicity of lifesty le and an increase in
consumerism from the availability of more disposable incom e . Id. at 163-65.
16
-' Camerer, supra note 139, at 172; see also Sunstein, supra note 161 , at 1179-81
(discussing behavioral evidence that an individu al's displeasure from losses tends to
exceed the pleasure from equivalent ga ins).
J6J Ruth Milkman & Eleanor Townsley, Gender and the Economy, in The Handbook of Economic Sociology 600, 614 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds.,
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come away with less of the bargaining surplus, and that the resulting bargains will deviate from the egalitarian ideal.
If women even partly share in the perceptio n that their contributions are 'North less, this carries important implications for the
real-life conduct of marital rel ations. Bargainers' subjective perceptions of fai rness can directly affec t bargaining behavior.
Women who th ink they have received a fair shake may simply
cease trying to get more (even if they would be happier with a
larger share) .1" 5 But if willingness to press harder is a component of
1994) . The effects described might al so help to expl ain repo rts th a t many women,
including th ose who are objecti ve ly overwo rked rel ative to their hu sband s, do not
perceive th eir situ a tion as inequit able or unfair. In the words of one researcher,
many em plo yed mo thers ex press " a surprisingly high leve l of sat isfaction with an objectiv ely unfai r situ ation. " David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and
the Division of Dom estic Labor, 42 Fam. Rel. 323 , 328 (1993). There is a voluminous
literature reporting on field studies in which husba nds and wives are asked whether
they believe marital responsibiliti es are allocated fairly. In many, although not all,
more than a majority of both me n and women consistently reply that the division is
fair. But cf. Sigel, supra note 85, at 36, 96-100 (finding that more than 80% of 650
women in sample focus groups expressed dissatisfaction with household division of
labor). Even though women do complain about "overload" and even though women
who ieceive more help from husbands at home are generally happier, most wives profess to be satisfied with less than a 50/50 split in responsibility or the balance of work
and leisure.
For a comprehensive review of the literature on perceptions of fairness, see PerryJenkins & Folk, supra note 16; see also Biernat & Wortman, supra note 11
(discussing the results of interviews with 139 married couples regarding their attitudes about home an d work life); Sampson Lee Blair & Michael P. Johnson, Wives'
Perceptions of the Fairness of th e Division of Household Labor: The Intersection of
Housework and Ideology, 54 J. Marriage & Fam. 570 (1992) (analyzing factors in
wives ' perceptions of the fairness of the division of household labor); Bryson et al.,
supra note 22 (studying dual-career families); Hochschild, supra note 23 (examining
the division of household respon sibilities between wives and husbands in two-job
couples); Emily W. Kane & Laura Sanchez, Family Status and Criticism of Gender
Inequality a t Home and at Work , 72 Soc. Forces 1079, 1095-96 (1994) (discussing
perceptions of gender in equality at home and at work); Lennon & Rosenfeld, supra
note 21 (investigating the sources and consequences of employed wives' perceptions
of fairness in the divisi on of housework); Major, Entitlement, supra note 157
(attempting to explain the perception of justice despite objective imbalance as stemming from women's sex-based perceptions of lesser dese rvingness and entitlement as
well as the intrinsic value attached to being male) ; Ste il & Weltman, supra note 11
(describing the effects of reso urces and personal attributes on the perceived importance of careers and sharing responsibiliti es at home).
165 Alternatively, women 's resignation may represe nt so ur grapes or an adjustment
of expectations to what women think they can get. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes:
Studies in the Subversion of Rationality 109-40 (1983); Sen, supra note 32, at 126;
Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 32; see also Hochschild, supra note 23, at 258-62

,
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bargaining power, it might be possible for women to increase their
share simply by being more insistent. T his strategy m ight work
precisely because where bargainers come to rest within the negotiation set is largely a m att er of subjective perceptions of value and
worth. There is no ine xo rable re q uirement th at a particular contribution within a closed bilateral monopolistic system must carry
any fi xed exchange value within the relat ionshi p. T here is n o reason why income must tra nsl ate into marit al powe r more readily
th an domestic work , or why "women 's fert ili ty, child rearing, emoti onal work, and housework are som ehow less of a contribution
than men's earnings." '"6 T hese relative values are a matter of psychology, not economics; bargainers in an off-market relationship
that generates a bargaining surplus are not price-takers. T here is
no competiti ve market, with many buye rs and sellers, where aggregate supply and demand curves meet to dictate price. 167 T hus,
"exchange" values within a bargaining relationship are not the
product of microeconomic forces generating an objective metric of
value that is beyond the influence of individual actors. 168 On the
contrary, the "value" of a particular contribution is a matter of the
allocation each party can force the other to accept, which in turn is
determined by volatile processes of negotiation and renegotiation.
Once the negotiation set and bargaining surplus are fixed (by factors that do in part reflect the external market value of the parties'
holdings and contributions), there is no reason , outside the perceptions of the parties, for the party who happens to be male, or whose
primary contribution is monetary, to have a strategic advantage.
T he advantage proceeds from the bargainers' choice to honor the
metrics of a market external to the bargaining process. That choice
is far from inevitable, because the values bargainers attach to any
deal are not fixed by any outside force.
(suggesting that wome n cease to press for change in their do mestic situation principa lly because they reali ze th e y lack the power to obta in a be tte r ba rgain).
Inn England & Kilbourn e, s upra note 5, at 165 .
167
See Rasmusen , supra not e 65 , at 227.
I6S The market price is gen e rally impervious to individual cho ices or will. That does
not mean, however, that peopl e must adhere to th e ma rke t price in day-to-day transactions involving market commodities. There is nothing to stop persons from selling
o r buying something for less or more than its mark e t price if they can find a trading
partn e r to join them in th eir fo lly. Finding som eone to go along is the challen ge . The
ma rk e t at least provid es a n o bj ectiv e measure of va lu at ion to which those transacting
busin ess can refer.
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On the other hand, just because some factors confe rring bargaining advantage are "in the head " does not me an that they are
easy to change. For one thing, there are two piayers to the marital
bargaining game , and spouses' in terests in adjusting the valuation
of marital contributions are clearly divergent. Eve n if a woman
successfully fights the psychology of her own devalu ation and fear
of loss, she must still negotiate to "get her way ." But that introduces yet another factor that may impede women's bargaining success. T hat women at times seem to obtain obj ecti vely smaller
shares can be fully explained by a combination of entitlement, endowment, and "threat potency" effects. But women 's smaller share
is often attributed to women's being more deferen tial, accommodating, or conflict-averse. 16·> The latter can aiso be reconstrued as
reflecting the uti lities attached to the spoils of bargaining when set
off against the psychic "transaction costs " of obtaining those spoils.
As Jeffrey H arrison has put it, "one could say that the accommodations of others or the avoidance of conflict is something from
170
which [a woman] derives utility. " A worse deal only looks worse
because personal transaction costs have not been factored in. On
this view, the problem with the "soft negotiator" is not that she
does not press hard enough for what she wants. Rather, she just
. enoug h .17 1
does not want rt
The possibility of reinterpreting what can be viewed as tactical
weakness as simply reflecting the "utility of the bargain" means
that the status of the factors that are said to affect bargaining strategy is necessarily more ambiguous than those that determine the
negotiation set. But , as already noted, the "softer " party's personality and strategies are not the only ones at stake. Men's tendency
to attach little importance to women's efforts is as critical to the

See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 10, at 7-9; see also id. at 8 ("[A]n accommodating
person dealing with a non-accommodating person will likely receive a smaller share
of the ga in from the exchange."); see generally Rose, supra note 55 (discussing the
irnportance of women 's putative conflict-averseness in bargaining over property).
170
Harrison, supra note 10, at 7.
17 1
That cannot be the whoie story, of course. A deferential bargainer will, in the
long run, find herself with fewer objectiv e resources, a nd she will have less to bargain
'>-Vith at a fut ure time whe n there is something that she dearly wants and she is willing
to shed any scr upl es against " hard bargaining." See, e .g., Rose, supra note 55
(describing how wome n fail to accumulate tangibl e barga ining ch ips in the form of
property ove r the cours e of a long-term relationship).
169
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outcome of the process as women's tendency to denigrate their
own cont ributions. If a woman's firmer belief in her own deservingness ·were reflected in greater boldness and higher expectations
at th e bargaining table, she still might not succeed if her husband
did not share her views. Both parties' expectations are critical to
the outcome Clf bargaining. Of course, one could argue that this is
only appropriate: One cannot expect men to give up value for what
they regard as worth less. D oes this reflect a tactical advantage , or
is it just a rnatte r of men's being true to their own utility profiles?
The difficu l of resolving this question makes it hard to know
whether and hovv mucrt the strategic considerations discussed in this
section can be said to ini:1uence equity, or deviations from equity.
There is always the possibility of reframing considerations that
seem to retl ect th e psychology of bargaining as simply reflecting
the value of the underlying bargain itself.
The forego ing discussion focuses on why women might make
greater concessions in one-on-one bargaining than they really need
to. But, there is some evidence of movement in the opposite direction: that women 's sense of fairness or equity is increasingly working to place limits on the concessions that they are willing to make,
even to the point of leading to the rejection of some bargains that
otherwise appear better than no bargain at all. T here is, for example, evidence from behavioral game theory that parties will sometimes "irrationally" reject positive-sum bargains if they believe
they are being taken advantage of. 172 In noniterative situations
(like marriage) where the strategic advantages of establishing a
reputation as a " hard bargainer" by rejecting a favorable deal are
not apparent ,173 the decision to divorce a spouse who insists upon
lopsided bargains can be explained as reflecting an independent
"taste for equity," which factors revulsion against unfairness into

m See Rasmusen, supra note 65, at 229; Roth , supra note 139, at 266-74 (attempting
to explain the rejection of profitable offers in some "ultimatum game[ s]" as manifesting a prefe rence as to "relative share[s)'' or "fairness," or as advancing strategic
retaliatory or credibility-enhancing goals); see also supra note 153.
173
Marriage is still most commonly entered into only once or twice in a lifetime, and
a reputation for having called a previous spouse's bluff may well make it somewhat
harder to find a nevv " trading partner." Although discarding a spouse as a strategic
move probably has fe w tactical advantages, driving a hard bargain within the context
of a particular marriage might.
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17 4

the utility function.
Re gardless of whether the rebellion against
bargains perceived as lopsided is seen as a tactical choice or as a
shift in the perception of costs and benefits, it may he lp account for
the observation that most divorces are initiated by women, even
th ough marital breakup leaves most women objectively \NOrse off
(a nd worse off than thei r husbands).i 75

D. Hard Barga ining and Dual-Earner Co uples
If we accept that some of the factors discusse d in the for egoing
Section may operat.e to ca use marital deals to deviate frorn equity
in favor of men (rather than to change the way we calculate eq uity) , the payoffs of the actual bargains struck vvould diverge from
t he e galitarian ideal to the vvife's detriment even more th an those
176
struck from bargaining equipoise. T here may be additional countervailing forces, however, that act selectively to moderate these
sources of women's putative bargaining disadvantage. By someaithough not necessarily all-external measures of \vell-being, traditional role-divided marriages are more egalitarian than dualworker marriages: Specifically, conventional housewives' hours of

174
See Harrison, supra note 10, at 5-9 (discussing ways to conceptualize , or incorporate into utility calculus, the observed " irrationality " of be hav ior in ex perime ntal ultimatum games); id. at 9 (suggesting th a t, as a matter of sim ple econo mics, " as soon
as a potential contracting party develop[s] a sense of compe nsatory justice th a t preve nts the making of the bargain, the bargain is not one that would have enhance d the
position of both parties in the first place") . But see Werth e imer, s upra note 32, at
239 n.75 (questioning whether th e preference for fair de als is best analyzed as a
"psychic utility gain[]" from fairn ess).
175
See Ira Mark Ellman & Sh aron Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments fo r Fault Divorce, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 719,731 n.44
(sta tin g that it is often difficult to determine whether wives or husbands are instigating a div orce, but noting polls that reveal that "between the ea rl y 1970s and th e !a te
1980s, a majority of divorce d persons shifted from re porting tha t their divorce was
the husband 's idea to reporting that it was the wife's "); see also Paul DeWitt, Breakin g U p is Hard to Do, Am. Demographics, Oct. 1992, at 53, 56. Data from the first
half of the century indicate that the tendency of wives to initiate most divorces is not
a recent trend . From the 1920s to 1950, women sought almost three-quarters of all
divorces a nd annulments nationwide . See J. Herbie Difonzo, A lte rnatives to Marital
Faul t: Legislative and Judicial Exp e riments in Cultural Change , 34 Idaho. L. Rev. 1, 6
(1997) (citing Pau l H. Jacobson, American Marriage and Divorce 121 tb l.58 (1959)).
For furth e r discussion of how th e bargaini ng paradi gm helps explain patterns of initiation of divorce, see infra Section IY.C.
176
This divergence is represented in Figure 4 by point f. Supra p. 578.
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work more closely match their husbands', whereas employed
women generally work significantly longer hours than their husbands overall. 177 As already discussed, the traditional wife's sources
of bargaining weakness (large marriage-specific investment and
market opportunity cost leading to reduced outside earning potential) mi ght be partly offset by the utility-enhancing effects of the
housewife 's specialized efforts and preferences. 178 If housewives do
get more of what they want, however, the one important reason
may be the strong conventions that dictate that, in carrying most of
the dom estic load without contributing earned income, a 'Homan
has done all that is expected of her-that is, she has done her fair
share. Altho ugh breadwinner husbands may theoretically be in the
position to extract more from the marriage-by deman ding an
even higher level of services, or effectively monopolizing all the
discretionary income, or dictating all major family decisionssocial taboos may prevent the more powerful person in a traditional marriage from really pressing the bargain to unseemly limits.
Thus, the actual bargain in many traditional marriages may be
skewed even closer to the egalitarian point than even a bargaining
surplus split would allow. 179 That equality would not reflect real
equality of bargaining power, but rather a form of grace or gift conferred in the shadow of social expectations regarding the proper
balance within the family. Nonworking wives can thus achieve an
actual though uneasy equality of well-being within an ongoing marriage. Nevertheless, they do not hold power equal to their husbands'. Their equality is provisional, in the sense that it depends
both upon men's forbearance and upon forestalling divorce.
In dual-earner couples, in contrast, social conventions governing
the division of labor will tend to accentuate rather than mitig ate
inequality. V/hen a woman brings in some portion of the family income, however large, there is no perception that she has done ali
that is expected. Quite the contrary. In this situation, there are
fewer normative checks on a husband's full use of his bargaining
power to negotiate for a more favorable deal and powerful incentives for him to do so. The result will be, at the very least, a failure
177
See Pleck, supra note 15, at 62-63; Szinovacz, supra note 15, at 175; see also supra
Section I.B (discussing the work-leisure gap among dual-worker couples).
17
' See discussion supra Section III.B.
179
See point gin Figure 4, supra p. 578.
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to mitigate the deviation from equality that would othervvise result
from the host of other factors creating imbalance. The foregoing
analysis he lps explain why women's economic gains in the workplace have not transl ated into gains at home. 180 Although market
earnings increase bargaining power, other factors supervene to undermine parity in du al earner families. This suggests that the future of egalitarian marriage is not bright and grows dimmer as married women engage in more and more paid work to generate
needed income for the family. 181
IV. INEQUALIT Y OF BARGAINING POWER: THEORY AND R EALITY

A. Equality in Practice?
The marital bargaining paradigm and the working definition of
egalitarian marriage used in this analysis beg many questions.
These questions are both theoretical and practical. The theoretical
objections center on issues of baselines (the starting point for
measuring equality in the working definition of egalitarian marriage), metrics (the currency in which equality is measured), and
the choice and treatment of variables such as preferences, norms,

sv This conclusion is buttressed by data collected by the economist Victor Fuchs
which suggest that the bargains married women have struck with their husbands have
generally become less favorable in recent years. Using data from a number of sources,
Fuchs found that in 1960 men on average worked longer hours than women
(including hours of wage and non-wage domestic work). Fuchs, supra note 7, at 78
tbl.5.1. By 1986, that trend had reversed, and women worked more hours. Id. Fuchs
also calculated an index of effective income per hour of work (paid and unpaid) for
all men and women, and for married men and women, using an assumption of equal
sharing of marital income. He found that the ratio of married women's to men's effective income per hour of work declined steadily from 1960 to 1986, dropping more
than 10% in that interval. Id. at 82. The 1986 ratio was still slightly greater than parity, however, which may represent the influence of the traditional couples in the mix.
(Unfortunately, Fuchs lumped together dual-earner and sole breadwinner couples,
thus limiting the usefulness of his data for this Article's purposes.) Fuchs attributed
the decline in the sex ratio of effective income to "the increased burden of work on
women who took paid jobs but still had substantial responsibilities at home." Id. at
82. Although the ratio is not a complete gauge of well-being by any means, it does
provide one good measure of women's economic status relative to men's, which reflects women's effective access to the pool of marital income. That access may serve
as one indicator of women's relative bargaining power.
181 See supra note 7 (discussing the importance of women's earnings to maintain
their families' standard of living over time).
1
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and social conditions that are taken as exogenous in setting up the
bargaining model and in defining egalitarian marriage.
Even if the basic elements of this framework are accepted , those
disinclined to believe that marriage is an engine of sex-based inequality are not without argument. It is one thing to posit a theoretical frame>;vork that predicts inequality of bargaining pmver in
marriage, and another to assert that marriage often produces reallife inequality in fact. It can be argued that a truly complete accounting of all the costs and benefits of marriage for bo th sexes \vi ll
produce a version of marriage that is, in practice, much more
anced. Indeed, alternative stories can be told to suggest that rnarried men are in fact operating quite near their reservation price for
·
, · w h.l
1s2
Th. e purpose ot- tms
, . rrart
t h e re l at10nsmp,
1 e women are not.
is to examine some of these possible accounts.

1. The Drudge "'vVife and the "Efficient" Household
Consider the example of a household that the social science data
suggest is fairly common: Husband and wife engage in roughly
similar hours of paid work and make significant, although not necessarily equal, contributions to family income, but the wife performs most of the domestic labor; she acts as a "drudge wife."
Each hour of household work is costly to the performer. 183 But the
work also generates positive utility, in the form of the production
of services performed. Assume the couple shares in this positive
184
utility in various degrees.
Suppose that, all else being equal, the
wife has a modest absolute advantage in domestic productivity. 1s5

182
See, e.g., S.A. Lloyd, Family Justice and Social Justice, 75 Pac. Phil. Q. 353, 36768 ( 1995) (offering three hypothetical marriages in which labor is unequally divided
between spouses-with the greater burden resting with the wife-and attempting to
reinterpret these as creating just allocations of burdens and benefits).
183
That is, it generates "intrinsic negative utility" for the person who performs it.
This function takes into account the inherent pleasure or consumption value (if any)
of actually performing the work minus the cost of the effort expended. The sum of
these two factors is assumed to be negative.
184
Differences in shares may result from different preferences for public goods
(such as a clean house) or because some of the tasks are performed for the benefit of
one person only (such as ironing a husband's shirts).
185
This may be because she generates more utility when she performs the tasks (she
does a better job) or because she dislikes performing these tasks less than her husband does (although her performance is still costly for her).
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\Vhy does the wife consent to act as a drudge wife? O n the assumptions here, the lopsided division of domestic responsibility is
Kaldor-Hicks efficient for the unit as a wh ole if we compare it to
an arrangem ent in which some of the dom estic labor is reallocated
to t he husband (a so-call ed "shari ng" arrangemen t). T he drudge wife produces a greater q uantity of gains for the spouses to share.
The problem with that explanati o n , as ~we h ave seen , is that it does
not teli us whether or how those gains ar e divide d. O ur impulse is
to assert that the wife must be capturing eno ugh of a share of the:
extra gains to m ake her effort worthv;hil e . T hat is, the arrangement m ust be Pareto-superior to any altern ative division of respon··
sibility within the fami ly, despite the extr a costs imposed upon the
wife, or she ·would not consent to it. This coul d occur in two ways.
T he drudge-wife scenario cou!d be intrinsically Pare to-superior to
186
alternatives (such as "sh aring") .
O r it could be m ade Pare to1s6 How, despite appearances, might th e wife be better off doing all the work ? T here
are several possible stori es to te ll. T he re are two sources o f pos itive utility fo r th e
wife : her share of the ben e fits of he r labor, and the intrinsic consumption value from
perfo rming it (which can includ e vicarious pleasure in o th ers' consumption of he r
services). On the negative sid e of the le dge r are the costs of he r effort (which factor
in he r degree o f distas te for ho usewo rk , which may o n a ve rage be less than her husband's) a nd th e opportunity cost of fo rgone leisure or o the r activiti es. Le as t pl a usible as a n expl a natio n fo r why wives do mo re is the possibili ty th a t a wife enj oys doing
a ll th e ho use ho ld work so much t ha t he r positi ve co nsum p ti o n va lue o utwe ighs a ny
extra nega tiv e utility or leisure opport unity costs she incurs. More credibl y, th e wife
mi ght ha ve a n absolute prod ucti vit y advan tage in do mes ti c tasks, a nd he r direct share
of the yield from th e la rger pie , e ve n without sid e-pay me nts, might e ffectiv e ly co mpe nsate her for the extra net cos ts of ta king on more work (w hi ch, due to differe nces
in distaste for housework , mi ght be so me what less th a n he r husba nd 's costs und e r a n
eve n-sp li t arrangement). In bo th of these scenarios, th e wi fe ta kes on the extra tasks
" vo luntarily"-that is, because she herse lf comes o ut a head by doin g them . Put a no ther way, if given the cho ice, she wo uld ch oose th ese a rra nge ments ov er an oste nsibl y more ev en spl it o f re spo nsibility.
T he working wife's tak in g o n t he li on 's sha re o f domesti c res po nsibility mi ght also
increase ho use ho ld productivity ove rall in a noth e r way: by increasing he r hu sba nd 's
ea rning power. If the wi fe ga rn e rs a great en o ugh sha re of th a t increase d earnin g
powe r (which is by no mea ns ass ured, see discuss ion infra Sectio n IV .B.l.a) she may
come out ahead despite he r "ex tra" effo rt over th e b ase lin e of a n equal split. T he
sources of increased earnin g powe r mi ght includ e a rejuve nati on effect, where by th e
ex tra leisure men enjoy e na bl es th em to work hard e r a nd perfor m be tter on th e job.
If th e husba nd earns more than t he wife , the enhan ceme nt o f fa mily incom e fro m
rej u ve na ti on might be greater for th e ma n than th e wo ma n. Simila rl y, the fl exibility
tha t freedo m from domestic respons ibility affords a ma n may have a significant impact on earning power by all ow ing him to be ava ilabl e to respo nd to unp re dictab le
work de ma nds a nd contingencies. Such flex ib ility may be more va lua ble to th e fa m-
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superior by a redistribution of the surplus through side-payments.
In exchange for the wife's greater contri bution of time, the husband might cede to her enough of a share of the surplus generated
by the wife's more productive efforts, in the form of other tangible
or intangible benefits, to cover the wi fe's costs and mak e her better
off overall than if she reduced her own effort at his expense .
Although these scenarios are no doubt apt depictions of some
relationships, there are important reasons to doubt that they account for most observed instances of drudge-wife households.
First, the exa mple takes for granted that the arrangem ent is Kaldor-Hi cks efficient because the wife has an absolute advantage in
all domestic labor-an assumption that is problematic at best, and
especially problematic in the case of dual-earner coupl es.187 Even if
ily in the hand s of men either because men 's earn ing power is greater fo r eq uivalent
jobs or because male jobs te nd to require more flexibility o r greater commitment.
A lterna tive ly, perh aps empl oyers reward men 's extra commitme nt at a hig her rate.
Even if such sex- linked effects were elimin a ted, however, it is not clear th a t two persons, each with half as much flexibility as a traditional husba nd, could eq ual th e
earning power of one person who has a mono po ly on th e ability to respo nd to employer demand s. On the perils of trying to combine paid work with d o mestic labor,
see Hochschild , supra note 23; Edward J. McCa ffer y, Slouching Towa rds Equality:
Gender Discrimination, Market E fficienc y, a nd Social Cha nge, 103 Yale L.J . 595
(1993); Williams, supra note 3.
An additional factor that makes it costli er, to both men a nd wom en, for men to
substitute domestic responsibility for leisure is that disgrace a ttaches in o ur society to
men who tak e o n tasks or ro les that are associated with fem ininity. See Case, supra
no te 159, at 3; see also supra Secti o n III. C (di scussing th e deva luation of trad ition a ll y
feminine activities). This intangib le stigma is compo und ed by more concrete re putati onal or signalin g costs th at may adverse ly affect a man 's occupation a l position o r
prospects, with financial ramifications for th e e ntire famil y. Even leavin g aside th e
poss ible financi a l effects , a wife may refrain from attempting to pre ss her husband
into domestic serv ice be ca use she prefers not to be marr ied to an uxo ri o us mane ith er beca use she cares about how her husband appea rs to o th ers or beca use he will
appear less attracti ve to her.
Finally, a comparison based sole ly on dura ti o n o f work tim e- the m etri c of marital
contribution th at implicitly underlies concern over th e work-leisure gap-does not
take into account the inten sity of work effort, work-related stress, and th e subjective
unpl easa ntn ess of work . It ca n be clai med th at men on average " work hard er" or are
subj ected to more stress on th e job, and th at the " extra" work women do a t hom e
barely makes up for this in th e cost-be nefit calc ulu s.
1x7 Discussions of the allocati on of wage work an d dom es ti c effort be twee n spouses
are ofte n domin ated by images co njured up by Becker's efficie ncy mode l, in which
women are assumed to have both a " natural" absolute adva ntage as well as a comparative advantage ove r men in domestic pursuits compared to wage wo rk . See
Bec ke r, Treatise, supra note 36, at 22 (d iscussin g comparative adva ntage); Bergmann,
supra note 7, at 266-67 (summarizing Becker 's theory of co mparativ e ad vantage);
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th at is the case, however, a drudge-wife arrange ment will not
necessarily be more efficient in every case th an a more even split of
responsibility. 188 Second, it is unclear wh at husbands are systemB! a u & Fe rbe r, supra note 16, at 37-45 (describ ing the simp le neoclassical mod e l o f
fami ly special iza ti o n a nd exchange): Hadfield , supra no te 55, at 96 (di scussing
Becker's th eo ry); Isabe l V. Saw hil l, Economic Pe rspec ti ves o n the Fa mil y, 106
Daedu lus 11 5, 11 8-20 (1977) (summarizing Becker 's theory of compara ti ve advan tage); Ja na B. Sin ge r, A li mony a nd Efficiency , 82 Geo . LJ. 2423, 2429-34 (1994 )
[he re in a fte r Singer, A lim ony and Effici ency ] (des cr ib ing efficie ncy justifica ti on for
alimo ny) . For a critiqu e of the co mpa ra ti ve adv a ntage a rg umen t, see H adfiel d , supra
note 55, a t 96-98.
Be cke r's comparati ve adva ntage a rgu me nt for ho useho ld spec iali za tion is prem ised
o n a o ne-fo r-on e tr adeo ff betwe e n the hours worked by husba nd s and wi ves in
mark e t a nd no nm ark e t sectors, in whi ch the husband's time free d up by the wife's
dom es ti c la bo r is p lowe d int o prod ucti ve wage work, a nd vice versa. Th a t mode l is
consiste nt with bo th spouses' devo tin g equ al tim e to work a nd e nj oy ing a n eq ua l
a mo unt of le isure, a nd it does no t d irectl y add ress th e e fficie ncy o r o th e r co nse q ue nces of a significant di spa ri ty in work a nd le isure time.
As we have seen , ma ny d ua l-e a rne r ho use ho ld s dev ia te fro m Becke r's pre mi ses. In
ma ny ho useholds , a spo use's wo rk in o ne sector does not always co m e at the expe nse
of work in the other. R ath e r, it co mes at th e expe nse o f th at spouse 's le isure .
Becke r's model simply does no t tell us how "optimizin g" spo uses should, or wo uld ,
a llocate the distribution o f work and le isure hours in excess of the o bserved "ma tched
ho urs" of labor, when o ne perso n is substitutin g consumpti o n fo r work. See supra
Sectio n I.B.
ti'S T he re a re a numbe r of fac to rs th a t could te nd to reduce th e e ffici e ncy o f a
" d ru dge-wife" situati o n re la ti ve to sha rin g. A be drock ass um ptio n of G a ry Becke r's
a na lys is is that wome n a re mo re producti ve in the do mestic sph e re . See Becke r,
T reat ise, supra note 36, a t 22 -23 . But Becker 's "sepa ra te sp heres" a nalys is assu mes
th a t the firs t and las t ho urs of wo me n's work a re in the un pa id secto r, a nd th at me n's
a nd wome n's efforts are ro ughl y matched . W he n wo me n work fo r p ay, the first hour
of do mestic work com es afte r ma ny hours of paid wor k . T hat p laces her hou se hold
effort o n the steep pa rt o f th e curve wh e re the cost o f p uttin g in additional hours ri ses
rap idly . Moving tasks to a tl a ttcr pa rt of the curv e ca n be ex pecte d to reduce costs
overa lL Thu s, the total costs of di stributin g tasks more even ly be twee n two wo rking
peop le may we ll be less th a n th e tota l costs incurred by ove rl oadin g o ne p e rso n wit h
most of th e respo nsibility.
F urth e rmo re, the ma rgin al va lu e of le isure ri ses as the number o f ho urs of work
pe rfor med increases. Thus, th e first ho ur o f le isure afte r e igh t ho urs o f wo rk is wort h
less th a n th e first ho ur aft e r twe lve, whi ch mea ns th a t, ceteris pa ribus, the co nsum pti o n utility to the du a l- ea rn e r unit will be grea ter whe n the le isure is shared than
whe n it is monopolized. See B la u & Fe rber, supra no te 16, at 47 (" [L] eisure is like ly
to be mo re highly valued by the partn e r who has less of it.") .
As already noted, see supra no te 129, the gain s a ttri b ut ab le to specializatio n in
domes tic work are also greatly a tte nu a ted (an d th e q uality o f the product much red uced) wh e n one spouse must sq ueeze do mesti c tasks into off-w ork hours rath e r tha n
perform the m as he r prim ary activity. Thi s a tten ua tio n arg ues fo r more sharing
a mo ng wo rki ng co upl es. Of co urse, it mig ht also a rg ue for wives' avo idi ng pa id work
altoge th e r. But see Brinig, supra no te 129, a t 2472 -73 & tb i.I (expl aining why, con -
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atically g1vmg their wives-or what benefits 1NOmen are syste matically enjoying-to mak e up for tbe extra work the wives are
doing across the board. 189 Third, although these accounts mitigate
trary to Becker, dual-earner famili es are sometimes mor•; efficie nt than traditional
breadwinner famili es).
Finaliy, for som e couples-for examp le, where both spouses can command a high
enough return on the labor mark et-the most effic ient arran ge ment might be to hire
house hold help. See Bergmann , supra note 7, at 260 (descr ibi ng the " cash-paying"
altemativc to hou se keep ing); supra note 129. O nly aboui 15 % o f couples use any inhom e paid hel p at a ll, which suggests that the " cash-paying" so iution is not efficient
for most couples, and thus matters litt le to our analysis here: . See Bergm ann, supra
note 7, ot 263 tb!.11-2.
''?Sec su pra no te 186. For examp le, mone tary side-paym e nts wi ll largely be confined to those affluen t families in which most resources ar.:: not co nsumed in meeting
basic needs and husbands hav e access to discretiona ry ir;come that can be " kicked
back " to the wife to make in-kind efforts worthwhile. In most families, howev er,
money is short, so most transfers must be in-kind. T he on ly way the hu sban d can
"compensate" his wife is by giv ing up his le isure or by making o ther concessions.
(Some of those concessions might be sexual. See infra Section IV.A.3.)
A lso, both the rejuvenation and flexibility arguments lose th e ir force unl ess men' s
freedom from respo nsibility raises total marital income (compared to the income under the sharing arrangement) enough to convince the woman, given he r individual
and joint shares, to agree to do most of the work. Such circumstances are most likely
familiar o nly to upper-income bracket couples, for whom the nature of emp loy ment
puts a steep premium on round-the-clock availability. See, e.g. , W illiams, supra note
3, at 2236 (describing the "domin ant family eco logy'· of high sta tu s professional jobs,
where the ideal worker can be away from home for more tha n twelve hours each
day). Finally, the claim that men work at more stressful jobs is difficult to support
empirically, as it is gro unded in highly subjective preferences and requires a gene ralization over a range of diverse experiences. To the extent that there are durable
measures of work-re lated stress, however, the evidence suggests that persons in low
status, low control, or humdrum jobs experience more stress; it is women who are
more likely to ho ld such jobs. See Spain & Bianchi, supra note 7, at 90-96 (discussing
occupational trends of women); Shirley Fishe r, Control and Blue Co llar Work, in Job
Stress and Blue Collar Work 19, 44 (CaryL. Cooper & Michael J. Smith eds., 1985)
(concluding that " the blue collar worker should incur more distress at work") ; Ben C.
Fletcher, The Epidemio logy of Occupational Stress, in Causes, Coping and Conse quences of Stress at Work 3, 21-24 (CaryL. Cooper & Roy Payne eds., 1988) (citing
studies that found higher levels of strain and stress among those in low occupational
positions); Mahony, supra note 16, a t 14-17 (d isc ussing occupational sex segregation).
T he main problem with the conclusion that some variation on the drudge-wife arrangeme nt is Pareto-superior to sharing is that it fails to account for th e sex bias in
the data: Not only does the work-leisure gap in every study uniformly favor the husband on average, but it also does so in every fam ily. It is exceed ingly rare to find
specific couples in the samples for whom the work-leisure gap is reversed. See
sources cited supra notes 18, 21 . Th us, the suggest ion that money-or nonmonetary
concessions-wi ll routine ly be used by one spouse to "compensate" the other for the
extra effort represented by the work-leisure gap only begs the que stion of why wives
are virtually never observed to use money or intangible concessio ns to compensate
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the apparent inequalities of the drudge-vvife situation, none provides any guarantee that th e work-leisure imbalance will leave the
wife as well off as other family members who benefit from her effo rts.1'i0 On the contrary, th ere is a more compelling scenario: that
a drudge -wife situation is Pareto-inferior to shari ng-that is, it enta ils an absolute loss for th e wife, ·with or without side-payments.
T he bargaining paradi gm explains why this scenario is not just
plausible but likely to occur in many cases: T he wife consents to do
more be cause she lacks the bargaining power to get a better deal.
T hus, acting as a drudge is not, for the wife, Pareto- superior to
sh aring (or, for that matter, to a n umber of marital arrangements
the co upl e could " rationally" adopt). R ather, it is better for the
wife than the prospect of losing her husband. And although the
husband who shares might also be better off doing half the work
than losing his income-producing wife, his greater bargaining
power allows him to avoid facing that choice.

2. Married Women's Labor Market Choices
The previous discussion suggests a diversity of answers to a question that has long engaged economists (and others): What determines whether and how much a married woman decides to work
for pay? 191 The evidence suggests that married women who enter
the workplace shoulder a greater burden of work than women who
the hu sband for taking on mo re responsibil ity . Even if women are on average better
a t performing domestic tasks , it is difficult to beli e ve th at working wom e n are so uniforml y more domestically productiv e than their husband s, or that the flexibility or
rejuv e nation effects are so uniformly more valuable for men, that a re versed pattern
is nev e r more e ffici e nt for any family. Fin all y, the mos t powerful objection to such
models is th a t there is simply no intram arital mechanism to ensure t hat, even if an
unequal division of labor produces a surplus, enough of that surplus will find its way
back to the wife to make her extra e ffort better for her than a more equal division of
responsibility.
190
For example, there is no guara ntee th a t th e husb a nd's putative extra earnings
due to the wife's greater domestic efforts wi ll be di stributed in the same mann e r. Indeed , existing evidence on the di stributi on and co ntrol of marital income suggests
that, e ven wh e n women make a significant contribution to family income, the husband still maintains greater control over di scretionary spe nding and family finances.
See supra note 11; infra note 220.
"' See, e.g. , Shelly Lundberg, Labor Supply of H usbands and Wive s: A Simultaneo us Eq ua tions A pproach, 70 Rev. Econ . & Stat. 224 (1 988); David Shapiro & Lo is B.
Shaw, G rowth in the Labor Force A ttachme nt of Marri ed Women: Accounting for
Changes in th e 1970s, 50S. Econ. J. 461 (1 983) ; James P. Smith & Michael P. Ward,
Time-Series Growth in the Female Labor Force, 3 J. Lab. Eco n. 59 (Supp. 1985).
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work excl usively at home . Certainly in some cases a woman may
judge that the "positive utility" she enjoys fr om working for pay
o utweighs the greater burdens. The sources of such utility can include the woman 's share of a larger famil y income; her vicarious
interest in her children's greater economic well-being; her expected
long-term payoff fro m career investment; th e value of insurance
ag ain st marital breakdown; the bargaining pmver gains fro m improving her ex tra marital prospects and contrib uting fa mily income;
an d the psychological and social benefits of occupational e nde avor
and career advancement. Of the items on this list. the va lue of insurance again st eventual marital breaku p probably looms especi ally large in li ght of current divorce rates and may go a long way
towa rds explaining many women's apparently costly labor market
choi ces. But that factor will not necessarily explain all wives' decisions to work .192
It is te mpting to assume that no wife will go out to work unl ess
working makes her personally better off. (Many women are motivated by their desire to make their children better off, but such desire counts in the present model as a personal gain in the wife's
welfare.) If a married woman is better off not working, why would
she ever go to work? This question should be answered in light of
evidence of ambivalence towards fathers and mothers in marriedcouple households both working full-time for pay. The data suggests that some working mothers would like to work fewer hours or
not at all. 193 It is possible that women who say they would like to
'"For an arti cle that find s a corre lation be tween wome n 's labo r mark et participation and th e av ail ability of no-fault divorce , see Allan Parkman , Why Are Wom e n
Workin g So H a rd ?, 18 Int ' l Re v. L. & Econ. (forthcoming 1998) (o n fil e with the Virginia Law Re view Association). Parkman find s that " living in a no -fault divo rce sta te
results in marri ed women having four and a half hours less leisu re a nd approximately
the sam e amount o f additi o nal time d evoted to work ." Id. (m a nuscript a t 11). He
specul a tes that th e increase in paid employment " is mo ti va ted by a des ire for perso nal in surance against the potenti a l costs o f divorce rather than to in crease [th e]
family 's we lfare. " Id. (manuscript at 13). Nevertheless, women still "continue to provide substantial hours of domestic work" so as to "make their ma rriage attractive to
the ir husba nd ." ld .
193 In a survey conducted by the Ind e pend e nt Wome n's Forum in 1996, o nly 13 % of
a rand om sample o f mal e a nd fem a le voters stated th a t both pa re nts working fulltim e was their " id eal bal ance betwee n work a nd famil y,·· and 36% of respondents
said tha t one pare nt should stay ho me full-tim e . See Ka rl Z in smeister, Indicators:
H om e Life & Life Work II , Am. Enterprise, July-Aug. 1997, at 16. Yet th e majority
o f moth e rs of children und e r 17 work full-tim e . See supra note 19.
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work less are not focusing on net benefits. Ra ther, they are foc using selecti ve ly on, and expressing regret over, the cost side of the
ledge r, which includes less time with thei r children and work overload, while selectively ignoring the compens ating benefits (money,
family power, relief from boredom) they receive from outside
work. Perhaps what they are truly expressing is a desire for the
benefits without the cos ts.
It is possible to imagine an entirely different explanation for this
regret or ambivalence, informed by a scena ri o in which the woman's
ga ins fro m working do not outweigh th e personal costs to her: In
that case, a housewife 's move into the workforce wi ll cause her to
be net worse off within the marri age . A woman might work because her husband and fa mily want more mon ey-they want a bigge r pie and believe her working will get them one-and she lacks
the power to refuse them. But, as the bargaining model shows, a
bigger pie does not necessarily translate into a bigger slice for the
person who works to expand the pie. Indeed, depending on that
person's bargaining position, she may find herself in a worse position.
How might this come about? Assume th at a wife and husband
agree that the family needs more money. T hey are faced with a
dilemma: If the wife works, who will care for the children and run
the home? These responsibilities, the couple might understandably
resolve, will be adjusted after th e wife begins her job. Assume,
however, that they are never adjusted after all, or at least not
much. T he woman finds herself with more responsibility and less
time . H er share of the family's larger income simply does not
make up for her personal utility losses. O nce she adjusts to this
crunch (by delivering fewer or shoddier domestic services or delivering services less efficiently) , the household may indeed be better
off as a unit than before. But it may be worse off. 194 Regardless of
whether the pie is larger or smaller (that is, whether the bargaining
fro ntier moves out or in compared to the alternative of a single
breadwinner household) , the new equilibrium bargain may place
the woman in a worse situation than she was in before . If there are
net gains to the unit, most of those gains may go to other family
members, with " assignment of the cost of increased economic

194 Se e supra Section III.B on the ind e termin acy of effici ency co nse qu e nces of wives
work ing for pay .
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benefits the whole family enjoys thanks to the wife 's employment
to he:r alone. "l''s And even in the absence cf net gains, the restriking of the bargain may shift the allocation of existing family resources away from the wife and towards othe r family members. In
particular, the wife's paid labor m ay benefit the husband at the expense of others in the household. The husband rnay spend m ore of
his incorne on personal pursuits, leaving his -;vife to pay ho use hold
expenses previously paid out of his earnings alm1e. :'16 A nd he may
no t mind the lmver quality or increased disorder resulting from his
wife 's diverted energies, especially if those costs fall mainly on the
children. T hus, despite a husband's rueful attention to the;; costs of
' .
. ,. '
' .
J07
'1
. I t '
,.,,
ms wne
s woncmg,
· ana' even zf th
_,.e f am11y
unit. rmgn
_ De worse on
as a whole, a husband might actually want his wife to continue
working because his gains outweigh his costs. This explains why
women might work even though they really do not want to (in the
sense that they would personally be better off if they did not).
Their husbands want them to, and their husbands have the power
to get their way. 19 s
In the same vein, however, bargaining theory also explains why
some women might not work even though they do want to. Suppose that a woman's going out to work would increase net returns
to the household unit as well as make the woman, individually, better off. Assume further that the husband perceives that his wife's
working for pay would make him individually worse off He would

Pleck, supra note 29, at 284.
See infra note 220 (describing how men's greater bargaining power enables them
to force their wives to spend their earnings on the household while allowing men to
sequester some portion of their own earnings for personal spending).
197
See supra note 162 and accompanying text (indicating that men are aware of and
express regret over the costs of wives working).
8
'" Although he overstates his case and erroneously assumes that all marrie d women
who work are the "victims" of husbands who force them to do so, the conservative
writer David Gelernter is not too far off the mark when he writes that
the typical husband would always have been happy to pack his wife off to work;
he had no need of Betty Friedan to convince him that better income in exchange for worse child care was a deal he could live with. Society used to restrain husbands from pressuring their wives (overtly or subtly) to leave the
children and get a job. No more.
David Gelernter, Why Mothers Should Stay Home, C'::tmmen tary, Feb. 1990, at 25,
28; see also Maggie Gallagher, Enemies of Eros 45-48 (1989) (noting evidence that
men increasingiy are insisting that their wives work); David Gelernter, Drawing Life
90-98 (1997) (same).
1 5
''
196
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then resist her decision to work. His greater bargaining power in
the relationship, and the threat of his alienation or defection, might
result in the wife's staying at home.
F inally, a housewife may recognize that working for pay could
potentiall y carry some positive gains for her. But she might lack
th e bargaining power to force a reallocation of household responsibi li ty that would mak e going out to work a net positi ve ra ther
tho.n a net negative move for her. If she co uld get other house hold
members to change their ways, working woul d be wort hwhile for
her. But since she Jacks th e leverage to do so, she wi ll find herself
net v;orse off by going into the workforce an d will choose to forgo
the positive benefits of working that she might othe rwise enjoy.
In sum , the wife's decisions about wheth er or how much to work
are very much a function of her bargaining power within the marital
relationship. And without an account of the reality of bargaining
position, our understanding of workforce participation and other
aspects of family decisionmaking must be incomplete. Side-payments
and simple preferences can only be part of the story. Bargaining
power is an essential part of the explanation for existing patterns.
Husbands (and wives), like all "negotiators," will not compensate
others for what they can take by threat. The insight that bargaining power affects distribution allows us to state what by now is obvious: Families can make adjustments towards efficiency- or, for
that matter, towards inefficiency- in which one partner loses
something, then loses more, and still more again . T hat the losing
partner sticks around anyway should not surprise us. The loss of
the bargain in its entirety would be even worse.
3. Love, Fear, and Fidelity

Those who would object to the suggestion that spouses enjoy
unequal v;e lfare might also point to the impossibility of knowing
the dominant motives that operate when one spouse's choices appear largely to vindicate the other's interests. T he divorce threat
model posits that the person with the worse fallback options will be
influenced to some extent by the fe ar of the other partner's defection, with its consequences of diminished extramarital prospects
and disproportionate loss of marriage-specific investments. Thus a
wife will sometimes (and more often than her husband) do what is
worse for her personally or what she does not want to do because
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she fears the long-term consequences of getting her way in the
short term. But how does one distinguish between striking a
seemingly disadvantageous bargain out of a self-interested fear of
defection, and engaging in the same activities out of love or an unalloyed interest in the welfare of others? A woman may be
interested in the weifare of her husband for his own sake, because she loves him, and for the sake of her children, because
she loves them. She may therefore want to make a sacrifice for
her husband or her children that is in the nature of a gift. ... Or
the point can be put differently. One might say that her utility
is immediately increased by giving her husband or children a
gift , so that the wife is getting an immediate return on her investment in the form of the gratification that comes from giving
the gift. 1''')
The gift story is undoubtedly true in many cases, and the bargaining framework does not rule out pure generosity as an important motive in family life. Furthermore, husbands as well as wives
undoubtedly give gifts in many forms. Working husbands, after all,
give by allowing family members to share in their earned income. 200
But working women choose to give in that form, too. So why do
women systematically give so much more than men in the form of
domestic effort or work time? If altruism without expectation of
reward dominates in the marital calculus, its effects ought to balance out by sex, in the absence of a theory as to why they do not. 201

199
Schneider, supra note 63, at 212; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of
Contract and the World of Gift, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 821, 823 (1997) (defining a gift as "a
voluntary transfer that is made, or at least purports to be made, for affective reasons
like love, affection, friendship, comradeship, or gratitude, or to satisfy moral duties or
aspirations like benevolence or generosity, and whic~ is not expressly conditioned on
a reciprocal exchange").
200 As previously suggested, see supra Section III.D, there is evidence that some
men give gifts in the form of voluntary "forbearance" to press as hard a marital bargain as they might-although it is suggested that love does not carry the full freight
here and that forbearance is confined largely to circumstances in which social conventions are on a woman's side.
201
Although women may choose more often than men to express their altruism towards their families by providing direct domestic services, working women have obviously not chosen this as their primary mode of contribution. Unless women are
generally more altruistic than men (as opposed to simply different in how they
choose to channel altruism), it is not easy to explain observed patterns of effort and
reward. See supra note 133.
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Yet another way in which the typical snapshot of the utility/
disuti lity balance within marriage may be deceptive is in discounting or overestimating the va lue of certain elements of the marital
bargain for men or women. For example, there may be subjective ,
hidden costs to men- and, more tentatively, benefits to womenfrom marriage that fl ow from the conventi onal expectation of sexual fide lity. Men and women may place a differe nt va lue on sexual
202
variety- a ifference that could have bi ological roots. Men may
experience the sexual exclusivity expected within marriage as more
of a burden., \vhile women may gain more from sexual continuity
and security.
T here is yet another way in which average differences in men 's
and women 's sexuality might have implications for bargaining
power within marriage. A ltho ugh the " law of sexual scarcity" for
men has eased somewhat in recent years-in that it has become
easier for men to find sexual outlets outside of marriage 203-the
greater urgen cy of male sexuality may mean that controlling access
to sex within marriage is a more potent bargaining tool in the
hands of women than of men. Certainly, sexual withholding is
sometimes mentioned (although rarely written about) as a unique
source of women's power in marriage, and it is tempting to conclude that it serves as a counterweight to mal e advantage in other
sources of power. But the tactical advantages of sexual withholding for 'Nomen are almost certainly minimal. First, a wife who deprives her husband of sex may also deprive herself. Second, sexual
withholding is a risky strat egy because it may induce extreme dissatisfaction, or even anger, in men. 204 Like sexual infidelity, it may
destroy "marital capital " wholesale, dramatically reducing the
value of the marriage for the other partner in a manner that is often difficult to calibrate or control. Thus, it represents a potentially
high risk strategy that is as likely to lead to divorce as to a viable
202 See Dav id M. Buss, Evoluti on and Human Mating, 18 H arv. J. L. & Pub. Pol ' y
537, 544 (1995) (d iscuss in g evidence of male desire for sexual vari ety); Robert
Wri ght, T he Moral Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology 33-92
(1994) (same).
203 See supra Section II. D.3.a; infra note 338.
:OJ See, e.g., David M. Buss, Conflict between the Sexes: Strategic Interference and
the Evocation of Anger and Upset, 56 J. Person a lity & Soc. Psycho!. 735 (1989)
(reportin g, based o n responses to th eore tical questi onn aires , that sex ual withh o lding
by wives elicits most extreme expressions of ange r and dissatisfaction from husband s).
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bargaining advantage . Finally, because relatively little is known
about the conduct of marital sexual relations (apparentiy one of
the last taboos), it is unclear whether, in actual fact, m ale sexual
deprivation within marriage is a greater problem-and femal e
withholding a more common tactic-than female sexual deprivation and male lack o f interest. Also, many women may be neither
205
willing nor able to engage effecti vely in thi s ploy.
The expectations of marital exclusivity and fidelity, goes the ar-·
gument , can more plausibly be seen as adding more to the cost or
minus side of the n1arita l ledge r for men, thus decreasing the sum
total of their intrama rital vve U-being. This cost to men must be
f"
I
su b tracterj f rom tne otner resources ana oene<1ts
tney enJOY m LH~
net utility calculus. \Vhen the psychic disutility of sexual fid eli ty is
added to vvh at men otherwise ge t from m arriage (and the psychic
utility of sexual security perhaps taken into account for women),
there is less inequality in men's and women's share of marital utility than meets the eye. By this analysis, the fidelity differential
does not exacerbate inequality, but reduces it.
But there is an alternative way of viewing the effect of the fidelity factor. Negative utility attached to fidelity within marriage can
alternatively be viewed as positive utility attached to the opportunities for sexual adventure outside it. 206 By raising men's premarital
or extramarital threat point or reservation price relative to women's,
enhancing these opportunities narrows the possibility for equality
in the distribution of the other resources of marriage, and potentially exacerbates the problem of inequality of shares. Men would
demand an even greater share of the net pool within marriage to
bring them above their reservation price for entering into marriage
in the first place. Because men's compensating share must come
1

'

'

'

I

•

•

205 Douglas Allen and Margare t Bri nig arg ue that whether the willingness to accommodate the other partner sexually, or the threat not to, can serve as a bargaining
chip for one spouse depends on the spouses' relativ e level of interest in an d dem and
for sex withi n the relat ionship. They speculate that the relative level of interest
changes during the course of the relationship as a function of each spouse's age, with
men 's demand for sex genera ily exceeding women's during the earlier and later periods of marriage, but women's exceeding men 's during the middle period. According
to their analysis, a lower demand for sex creates a "property right" that can be traded
away for other concessions or to forestall divorce. See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret
Brinig, Sex, Pro perty Rights, and D ivorce, 5 E ur. J.L. & Econ. 211 (1998).
2 See discussion infra Section V.F on changes in social conventions regarding premarital and extramarital sex.
CQ
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out of other elements of the bargain that are up foe grabs, the fidelity differential will drive inequality in other sp heres. 207
What is the best way to understand the fidelity factor? The
analysis that treats men's relative preference for sexual variety as
tending to produce ine quality r ather than equ ality in marriage relies upon a fr amework similar to that evident in the egalitarian
convention: H views persons' prospects outside the relationship as
external to, rath er than as built into, the concept of an egalitarian
marriage. T his vievv is critically dependent m1 accepting a particular baseline for measuring equality of welfare . In addition to incorporating assumptions as to baseline, the framework put forward
here also depends on adopting a utility metric and accepting a role
for certain tastes or preferences as contributing to, or detracting
from, equality.cc'·' Is this approach justified, or are there better ways
to assess the balance of marital relations?
B . Equality in Theory?
1. The Lessons of Bargaining Theory: Egalitarian A1arriage as
Heuristic
To understand marriage as a bilateral bargaining relationship is
to position it within a category of interactions taking place in
widely varying social contexts. The puzzles posed by these rela209
There are no universally
tionships have much in common.

The British antifeminist author Geoff Dench sees the exchange value of male
fidelity as central to the explanation of observed patterns of effort and reward in
male-female relationships. According to Deneb, "on the issue of sexual possession
most men feel no less and probably much more, trapped than women do. Men would
say that it is they who are 'giving' most in a relationship which requests mutual fidelity." Geoff Dench, Transforming Men 228 (1996). Elsewhere he states that "[i]t may
well be that most women are sti ll prepared to carry a double load of domestic work,
in return for male fidelity. '' ld. at 229.
208 See discussion infra Section IV .B.2.
2 For a general discussion of these issues in the context of bargaining generally and
off-market monopolistic bargaining in particular, see Coleman, supra note 142;
Wertheimer, supra note 32; Young, supra note 46; Gauthier, supra note 46; Harrison,
supra note 10; see also Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New
Perspective on Contract IVIodification, 26 J. Legal Stud. 203 (1997) (examining settings in which nonmodifiable contracts might enhance contractors' welfare ); Edward
B. Rock & Michael L. \Vachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the Employment
Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913 (1996) (examining the coexistence of selfenforcing systems of norms and state-enforced contracts); J. Hoult Verkerke, An
207
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agreed-upon principles for fai r transactions and no unproblematic
criteria for equality of bargaining power within exclusive long-term
relationships, 210 just as there is no uncontested theory of a just or
equitable society as a whole .

Empirical Pe rs pec ti ve on Ind efin it e Term Employment Contracts , 1995 W is. L. Rev .
837 (offe ring an emp iri ca l inv estigat io n of ba rga ining fo r just ca use pro tect io n).
110 A compl e te treatment of the qu es tion of whet her marri age is exploitati ve is fa r
b eyo nd th e scope of this Article. No neth eless, th e characte ristics of ma rri age explored herein would suggest at leas t the possibility of an affirmative an sw e r for some
who have attempted to define explo itative relationships. For exa mple, Alan Wertheimer
and Joe l Fe inb erg ha ve arg ued that mutual ga ins from a relati o nship a re not inconsisten t with a claim of exploitation, a nd coerc ion a nd d uress are not nece ssary concom itants. Wertheim e r, note 32, at 251 (citing Joe l Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdo in g 176
(1 988) ).
The philosopher David M ill er suggests t hat th e re are two criteria for a n exploitativ e tra nsaction:
First, the tra nsaction must typ ica ll y be more advantageous to the exp lo iting
party a nd less advant ageo us to th e expl oi ted party th a n so me be nchmark
tra nsaction which we use (tacitly or exp licit ly) as a point of re fere nce. SecoT'd,
the actual transaction mu st h ave com e abo ut through so me speci al adva ntage
which the exploiter enjoys, upon whi ch he cap italizes to induce the exploited to
e ngage in this rela tively less be neficial exch a nge.
David Miller, Exploita tion in th e Market, in Modern Th eo ri es of Exploitation 149,
156 (Andrew Reeve ed. , 1987). If eq ual shares of we lfa re is the benchmark, and if
better extramarital prospects constitute a "spec ial ad vantage, " then m arriage could
be exploitative. Both criteria, howe ver, stand in need of fur ther justificati o n.
From the point of view of marriage as a fo rm of relation a l co ntract, reso lving the
qu esti on of wheth e r marriage is explo itativ e requi res decidin g wh e th e r changes in the
marita l status quo th a t a re indu ce d or moti va ted by th e poss ibility of the o ther
spo use 's defecti on are to be rega rd ed as va lid or legitima te modificati o ns. T he answer to that qu es ti on may pa rtly turn on whe th e r th e ongo in g agre e me nt not to
aband on the marri age is to be regarde d as fre sh co nsiderat io n for the other party's
oth erwise unremun e rated concess io ns. How th a t question is resolved may , in turn,
depe nd on whethe r the re is some bas is for deciding that th e promise not to abandon
the marriage is a constituti ve part of t he agree me nt to marry in th e first place. It is
on th e last point th at cl aims th a t marriage is inh e re ntl y exp lo it a ti ve p otentia ll y founde r. Under the domestic law in operation in mos t states , which permits partne rs to
call the contract off without in currin g the type s of penalti es tha t would ord in a rily be
appropriate for a breach of contrac t for continue d performance, there is lit tle basis
for infe rring that e ith er partn e r has made a forma l lega l pro mise to re ma in in th e
marri age indefinite ly. For this reaso n, one partn e r's agree me nt to stay o n wo uld appear sufficient to support any sacrifice on th e part of the othe r spo use. T hu s, a ny
claim that concessions motiv a ted by the fear of defection, or concess ions ex tracted by
the threat of defection, are ex plo ita tive mu st find support in the realms of convention , mora lity, or socia l und ers ta nding. See , e .g., Eric Rasmuse n & J e ffrey Evan
Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance : Persona li zing the Marriage Contract, 73 In d. L. J.
453 (1998) ; Eli zabe th S. Sco tt & Rober t E. Scott , Ma rriage as a Relat io nal Co ntract,
84 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming Nov . 1998).
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The idealized criteria for an egalitarian relationship suggested in
this Article include a utility metric and a benchmark of equal
maximum percentage utility. Equality of division is measured from
a baseline marital pool that employs a "worldly goods" assumption.
The partners bargain over everything they have, with nothin g held
back. For the most part , their preferences and tastes are taken as
exogenous-although not all preferences have the same status
211
within the egalitarian model.
As suggested in the previous Section, the framevvork advanced
here-especially in its use of the ·working definition of an egalitarian
relationship--is conceded ly vulnerable to challenge in a number of
respects. Before engaging in fur ther discussion of the problematic
aspects of the analysis, however, it is best to review the strengths of
the bargaining model in general and of combining that model with
a notion of egalitarian marriage in particular. This analytical
framework powerfully illuminates certain fundament al principles
of allocation between family members that would otherwise be unexplored or poorly understood. What have we learned from the
discussion so far?

a. The Fallacy of Compensatory Exchange
First, the bargaining analysis adopted here decisively scotches
the notion that a viable marriage is one in which each partner must
be as well off, or gain as much from marital transactions, as the
other. One spouse can start out better off outside the marriage and
212
once married continue to be better off. Indeed, it is precisely beSee infra discussion Section IV.B.2.
This point requires recognition of the difference between baseline utility or wellbeing, and gains therein. Attempts can be made to compare baselines or, alternatively,
utility gains as between persons. Here, the argument is that men's higher extramarital
baseline confers the ability to bargain for larger increments in utility over baseline.
Put another way, because women have a greater desire to be married, they get less of
what marriage has to offer. An analogy can be drawn to the relationship between an
unemployed subsistence factory worker and a business owner. The unemployed
worker's baseline well-being is extremely low. Precisely because of his dire straits
(which make him desperate to raise his baseline well-being, even if only slightly), his
bargaining position is weak. He is willing to accept quite a low wage (which represents his portion of the productive surplus generated by his work for the owner). The
owner, who starts out from a higher baseline, is in a far better position to do without
the worker than the worker is to do without him. This gives him the leverage to garner the lion's share of the productive surplus. It is tempting to conclude that for
211

212
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cause the better-off spouse (in general, the husband) star ts out
ahe ad that he can garner the lion ;s share of what the rela tionship
has to offer. The more favorable baseline confers bargaining strength,
which translates into ownership of a greater porti on of the gains.
The coupling of a higher baseline with greater gains fo r men helps
explain the seeming paradox of the folk wisdom th at women often
appear relatively eager, and men relatively re luctant, to marry despite
evidence that marriage boosts men's \Veil-being more than \vomen 's. m
someone who starts o ut with a lower baseline we l:-be in g, the marginal utility of a singl e q uantum of sought-after benefit or resou rce wiil be greater fo r that person. Ind ee d, A la n Werthe imer seems to acce pt thi s ass umpti o n. See ·w e rt h eimer, supra
not e 32, at 64-70. A lthough this may be true fm m oney (which has diminishing u tili ty
as the leve l of wealth rises), it is not necessaril y true of ot her typ es of reso urces. Th e
margin al utility of a particular asset o r be nefit tra nsferred to a person bears no necessary rel at ion to th e baseline utility from whic h that person starts o ut. See, e.g., John
C. Ha rsanyi, Interpersonal U tility Co mpari son s, irz The New Palgrave: Uti lity and
Prob ability 128 (J o hn Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1990); see also
Steven Cro ley & J on Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pa in-andSuffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1814-16 & n.103 (d istinguishing
be tween baselin e utility and increments in utility an d explaining that it is possible for
persons with lower levels of well-being to experie nce smaller marginal utility gains
from receiving certain quantities and ty pes of reso urces). In any eve nt, th e ways in
which th e a mount of utility gained from a fi xed a ll oca tion of resources might relate to
base line starting points has little to do with th e pos ited disparities in m a rital wellbeing, which are based on differences in utility th a t assum e no p ar tic ular di stributi on
of reso urces. Rath e r, those dispariti es are simply a function of the initially bet ter-off
spo use's ability to bargain for a greater share of uti lity from the pool.
213
See Lin da J . Waite & Glenna D. Spitzc, Young Women's Transition to Marriage,
18 Demograp hy 681 (1981); see also Waite, supra note 40. Married men a re notably
be tte r off tha n single men on measures o f physica l and mental health, life expectancy,
occupatio nal success, a nd earning power. The difference between married and single
wo men on these parameters is far less pronounced. T hi s pattern may refl ect men 's
abi lity to gamer the lion's share of th e marital surplus when marri age docs occur.
Men 's large gain in well-being from marri age makes their supposed re luctance to
marry seem puzzling, but that reluctance may be explained by me n's higher "baselin e, "
wh ich in turn is attributable to men's far longer re productive life a nd the availability
of extra mar ital substitutes for much of what men seek from marriage. See supra Section II.D.3 .a. The lack of urge ncy th at men seem to fee l about marrying, despite its
benefits for them, may also reflect th e nature of ma ny of ma rriage 's benefits fo r men .
Married me n are healthier and earn more, but those gains a re long-te rm and cumul ative. Because it is hard for the individual on th e thres ho ld of marri age to appreciate
a nd assess these effects, men may tend to overestimate the benefits of remaining sin gle , while underestimating th e benefits of getting married.
Bargaining theo ry also he lps explain why me n might fear divorce less th an women
though marriage is a bette r deal for them. Bargaining theory predicts that me n
wo uld value being married, whereas wo me n would value staying ma rried. Even if
men gain e d disproportionately from a ny "positive-sum" re lationsh ip , they wo uld still
typically pl ace a lower value than th e ir wives on the particular marriage th ey happen
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Bargaining analysis also cautions against indulgence in what
rriight be termed the fallacy of compensatory exchange. As the
discussion of the drudge-wife scenario demonstrates, 2J.l it is tempting to assume that any marriage that is a viable going concern will
consist of a series of Pareto-superior intramarital deals or exchanges in which no partner loses ground over time, and all compromise takes place from a starting point in which both spouses
sr:are equally in surplus-producing decisions. Without this condition, what reason would the partners have to consent to any specific 1narital sub-deal? 215 But this is obviously all wrong. In the
evolution of any marriage, one spouse's contri bution need not be
matched by the other's, and one spouse can lose ground absolutely
compared to where that partner, or the other, started out '.vithin
the relationship. All that is required for the marriage to remain
feasible as between rational actors is that the deal struck be better
for both partners than calling the deal off. This is perfectly consistent not only with one partner being chronically locked into a
worse position than the other, but with her position relentlessly de216
teriorating over the course of the marriage.
to be in presently because they have a better chance of finding a replacement mate.
Women would place a higher value on any existing marriage, because their chance of
finding a replacement is smaller (and grows ever smaller with time).
21
" See supra Section IV.A.l.
215 This type of logic appears to inform Ira Ellman's landmark article on alimony, in
which he takes the position that alimony should not take into account the balance of
costs and benefits incurred during the life of the marriage. Ellman, supra note 63.
Ellman writes that "a spouse who finds the intact marriage unsatisfactory, because
the 'current exchange' seems unfair or for any other reason, has the option of leaving
the marriage.'· Id. at 280. He goes on to assert (somewhat contradictorily) that when
"financial expropriation" continues within an ongoing marriage, it must be the case
that "the apparent victim is receiving some compensating financial or nonfinancial
benefits from the marriage." Id. Nevertheless, "(t]he availability of exit" means "we
need not worry about imbalances in the exchange during the marriage." Id. at 28081. But it is precisely because of the availability of exit that we do need to worry
about imbalances of intramarital exchange.
216 See infra Section IV.C (discussing the "bargaining squeeze").
This point about
the application of the bargaining paradigm to marriage is consistent with the lessons
of game theory generally, which show that "repeated play can sustain equilibria in
which people do very bad things to each other." Andrew Rutten, Anarchy, Order,
and the Law: A Post-Hobbesian View, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1150, 1158 ( 1997). Indeed,
the correct statement of the major result in the theory of repeated games is that
re peated play allows virtually any payoff to be an equilibrium outcome. In
other words, anything can happen in a repeated game. The reason is simple:
when people work together, they generate a surplus over what they could
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b. The Shadow of rhe Mark et and the Measure of Va lue

On a more specific level, the bargaining framework se t for th
here has the additional virtue of layin g bare the hidden importation
of market valu es into th e marit al bargain. Consider an objection
that could be leveled agai nst one aspect of the analysis: th e m arital
pooling condition, which ass umes bargai ning over all individual assets , net of utility costs. Implicit in this condition is the assumption
th at unequal sha ring or access to monetary income poten tia ll y represents a de viation from the egalitarian condition. 217 But men on
average earn more than women, and most husbands earn more
than their working wives. 2!S At the very least, it could be argued, it
is fair for wi ves to \Vork longer hours to obtain access to an equal
share of their husbands' greater income. 21 9 Put ano ther way, perhaps the better method of achieving equality would be for couples
to commin gle equal amounts of earned income, withholding any
excess for their own exclusive use. One spouse would share his or
her excess only upon the condition that the other make additional
contributions. 220 But to posit a swap of extra earned income for exac hi eve on th e ir ow n . This surplus is th e point of working toge ther. H owever,
there is no na tural way to divid e the surplus; as long as each player ge ts more
th a n she would ge t by working alone, sh e is better off wo rking with others.
Id . (citations omi tted) .
217
Of co urse, th e presumption will oft e n be rebutted, since th e me tric of equality in
th e mode l is utiiity ga in , not co ntro l ove r inco me . Not eve ry in sta nce of deviation
fro m strict eq uality in income-sharing is inegalita ri a n . Nor is eve ry dev ia ti o n from
strict equ a lity in tim e devoted to wo rk activiti es. Individual co upl es may have different utility function s for money, just as they hav e different prefere nces for work and
leisure. But a pop ul at io n-wide pattern of wiv es ' chronic in equ a lity of access to husband s' inco me (despite wives' equ a l o r greater work hours) , li ke a pattern o f wives'
chronic inequality of work time, ra ises suspicio ns o f structura l in equ a lity of access to
these reso urces, for th ere is no reason to expect ge nd er bias on average in preferences
for co ntrol over mo ney and lei sure. In " equal power" relati o nships , the di stribution
of th ese resources between the sexes, although subject to variation across relationships , would be expec ted to balance o ut in the aggregate.
218 See supra note 20.
219
The marital poo ling ass umption seems especially strained in extreme cases in
which hu sba nds hold vast fortun es. lf Bill Gates fails to sh a re all hi s holdin gs with his
wife, does he then fa il at egalitarian ma rriage? Eve n if he docs, can he hope to have
an ega lit arian marri age on our description? As noted, however, see supra no te 54
and accom pan ying text, this Article co ncerns itse lf primarily with marri ages that do
no t represe nt such e xtre mes.
220 The ev idence that wives do not always have e ffecti ve ly eq ua l control o r access to
famil y income, see supra note 11, can be interpreted as refl ectin g the outco me of bar-
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tra hours of domestic service is in effect to ab andon a measure of
mari tal balance in terms of individual net utility, and to adopt a
market measure of the worth or value of contributions in marriage.
A spouse's insistence upon being excused from dome stic responsibility because of greater earning power represents th e ultimate intrusion of the metric and et hos of the m arket into the preci ncts of
private ma rital relations, whi ch are supposed to be sh eltered from
the market's crass demands. But, as we h ave seen, the adoption of
such a market measure, at least to the extent it influences ailocation
of th e bargaining surplus, is a choice, not an economic necessity.
To suggest that a man wou ld be justified in refusing to contract , or
in cailing off, a marriage in which hi s extra earnings were not
m atched by his wife's extra domestic effort is to say nothing more
than that he will use his superior bargaining power to extract an
exchange based o n signals from a m arket that stands outside that
relationship. He elects to ground his marital relations in marketbased values.

gaining over to tal famil y income, or it can be viewed as th e res ult of me n 's violation
of th e pooling condition by holdin g back a po rtion of ea rnin gs for th e ir ow n exclusive
use. See supra Section II.D.1 (di sc ussing poo ling co nditions a nd " holdin g back " ).
There is evidence th a t working for pay increases women 's control a nd access to
marital income although it rare ly eq ualizes it. See, e.g., Alsto tt , supra note 6, at 202728; Ma rjori e E. Kornhauser, Love, Mon ey, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sha rin g, a nd
the Joi nt Inco me Tax, 45 Hastings L.J. 63, 90 (1993); Lundbe rg & Poll ak, Bargaining
and Distribution, supra note 56, at 154-55 (describing evidence for th e "kid s-dobe tter" hypothesis, in which wo me n 's mo ne ta ry ea rnings are correl a ted with hi g her
famil y ex pe nditures on women a nd children). Although thi s increased access co uld
be vi ewed as part of a marital exchange in which increased access fun ct ions as a sid epayment or ex tra rew ard to compe nsate fo r work ove rload , see supra Section lll.B ,
the better ex pl a nation is that working for pay increases women's barga inin g powe r.
But a lthough earning power may provide wo rkin g women with more potential co ntrol o ver spe nding th a n hous ewives, women's market effo rts will no t necessarily
equal control beca use, as noted , men hav e other so urces o f bargaining power. Inde ed , in some cases, a husband 's greater bargaining powe r may transla te into a
wom a n's loss of control over he r ea rnings. See Ma rj o rie Kornhauser, T heo ry vs. Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Tax Law Versus IntraHousehold Allocations , 69 Temp. L. Rev. 1413,1430-31 (1996) (describing a famil y in
whi ch a ll child related ex penses, includin g " the au pair, baby clo th es, baby toys , uncovered medi ca l bills, etc.," were paid out o f the wife's sm a ll e r income, with money
for a ny additi ona l expe nditures to be "requested" from th e husband ). More o ve r, if
greater con tro l over inco me fun cti o ned as a " reward " for role over load , o ne wo uld
~xpect to see wo men with th e grea tes t role overload exercising mo re contro l than
wome n in '·sh aring" fa milies. Whether thi s pattern o btains req uires em pirical inv estigati o n.
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c. VVh ar Does a Wom an H1ant? or From Choices ro Preferences

Revisited
The insights sf bargaining theory, when combined with the
working definition of egalitarian marria ge adopt ed here, also reveal a broad set of misconceptions about what lies behind couples'
ordering of thei r affairs and, more importantly, about the relationship between prefere nces and choices in and outside of marriage.
First. b;· high li ghtin Q the votential influenc e of extern al threat
advantage on the bargain that is actually struck , the bargaining
paradigm shows that observed patterns of marital be havior may
have as rnuch to do with women's desire to remain ma rried and to
hang onto their husba nds as it does vv ith the actual in trinsic tast es
and preferences for, and costs and benefits of, the elements of the
marital bargain itself. Marriage is widely valued because it is potentially a positive-sum game. There are reasons why women may
val ue playing this game even more th an men and why they may be
loathe to lose the relationships in which they find themselves. T his
all-important "threat" factor is often pointedly left out of the
highly idealized accounts of divisions of marital responsibility.
Those accounts often attempt to explain women's choices as
grounded exclusively and straightforwardly in their intrinsic skills
and tastes for domestic activities. But that explanation is radically
incomplete. That women do not mind shouldering the domestic
responsibility as much as men do, or that they do it better, does not
explain why th ey do so much of it, for they would still rather not.
Fear of the consequences of doing less completes the account .
The bargaining paradigm helps clarify the true relationship between choices and tastes. The disparity in bargaining power is based
in some part on mean differences in men's and women's preferences or tastes. But there is a careless way of discussing those differences, uninformed by bargaining constraints, that provides a
highly misleading and radically incomplete account of why women
and men do what they do. To tell the truth about men and women,
one needs to tell the truth about the way in which marriage forces
men and women to engage in bilaterally monopolistic bargaining
that differentially circumscribes the option set from which they
choose. Simple-minded attempts to link preferences with obse rved
choices do little to explain why responsibilities and privileges are
distributed as they are , and they ignore the problems of fr ee ri ders,
'
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........
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holdups, and defection thre ats that distort the payoffs within a bargamm g game.
221
R ecall the Parable of Ne at and Slob. Neat likes a clean apartment nwre than Slob does. Because they are forced to live togethe r, Neat bears all the costs of a clean apartment, while both
enjoy ti1e benefits . A n o utside o bserver is tempted to reason back
hom be ha vior to prefe re nces. He infers that Neat " prefers" to
clea n an d " prefers" a d ean room, and that Slo b "prefers" to study
and "prefers " a messy roo m. But neither of these statements is
tru e. Slob prefers a cle an ro om to a messy one, just as Neat does.
A nd for his part, Neat would rather Slob clean the apartment.
lVIore ove r, l\Teat's perform ance of all of the housework cannot be
expl ained as a joint effort to maximize efficiency. That Neat gets
mo re positive utility th a n Slo b from a clean apartment does not
necessarily mean that it is more efficient for Neat to do the cleaning. That depends on what Slob does instead; he might be, for example, watching television. Even if the reason Neat cleans first is
that he gets less disutility from cleaning than Slob (so that having
Neat rather than Slob clean increases overall net utility), that does
not explain why Neat cleans. He does not clean because it is more
efficient for him to do so. Rather, he would be quite happy to foist the
job on Slob even if that would result in less gain to the unit overall.
So far, the simple story of what Neat and Slob want does not
take into account the influence of exit threats. Now suppose that
Neat threatens to leave the apartment, sticking Slob with the entire
cost of the rent , unless Slob takes on full responsibility for cleaning
the apartment. F urther suppose both roommates know that it
would be impossible for Slob to find another roommate for the
balance of the semester. One would not be surprised to learn that,
in such circumstances, Neat no longer cleans the apartment.
Rather, Slob would do all the work, and Neat would study in a
clean apartment. One might say that Neat "prefers" to study,
while Slob "prefers" to clean, but that conclusion would be as nonsensical as its converse. To say that one party "prefers" cleaning
confuses a desire to gain the benefits of having an activity performe d with a desire to p erform it. Under the threat and nonthreat scenarios, both parties have in common that they benefit

211

See supra Section ILD.3.c.
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from the results of cleaning. Both understand that cleaning imposes costs. Both would prefer enjoying the benefits alone to enjoying the benefits while incurring the costs. Who will get his way?
As the Parable of Neat and Slob illustrates, the confusion inherent in the usual way of speaking of men's and women's choices in
marriage is compounded by the fact that intrinsic preferences and
the allocations forced by the bargaining dynamic (including the extrinsic differential threat of exit) often point in the same direction.
Women might value the fruits of domestic labor more and might
mind doing it less (although they still mind). They might have
more exacting standards for the duration and quality of parental
care (although t hey may be largely indifferent as to which parent
provides it). But it does not follow that women would not choose a
different bargain-one in which the allocation of costs, benefits,
and responsibi lities was more favorable to them-if they could
only get it. The fact that they often cannot is related to their preferences, but only indirectly. It is related to the manner in which
their preferences interact with the structural features of marriage
as a bilateral and exclusive monopoly and the rules for exit from,
and intervention in, marriage as ordained by law.
Where there are cost-benefit tradeoffs between bargaining partners, there is always another, better bargain that each partner
could conceivably procure. 222 Each partner could always get a
larger slice of the pie. It follows that there is always another more

~~~This situation follows from the most basic structural feature of a bilateral bargain
to split a fixed pie. If the bargainers differ in their preferences or utility functions,
one party's gains will entail losses for the other. Whether more or less depends on
how much those utility functions differ or overlap--which is determined in turn by
the degree of mutuality, commonality, and love within the relationship. But none of
those can completely abolish the need for tradeoffs or a role for power. See infra
Section IV.B.l.d. As Alan Wertheimer explains it:
[T]here is an important sense in which any marginal gain to one party within
the zone of agreement is indeed at the other party's expense: while the parties
may prefer any outcome within the zone of agreement to the nonagreement
solution, they are not indifferent to the distribution of the social surplus within
the zone of agreement. Each would prefer a price that is furthest from his or
her reservation price. And any movement away from one's own reservation
price is, in that sense, at the other party's expense.
Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 21 (footnote omitted). A more piquant observation on
the situation is offered by Rebecca West, who stated that "the great enemy of feminism is that men don't like housework and women don't like housework." Leslie Garis,
Suburban Classic, Ms., July-Aug. 1987, at 142, 142 (putatively quoting Rebecca West).
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favorable bargain that each would like to have , but might lack the
leverage to obtain. In the words of Susan O kin, a division more favorable to the other side will be resisted by those who "do not want
[it], and are able, to a very large extent, to enforce their wills." 223
Thus, doing what one wants to do in a bargaining situation is always a comparative concept. If the act of providing a benefit imposes costs on one partner, that partner will want to provide less of
it. If the resuit of a benefit being provided favors one partner, she
will want more of it to be provided, but preferably by another. As
between two partners, the re lative magnitu de of costs and benefits
does not matter as long as the net calculus points in the same direction: Each wou ld rat her free ride. That calculus will be retlected in
each partner's preferred ordering of bargaine d-for deals.
The effects of bargaining constraints on bargaining partners'
choices are parallel to the effects of tax policy on married women's
labor force participation, which have been described by Edward
McCaffery. 224 McCaffery accepts that men and women have different exogenous preferences for employment, as revealed by a "greater
[work] elasticity among married women" and a greater interest in
part-time work. 225 But the choices men and women make, given
those preferences, depend critically on a system of taxation that
taxes second-earner incomes at a much higher rate than primary
breadwinner's earnings. By attaching consequences to work that
"push[] men to work more and many women to work less," the tax
system "perpetuates social stereotypes" about what men and
women really want. 226 Yet, under a different tax system, men and
women might make very different choices that provide far less
227
support for those stereotypes. The same can be said about men's
m

Okin, supra note 32, at 153.

m See McCaffery, supra note 186; Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right Sort,

6 UCLA Women 's L.J. 289,306-17 (1996).
: 15 McCaffery, supra note 224 , at 316.
226 ld . at 317. McCaffery mak es a similar although less straightforward point about
how women's choices are influenced by the paucity of "quality" part-time work options in the labor market, which he describes as a form of market failure. McCaffery,
supra note 186, at 619-22.
227 McCaffery faults Richard Epstein and others for "repeatedly point[ing] to free
'choices' as being responsible for whatever observed inequalities we see. How can
we make men and women change if they don't seem to wan t to?" McCaffery, supra
note 224, at 316. Epstein has commented that "[i]f individuals do have different
natural endowments, then the system of voluntary arrangement should reflect those

'.
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and women's choices in marriage. \IVithin a very different institution-or outside of the institution altogether-m en and wom en
might behave quite differently than they do , and we might speak
about "what they \Vant" in very different terms. But the situations
in which men and ~;vom e n find themselves mili t ates decisively
against different choices.
d. Th e Inelu ctable Role of Pmt·er
Ferninists are sornet imes acc·used o f cli storting

tl~1e '~ tr11 e"

n ature

of marriage by viewing po-,ver as a key determin ant of relations bel
.
' ' .
.
.
t·,ve en L1e
sexes. r ~ :; 1 11s recastmg
mc an age -ow
mst1tutwn
w.hose
guiding principles are supposed to be cooperati on 0.nd affection is
criticized as sinister and destructive. Alt hough no one de nies th at
some actual relationships fall short of the mark, the attainable ideal
of a " good marriage" is thought to be one in which the assertion of
power has no place and no explanatory role. Power simply falls
out of the picture as a meaningful component of a "good marriage"
as it is commonly understood.
The modeling of marriage as a bargain teaches that this ideal
is hopelessly unrealistic. Feminists who assert that power is an
ineluctable feature of marriage may be guilty of subversive demystification, but they are not wrong. When the interests of two
individuals fail precisely to coincide, there is potential for conflict.
Even the very best marnage is marked by some degree of con~ h.

differe nces, " thus implying that tastes and dislikes are the exclusive source of family
divisions of labor, and that bargaining leverage has nothing to do with it. Richard A.
Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist Thought, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. P ol'y 331, 340
(1995). But Epstein candidly admits elsewh e re in the same article that there is a " risk
of exploitation ... present in marital arrangements" because a typical husband is in
the position to "extract most of the gains from the marriage, even if the wife is better
off than she would have been if the marriage had never taken place." I d . at 344. This
concession evinces an understanding of th e central insights of bargaining theory . Unfortunately, Epstein does not identify the forces and structures that determine how
gains within the family will in fact be allocated. Nor does he expand on the point that
those with a better fa ll back position within and outside of marriage hav e more power
to get their way within their relationships.
3
"
Ruth Wisse , a Harvard litera ture professor critical of feminism, has recently
stated: "By defining relations between men and women in terms of power and competition instead of reciprocity and co opera tion, the [women 's] movement tore apart
the most basic a nd fragile contract in hum a n socie ty , the unit from which all oth e r
social institutions draw th eir strength." Ruth R. Wisse, On the Future of Conservatism, Commentary, Feb. 1997, at 41 , 42.

1998]

Egalitarian lVJarriage

619

flict-not in the overt sense of acrimonious disagreement, but in
the sense that both partners cannot simul taneously maximize the
satisfaction of all their preferences an d desires . When both partners cannot \Vin, what de termines who gets his or her way and who
gives way? In a bargaining relationship , the answer is bargaining
pmver.
Certainl y the participants in a good marri age have many goals,
desires, and tastes in common . There are large areas of endeavor
in which conflict is abse nt because the couple is of one mind: Priorities overlap, and agreem ent is complete and absolute . And then
th ere is love, which can transform the fulfillm ent of another person's -wishes and desires into one's ovm. B ut although conflict may
be uncommon in some relationships, it is never absent. At some
point , individual interests assert themselves. /"..s long as the spouses
are in any way distinct persons with distinct goa ls, there will be
conflict in marriage.
T he bargaining p aradigm predicts that conflict will be resolve d
against women more often then against men. To be sure, women
are not wholly powerless within marriage. Tha t they will get their
way less often than m en does not mean that they never will, nor
does it mean that men will never have to relinquish their objectives
or do things they do not want to do. Moreover, an individual
woman may be very powerful, both absolutely and relative to her
hus band. The point is that women as a group have fewer of the
traits and assets that confer power within private consensual relationships. Their power is idiosyncratic, not structural. Indeed,
many individual attributes that confer power within relationships
could be expected to b alance out betwee n men and women: For
every woman who is physically beautiful, gracious, tenacious, or intimi dated by displays of emotion, there is a man with similar traits
(although those people m ay not be married to each other) .229 But

229 In measuring marriage agai nst an ega litarian id ea l, one ca n imagi ne three possible si tu ations: (1) equality case by case for each marri age; (2) a range of more or less
lopsi de d marriages, arrayed on a bell curv e that measures imbalance in favor of one
or the other sex, but with no clear se x-based skew overall ; or (3) a distribution of imba la nce in relationships, but with more relationships favoring members of one sex
a nd favor ing them to a greater degree (which this Article asserts is the prevailing pattern, in favor of men).
The great diversity among in divid uals who enter in to marri age and the heterogeneity
of coupling suggest that th e re alization of the egalitari an id ea l for each individu al

r

620

Virginia L aw Review

[Vol. 84:509

whe n potential sources of power are considered over the population as a whole, a structural advantage emerges over and above the
individual variati on, and that advantage favors men . \!1/ omen are,
on average, relatively powerless, which mea ns that, on the occasions when compromise is called for , it is women who will end up
compromising more often.
T his conclusion holds regardless of whether women tend to be
more deferential th an m en. Indeed, the point stands even if we indu lge every hoary stereotype about " differe nce" and accept for th e
sake of argument th at the aver age woman is more deferential , altruistic, and averse to con fl ict than the average man. 230 Even if we
assume that women defer to their partners more often than me n
because they want or " prefe r " to (in the sense that th ey "get positive utility out of it"), 23 1 that does not exclude the distinct possibi lity
th at women also defer more often than men even when they do not
co uple-represented by the first possibility-is an unrea li stic as piration. T he diffe re nces between peopl e who marry each other are bound to give rise at the individual
level to disparities in th e factors that confer power within relationships. Alth o ugh
th e elimination of the extremes of such individual di sparities is in itself desirabl e, this
Article is centrally concerned with inequalities o f bargai ning power within rela ti o nships that correlate systematica ll y with sex.
A consideration of homosexual unions clarifies the impo rtance of distingui shing
sex- based imbalances of power with in the population as a who le from any variance in
power balance within re latio ns hips-either in th e aggregate or individuall y-tha t is
unre lated to sex. For exampl e, lesbian coupl es may o n ave rage be more "equitabl e"
than mal e homosex ual relati o nsh ips-that is, th ey may cl uster more closely around
the center of the be ll curve fo r power dispariti es be twee n the pa rtners. Yet, by de finiti on, homosexual relati onships do not give rise to asy mm etri es in power within re lati ons hips that correlate with sex. See England & Kil bo urn e, supra note 5, at 172.
230
T his insight about power's in e luctable rol e in marri age also does not d epend o n
how rich or "loaded" our co ncept of psychic utility in marriage is. E ve n if each
spo use's utility function is replete with vicari o us prefe rences and second-ord er desires, a ll that matters is tha t, in each marriage, eac h spo use 's e levat ion of th e o th e r's
satisfaction over his or her ow n will at som e point run o ut. T he time will com e wh e n
each spouse will want so methin g o n his or her own acco un t. In other word s, all that
matters is that pure (or even partial) selfishness comes into play once in a while.
The important point is that th e conclusi o ns abo ut th e role o f bargaining powe r ho ld
eve n on a fairly straightforward rational choice mode l. This shows that th e mode l is
some times quite useful in demo nstrating the validity of fe minist insights and that the
fe minist critique of the rational actor model as subvers ive of fem inist goals is not always well-taken. See, e.g., Beyond Economic Man: Fem ini st T heory and Economics,
supra note 36; Engl an d, supra note 5; Elizabeth Anderson, Should Feminists R eject
Ration al Choice T heory ?, A ddress to the AP A Eas tern Division Meetings (Dec. 30,
1996) (transcript on file with th e Virginia Law Rev iew Associati on) .
231
See discussion supra Section III. C.
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want to. T he first type of (directly preference-dri ven) deference,
th ough perhaps the product of undesi ra ble or "oppressive " social
conditioni ng, 2 ' 2 might still be said to ad d to the welfare of th e actor
herself."' 3 T he second type of (non-preference-dri ven) deference,
in con trast, is a m att er of power only. It fo rces the actor to take
steps that do not add to her immediate well-being. R at her, she acts
to forestall immin ent or future consequences that will wor k an
even greater deprivation. That is, she acts out of fea r of consequenti al harm, not out of an anticipation of immediate personal
benefit. T he layering of tbe effects of power upon any preexisting
cendencies wi ll make women seem even more deferential than they
really are.
T he confl ict inheren t in marriage also sheds light on forms that
fem ale sexuality can take both within and outside that relationship.
A satisfying treatment of marital sexuality cannot proceed without
a fu lly nuanced anatomy of desire an d, perhaps, a normative hierarchy of the consistency of varieties of sexual experience with the
dignity and integrity of the person. Even without these tools, however, it is possible to recognize a continuum of sexual encounters:
from those accompanied by elemental sexual arousal or sexual desire, to those devoid of sexual feeling but undertaken for distinctly
instrumental purposes. On the latter end of the spectrum, a person
might decide to have sex without arousal or desire because of the
expected negative consequences of refusing or to make it easier to
obtain a desirable nonsexual objective. T he most extreme example
of "instrumental " sex is submission motivated by a fear of physical
viol ence. But that is not the main concern here. Rather, the more
interesti ng category for our purposes is that of women who find
themselves having sex, not because they welcome the encounter for
its own sake or even simply fro m a loving desire to give pleasure or
to make a partner happy, but because of concerns about conse-

'"See supra note 32.
233
There are, of course, man y who wo uld questi o n a utility mode l that viewed th e
sa tis fac ti on of all preferences, however fo rmed , as e nhancing the welfare of th e person holding those preferences. See supra note 32, a nd sources cited therein ; see also
Sen, supra note 8 (arguing that an individual's preferences are intlu enced by exogenous pressures); Sumner, supra note 32, at 66, 160-62 ("[P]ersonal va lues are al so notori ous ly subject to influence by accustomed social conditions. "); Cass Sunstei n, Lega! Interfe rence with Private Preferences, 53 U. Ch i. L. Rev. 1129 (1986) (noting that
private prefere nces are not uninflu ence d by legal rules).
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quences v;ithin and for the relationship. A woman may decide
against refu sing h.;:;r husband for a range of reasons: she may anticipate his displeasure or d read his moods or worry that he will
.
C'
.
1 sexual.
renege on 2 prormse.
J ne may recogmze that a we1'1 -t1mec
encounter \vill help her to "get her way" in a conflict t ha t lies on
the horizon or \vill simply aid her in procuring day-to-day cooperah
,. l""
1
1
'
twn. Ur S1le roay s1mp1y WlSl to sonu.ny or preserve a va1uea relationship by m~nimizing the increment al tensions th a t can lead to
1
-··
1
"'
T
1
· .,
eve11tua1 d1:;artect1c)n -or aoa11aonme11t.
c' oe stlre~ men m1,g.nt C)Ccasion a lly fin d the msel-ves having sex "without really wanting to"
21
for simil~r reasons. ; An d there is certainly room for" disagree;nent
1
c
•
as to \V_~"h etn_r=~r
211" 1 .-.'~ 1n_strtlrnentai )) reas(Jns tor
n1 a·v1ng
sex~ as so aescribed, are ttl be considered suspect or undesirable, especially
within an ongoing long-term relationship. B ecause motives are often mixed , the line between sex provided from anticipation o f loss
or gain and sex provided out of love can sometimes be very fine indeed. Nonetheless, it must at least be acknowledged that marriage
provides a potential setting for sex that has little to do with ardor
or affection as such, and much to do with fear of being deprived of
the forms of material and social well-being th at a partner can provide. Women 's weaker bargaining position suggests that the experience of having sex that is "unwanted"-in the sense that it is not
undertaken out of an immediate physical desire for the other person or from the wish to give or receive sexual pleasure, but rather
out of a concern for a deprivation the other person might inflict-is
a more common one for women than for men. The fundamental
insight is that women's e xperience of sex must be decisively colored by the power men (including husbands) exercise in ordinary
marital relationships.
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Biology ensures, however, that a man-unlike a woman-cannot have heterosexual intercourse in the absence of sexual arousaL 1f sexual desire is a richer and
more complicated psychological state than mere arousal, a man could find himself in
a situation in which he would prefer to forgo a sexual encounter despite a level of
arousal that makes the encounter possible. In that case, he might go ahead despite
his lack of desire for the same reasons a woman might do so: to further some instrumental purpose. Cf. lv1ary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8
UCLA \\'omen's LJ. (forthcoming 1998) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (recognizing a category of sexuai experiences that "one would rather forgo
than endure were there no negative consequences").
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2. Egalirarian lvlarriage and Prernarital Endowrnents

Formid able forces are arrayed against the realization of the
egalitarian ideal for marriage. Before further exploring the prag-·
matic implications of this insight , it is necessary to discuss some
problem atic limitations of the ega litari an paradigm. Every concept
1.
,
ot equa11ty must not only answer tne questiOn .. equa u ty or wnat;
but also ''equality as compa red to 'Nhat?" The latte r inquiry reqmres estao 1snmg a oase nne agamst wmcn w measure equauty-a
base line that is as fre e from arbitrary assumptions and "undeserved"
credit as possible. How \Vell does the concept of egalitarian marriage employed here satisfy those conditions?
The utility measure and the marital pooling condition see k to
minimize " the importation of a market idea of fairness into family
life. " 235 The measure of entitlement is not an individu al's market
resources, but the more neutral me tric of equality of satisfaction or
well-being. That measure strives to be "for internal use only " 236 in
two senses. First, it does not rely directly on market price and
value in fixing the terms of exchange within marriage. Second, it
excludes certain conditions external to the marriage-partners' differential prospects on the remarriage and labor markets, for example-in determining the measure of well-being.
These conditions raise the question of whether, even if spouses
are equally likely to get their way within a marital union, they are
really equally well off if one spouse, but not the other, could do
almost as well within another marriage or outside of marriage altogether. Should the measure of relative posi tion take account of
opportunity cost-that is, hmv well each spouse is doing compared
to his or her prospects elsewhere? T his question shows that rejecting extramarital opportunities as the basis for assessing equality
requires some justification.
The decision to view exuamarital prospects as external to the
bargain is a decision to reject extramarital well-being as a baseline
for gauging marital equality, and equal gain in uti lity over that
baseline as the benchmar k for equality. If the latter measure were
adopted, the basis for eq ual division would be the divorce-threat
bargaining surplus, and an equal division of that surplus would
l
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spell marital equality. Such an approach would obviously yield a
quite different assessment of the degree to which real life bargains
deviate from the egalitarian norm, because the potential effects of
unequal extramarital prospects between men and women would be
rendered invisible by fo lding th ese facto rs into the starting point
for equality. Nevertheless , our fr amework suggests that actu ai relationships might still deviat e fro m this measure of equ ality, though
perhaps not as sharply as under our workin g mode l: T he free rider
effects of diffe rent intramarital th re ats or the sex im bal ance in negotiating skiiis and strengt h might still opera te to allow m en to
garner a greater share of gains ove r the extr amarital baseline.
T he main problem with ad opting an extramarital baseline and
shares of utility gain over th at baseline as the measure of equali ty
is that it "may well prescribe exactly the sorts of distributions that
motivated the concern with inequality of bargaining potential in
the first place. " 237 This does not mean that it is the wrong principle.
But it is a less heuristically valuable one. T he chosen fram ework
permits clear identification of more of the key factors that put
women at a real-life disadvantage.
It is nonetheless important to acknowledge that the egalitarian
calculus adopted here does not create a division rule that is entirely
untainted by fixed traits, market values, or other extrinsic social
forces that influence the parties' baseline endowme nts. Indeed,
it would be difficult to come up with a calculus free from these influences that did not wholly flout our intuitive sense of marital
benefits and burdens. Partners' endowments (in the form of beliefs, talents, energy , tastes, and skills) he lp determine how much
utility each spouse can and will contribute to the marital pool.
Those endowments also determine how much value each spouse
draws from the pool (including how much benefit is derived directly from the other spouse 's contributions). A paradigm that allows these endowments to affect gains and entitlements-as does
ours-can be faulted as arbitrary or unjuse 3s in its treatment of the

m Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 68.

On the supply side, earnin g po wer and accumulated wealth in ev itably affect th e
utility calculus because earnings expand th e pool of marita l assets to be di sbursed and
generate utility for family members. But earning power and wealth , lik e other assets
and endowments spouses bring into th e ma rriage, can be traced in part to arbitrary
advantages that differ by sex, such as better educational, training, or job opportuni238
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range of background cond itions that may create a debt for one
party in favor of the other.m
ti es for me n. Alternatively , sex -correlated preferences fo r certain kinds of work
mi ght produce supply-side di slocat io ns that dep ress o r e nh a nce th e pay for some sex ste reotyped jobs. A lso , me n migh t have a greater ·'tas te" fo r wealth accumulation.
See Spa in & Bianchi , supra note 7, at 90-96, 129-31; Daniel R. Fi schel & Edward P
Lazea r, Co mparabl e Worth and Discrim in a t ion in Labor Markets, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev.
891 (1986); Richard A. Pos ne r, An Eco nomic Ana lysis of Sex Di scrimination Laws,
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1311 (1989). A lt ernat ively, though, grea t wealth and earni ng
power may als o be the product of great pre marital effort or hard work, which is ge nera lly costly to the spouse expe nding that effort. I1. cou ld be a rgued that a spou se
sho uld so mehow get credi t within the marriage for ·' negative utility" expend ed in
creating asse ts that are im ported int o th·.; marriage, at least to the degree that those
pre marital costs exceed th e other partner's . Ye t o ur mode l does not generally p e rmi t
such credit, since it ne ts o ut from th e marital poo l on ly those costs individually incurred during the life of th e ma rri age.
Furth e rmore, a husba nd may be ab le to add value to th e marriage through minim al
effort because he is handso me. empat hic, or charming. These a ttributes generate
ma rital capital, which red o un ds directl y to the benefit of his wife. The wife's gain is a
functi o n of the husband 's fixed, pass ive, a nd " unearned" characteristics, and not of
his effort or active input. Yet the husband wi ll "ge t credit" for these contributions in
the marital calculus, if only because they add directly to hi s wife's satisfaction. Th e
amount of satisfaction his wife gains from the husband' s possession of those attributes is in turn based on her preferences and tastes, which are equally arbitrary and
undeserved. More pertin ently for present purposes, it is suggested that men a nd
wo me n may differ in their degree of distaste for dom es tic tasks. If a husband hates
doing laundry twice as much as his wi fe does, is he to be rewarded for this preference
by having to do half as much o r ge tting tw ice as much ma rital compensation for do in g
it all? The latter case prese nts the problem posed by a re la tion ship in which one
spo use 's preferences threa te n to turn him into a type o f " utility mo nster "-that is, a
pe rso n who obtains "enormously greater gains in utili ty fro m any sacrifice of others
than these others lose. " Robert Nozick, A narchy, State, a nd Utopia 41 (1968). Th ese
possibiliti es raise difficult iss ues that this model does not resolve. But see Wertheime r,
supra note 32, at 216-30 (discuss in g how the judgme nt of the fai rn ess o f a bargain is
influenced by the sense of justice or the moral significa nce o f the background conditi o ns contributing to th e bargainer's e ndowments and o utsi de opportunities). Se e
ge nerally Richard H. Fallon , J r. , To Eac h According to His Ability, From None According to His Race : Th e Co nce pt of Me rit in th e Law of A ntidiscrimination , 60 B.U.
L. Rev . 815 (1980) (assessing the costs a nd bene fits of merit-based distributi ve systems) ;
John Rawls, A Theory of Ju sti ce (1971) (describin g th e a rbitra riness of talents);
George Sher, Desert 22-36 (1987) (assess ing Rawls 's critique of concepts of desert).
239 There are additional probl e ms with the model 's trea tme nt of preferences.
For
exa mple, in discussing th e influe nce of the endowment effect in the negotiating process, me n 's tendency to di scou nt th e worth of working wives' monetary income
(because those inputs are see n as coming at the expense of other valuable wife ly
services) is viewed as contributing to de viation from an egalitarian relationship because it " distorts" the ne goti ati ng process. There is , however, a n alternative way to
think about this phenomen on. If men view their wives' paid work effort as imposin g
gri evo us costs as well as bene fits, then pe rhaps it mak es se nse for women to work
hard e r at home just to balance o ut those perceived costs a nd eve n up the ledge r of
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These probiematic feat ures cannot be completely avoided if one
240
sticks with subjective, psychic utility as the m~asur; of well-being.
A lthough this exercise by no means requires a larger commitment
to the view that preferences are exogenous, the model adopted
here by and large takes p eople as it finds th em. \Ve ne ed only be
mindful that the working egalitarian calculus has the potenti al to
hide problematic sources of advantage in the marita l bargaining
game. Nevertheless, th e concept of egalit arian m arri age , for all its
flaws, provides a useful heuristic for identifying and examining a
host of forces that push intramarital arrangements in directions
that favo r men over women and for und erstanding the consequences of bargaining imbalance.
C. The Ba rgaining Squ eeze

The bargaining approach helps identify the forces that cause the
average wife to agre e to tak e on a greater burden of domestic work
and responsibility than her husban d. If the wife also p articipates
significantly in the paid labor market, she will find herself working
harder overall. Nloreover, as discussed, 24 1 power distribution afeffort and reward . In o th e r word s, if we take men's pe rcep ti ons of the worth of
women 's efforts as given in the utility calculus, then perhaps wome n's greater domestic effort sho uld be perce ived as ma king the relationship mo r e eq ua l, not le ss.
Moreover, in choosing o ne base lin e among oth e rs, the mod e l treats ce rt ai n e le ments (like personal tastes or preferences, or labor marke t prospects) as so metim es
intern al to the model and a t oth er times ex ternal to it. Like earnin g power, a
spouse's professional status, mecha nical sk ill , social graces, and love of c hildre n are
all incorporated into the meas ure of a n ega lita rian re lationship , in that each affects
the conte nts of the pool from whi ch the other spo use draws satisfacti o n within the
marriage . In contras t, a ma n's de sire to marry a younge r wom a n is a pre fere nce th a t
is viewed as external to th e re lati o nship and to the definition of equality. Thus, so me
differences in prefe rences an d e nd owments defin e eq uality wh il e o th ers are id e nti fied as sources of deviation from it. Also, some of th e sa me el eme nts appear on both
sides of the equ a tion , as when mark e t earning power figures bo th in th e cre ation o f
the mari tal pool (which fixes the crite ri o n for the id ea l ega li tari a n division ) a nd in th e
magnitud e of th e marital threat va lu es (which determines th e negotiation set and
thus the likely deviation from equality).
2
.w For exampl e, in proposin g a " sh a ring et hi c," in whi ch each spouse 's co ntributi o n
would be valued "as proporti o nal to the tota l time th e pe rson devo ted to the famil y's
economic well -bei ng " and " [e]ach ho ur woul d be valu ed inverse ly to th e p leasure th e
activity gave," Barbara Bergmann sid esteps the difficult probl e m of assessing the equitabl e value of spo uses' pos iti ve con tributio ns by adoptin g th e metric o f hours o f
work. Bergma nn, supra note 7, a t 272. She thus obv iates the need to cons ider any
subjective measure of th e utility spou ses gen erate for themselves or others.
2 1
' See supra Section IV.A.2.
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fects tr1e choices that wives mak e about whether and how much to
participate in the labor market A wife might work for pay even if
she would be better off staying home, or she might stay home even
if she wou ld be better off working. A more detailed and dynamic
examination of the elements of marital bargaining adds richness to
these insights by showing how initial disparities in bargaining
power, and ether factors that com pound th ose disparities, create a
'"f
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behavioral differences betv;een the sexes and, ultimately, gender
ine quality. T he result is a progressive ba rgaining squeeze that has
potentially detrimental consequences for women, for children, and
for the marital unit as a whole.
Hmv does feedback transmission work? This Article has suggested that men an d women do not start out with equal bargaining
power in marriage because marriage is on average more valuable
to women than men, and because men and women have different
utility functions for the supply of public goods.w That initial disparity leads the average woman to agree to take on a greater burden of domestic responsibility than her husband, even if she also
works long hours for pay. Initially, she may find herself making a
more intensive "active" investment in idiosyncratic marriagespecific capital than her husband. Even if that greater investment
does not at first result in greater labor market opportunity costs
(i.e., cutbacks at work), she still functions as a first performer of the
implicit marital contract: Her greater sunk costs (which necessarily
increase her relative costs of exit) will le ad to further erosion in her
bargaining power. She will also begin to experience a decline in
her remarriage options, which will add to the weakness of her position.244 As her bargaining position slips, her husband is tempted to
press for a greater share of marital gains because he has the power
to get his way. As a result, she may experience steadily increasing
pressure to take on more responsibility. The greater pressure has
t\vo possible results. The wife may resist the pressure by shirking
and cutting corners at home in order to bring down her total costs

2" 2 The phrase is Amartya Sen's. Sen, supra note 8, at 138 n.25 (noting the tendency
to " ignor[e) the role of 'feedb ack transm iss ion· in sustain ing gender asy mmetry ").
w See supra Section II.D.3.c.
244 This corresponds to the passive first performer component, described above. See
supra note 14 and accompanying text.

,
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in the marriage and increase her net share. At the same time, she
may increase her investment in paid work, in order to buy
"insurance " against the spouse's further reneging or decision to
dissolve the relationship altogether. A lternatively , she may withdraw from paid work and specialize more in unpaid work in order
to relieve the pressure and costs of greater responsibility. But the
latter choice only worsens her bargaining position by introducing
significant market opportunity costs as well as deepening her sunk
costs (in the form of marriage-specific investment) re lative to her
"portable " employment market investment. This process can continue indefinitely until the woman withdraws from market work to
a significant degree or drops out of the labor force altogether.
This scenario reflects the fact that the inability to enter an enforceable long-term contract to govern a relationship where one
party is the first performer is equi va lent to inviting inefficient opportunistic renegotiation. 245 Because couples cannot make a premarital contract that is enforceable intramaritally, they must constantly negotiate and renegotiate the marital bargain as the
marriage progresses. The position from which women renegotiate
the bargain is generally one of progressively declining bargaining
strength, in which they stand to relinquish the gains, or "quasirents" that they might have captured if an enforceable, long-term
agreement had been negotiated before entering into the relationship.246 The response to the threat of opportunistic appropriation is
some form of suboptimal investment, in which the more powerful
party reneges or threatens to renege, and the vulnerable party
scrambles to minimize her potential losses by decreasing her total
investment as bargaining strength permits (by cutting back at work,

:,; See Cohen, supra note 4; supra Section I.B (discussing the first performer problem); see also Brinig & C rafton, supra note 55 (d iscuss in g opportuni sm in marri age
under no-fault rul es). The first performer problem is a variant of the la rger dilemma
posed by "sunk costs, " or specialized inves tment in the context of relational contracts
in which the parties find it necessary (because of un anticipated continge nci es) to renego tiate the terms of th e contract midstrea m. In th a t cas e, the parties "have ince ntives to use strategic or opportunistic behavior in order to secure a large r slice of the
enhanced contractu al 'pie."' Goetz & Scott, supra note 107, at 1101. For a discussion
of relational contracts, see infra notes 250, 297 and accompanying text.
2J 6 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 287-89.
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at home, or both) or by rechanneling her efforts into "portable" as247
sets (such as labor market human capital).
Consider the hypothetical bargain that a particular couple would
strike on the eve of marriage if they possessed perfect information
and were guaranteed perfect enforcement of their deal. Even if the
couple did not start out from positions of equal outside options and
equal extramarital welfare, and thus would be unlikely to negotiate
248
a perfectly egalitarian deal, the ability to negotiate a binding ante nuptial agreement would still have salutary effects, because it
woul d arrest the bargaining squeeze and eliminate the potential for
opportunism that it presents. If we assume that the couple first settles on some significant level of mutual parti cipation in the paid labor market, ~ then they would likely agree initially to an allocation
of unpaid labor that was efficient (P areto or Kaldor- H icks), and
then would agree on side-payments that reflected their relative
bargaining position. This might result in some degree of role division. But because, by hypothesis, their agreement would be both
specific and specifically enforceable for the life of the relationship,
any role division (which might require one party to make a greater
domestic investment) would not contribute to the more domestic
spouse's deteriorating bargaining position. There would be no op2 9

'" 7 Although it may "cost" a woman to combine domestic work with market work
during the life of the marriage (as compared to dropping market work altogether),
investing in market work is a wise strategy in a climate of uncertainty regarding the
contours of the marital deal or the very continuation of the marriage itself. One explanation for why women persist in working for pay despite the relative overload of
dual responsibility is that they are purchasing insurance against divorce. See supra
Section IV.A.2 .
8
'" The average premarital positions of men and women-the positions from which
they would write a private contract to govern intramarital relations-are probably
not the same and thus would not be expected to produce an egalitarian deal for most
women on the market. An egalitarian deal might be possible if the woman settled for
a much Jess desirable partner than she could ordinarily obtain on a marriage market
in which both matches and marital terms would be determined competitively. For a
discussion on the interaction of the marital bargain and the marriage market, see supra Section 11.0.3; infra Sections V.C, 0.1 .
'"'In reality, not all couples would decide on this level of mutual employment, and
the decision about just how much paid labor each person would perform would not
be made independently of all other decisions about work, leisure, and distribution.
Moreover, the couple's commitment to paid employment could not really be independent of bargaining power. But, for simplicity, this discussion takes as its starting
point a situation in which both members of a couple engage in significant amounts of
paid work.

,
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portunistic renegotiation because the more vulnerable party could
refuse to renegotiate the contract or demand compensation for
doing so. The deal would be stable and permanent, and an optimal
250
and efficient level of domestic services would be supplied.
But consider \Vh at happens when any initial arrangement is not
enforceable. Once the marriage is underway , the vvoman wil l come
under pressure to do an even greater share of unp aid vvork ; her
greater sunk costs improve her husband's bargaining position, allowing him to engage in opportunistic shirking of the performance
of his initi ally agreed-upon amount or to ren ege on promised sidepayments. The husba nd 's shirking will in tum induce the wife to
shirk: It may not be wor thwhile for her to continue to m aintain the
to rall evel of domestic services contemplated in the original agreement by taking over the husband's share in addition to doing her
greater agreed-upon share. Rather, she will adopt some level of
output of domestic services (probably a level between her own initially bargained-for level and the amount needed to maintain the
total-his plus hers-bargained-for output) that is optimal for her,
given the balance of costs and benefits. Because of the ceiling effects of women's time and effort overload and the steep increase in
the negative marginal utility of work near the top of the ceiling, it
may be in her interest to reduce her effort significantly. In other
words, she will engage in a process of self-help to soften the effect
of her husband's refusal to honor the bargain, thus capturing some
portion of the benefits of the bargain at his expense. The result
may well be an overall undersupply of domestic investment to the
unit (by both husband and wife) relative to the optimal amount.

250
See, e.g., Be njamin Kl ein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J .L. &
Econ. 297, 301 (1978) (describi ng the efficiency costs of opportunistic behavior). Of
course, a comprehensive anticipatory contract is a virtu al im possibility because th e
parties cannot possibly predict all future eventual iti es that bear on the relationsh ip
bet\veen the parties. To posit a fully specifiable contract is, in effect, to read marriage out of the category of relational contracts as they have been described and
anal yzed. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 66; Robert E. Scott, Conflict a nd Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. R ev. 2005 (1987). lt is nevertheless
analytically useful to set out the ramifications of assuming that an anticipatory binding contract could be devised. See infra Section V.D.l.
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The unit as a whole would be worse off, and both spouses, as indi251
viduals, would be too.
T here is another possible consequence of men's shirking from an
ideal bargain if that beh avior is coupled with direct pressure on
wives to take up the full degree of slack: Men's greater bargaining
power might result in some husbands' overp laying their hand and
pushi ng women beyond their "reservation price" for the rel ationship, thus inducing wom e n to initiate divorce. This scenario helps
explain how evolving bargaining inequality due to diverging threat
alternatives can dest abilize marriage. It also hel ps explain how the
data suggesting that women initiate divorce more frequently than
men 252 is fully consistent -,vith the bargaining paradigm and with
women doing worse by marriage than men. Because of her we aker
bargaining position and he r smaller surplus share, the typical wife
may be squeezed closer to her reservation price than her husband,
and the margin for further pressure is smaller. In the give and take
of marit al negotiation, the person in the weaker position (the wife)
is more likely to be pushed past her reservation price to a zero, or
negative, share of marital surplus. 253 The husband, in contrast, has
a much larger cushion of surplus going into any negotiation, and
thus is less likely to be pushed "over the edge" by the other partner's hard bargaining. This explanation for observed patterns of
divorce initiation holds good even though what awaits the woman
after divorce is less attractive than wh at awaits her husband. The
wi llingness to divorce is not a function of this interpersonal comparison. Rather, what matters is the intrapersonal difference in
how well each spouse can do inside versus outside the marriage. If
the woman's bargaining position is so weak that she cannot gain
even a minimal share of marital surplus, she will initiate divorce.
vVives are more likely to be in that position than husbands. 254

~ 51 That is because, by hypo th esis, ihe size of the pie would be smaller under th e renegotiati o n scenario than if an e nforceable deal could be made between the same
sp6uses up front. This scenario ass um es that there is no marriage market effect from
being able to write an enforceable prenuptial agreement. See infra Section V.D.l.
152 See supra note 175.
153 T his effect can be exacerbated by a woman's sense of th e unfairness of being
pushed too hard. On the role of th e "taste for equity" in fue ling marital breakdown,
see supra note 174.
~j.l B ~t see infra note 268 (su ggesting factors going to variations in timing of divorce
initiation by men and women).
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The real victims of th e spousal race to the bott om , however, may
be third parties who typically bene fi t most from investments in
domes ticity: children. As workin g couples engage in th eir rounds
of se lf-protective shirking, children may receive less than an optimal amount of attention and suffer accordingly. Indeed, the scenario shows how women's lesser bargaining power within marriage
can hurt children. Women may have strong preferences for children's receiving parent al attention and care. If working women
could someh ow attain greater barga in ing power in marri age, they
mi ght use it to induce men to relinqui sh som e of their leisure time
in orde r to care for children. If wom en had the bargaining strength
to effe ct more spousal sh arin g of domest ic responsibility, each unit
of women's attention to children wou ld come at lower cost than
under conditions of severe maternal work overload. The result might
be a greater degree of combined parental time for children overall. 255
T he social science data provide evidence of a dramatic reduction
in total household time devoted to both housework and childcare
over the past thirty years.256 To be sure, much of the decline follows women's substitution of paid work for unpaid work, which increases monetary income that can be spent on children. Whether
the reduction in parental time represented by the substitution of
paid work for domestic work represents a harmful net loss for children in a family is a function of a complex calculus: It depends on
whether increased earnings make up for the loss of maternal attention, whether one or both parents have adjusted the quantity or
quality of attention paid to children in off-work hours, 257 and
~~~ This conclusi o n is of a pi ece with the " kid s-d o-better" hypothesis, see supra note
220, which asserts th a t " childre n be nefit wh e n their mothers co ntrol a large r fraction
of fa mil y resources." Lundbe rg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56,
a t 155. That control can tak e the form of ini tia l matern a l co mmand over reso urces
brought into th e marriage (such as the moth er' s earnings or child allowan ces assigned
specifically to th e mother, see Lundberg & Po llak, Noncoope rative Bargaining Mode ls , supra note 56, at 135) or thro ugh any measures that give women more bargaining
power within th e family.
256
See Blau & Ferber, supra note 16, at 126 tbl. 5.3; Robinso n & Godbey, supra note
18. For an inte res ting sociological perspective o n the " fli ght from dom es ticity," see
Arli e Hochschild , The Time Bind: When Work Becomes Ho me and Hom e Becomes
Work (1997).
25 7
As to the issue of "quality time, " Steve Nock an d Paul Kingston, in th e ir 1981
st udy of working couples with children , found that children in single breadw inner,
two-pare nt families spend substa ntially more time with their pa re nts (mostly mothers) t ha n childre n in dual-earn er families , but that the diffe re nce with dua l- earne r
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whether there is an important and independent value in a parent's
just being present for most of a child's waking hours. It is possible
that, in some families, couples work too hard and long to give children the attention they need, even if all of both parents' nonwork
hours are devoted to children. Below that level, and at any given
le ve l of total commitment to paid work, reductions in parental attention during off-work hours may at some point start to detract
significantly from children's well-being. Evidence indicates, as already discussed, that the void at home prod uced by women's entry
into the job market has not been completely fi lled by men. On the
contrary, men seem to have taken full advantage of their bargaining power to minimize the extent to ~whic h women's market efforts
impinge on their freedom an d leisure. This an alysis suggests that,
by imposing costs on women and pressuring them to engage in selfhelp, this strategy may have come at children's expense as well. 258
The foregoing explains how the marital bargaining squeeze might
produce suboptimal total investment in domesticity and children.
In other cases, however, it might have the effect of exerting downward pressure on a woman's investment in paid work below the
level that a woman might select if she bargained from a position of
greater strength. Some wives might choose to recapture a greater
share of the bargaining surplus not by cutting back on domestic
families is "largely accounted for by the lesser time of employed mothers in activities
that involve children only peripherally, not in directly child-oriented activities." Steven L. Nock & Paul William Kingston, Time with Children: The Impact of Couples'
Work-Time Commitments, 67 Soc. Forces 59,59 (1988).
'"This conclusion comports with the observations in one study of working spouses'
childcare arrangements, which found that "variation in husband's [sic] hours of work
has no statistically significant effect" on men's childcare responsibilities or time with
children. Richard R. Peterson & Kathleen Gerson, Determinants of Responsibility
for Child Care Arrangements among Dual-Earner Couples, 54 J. Marriage & Fam.
527, 532 (1992). The authors conclude that "[h]usbands' involvement in paid work
and relatively low participation in household work appear to be the path of least resistance." Id.
Nock and Kingston found that fathers in dual-earner couples do not generally
make up for even a portion of parental time lost to children by mothers' going out to
work. Rather, they spend on average less time with their children than otherwise
comparable men in single:earner couples. See Nock & Kingston, supra note 257, at
74. Much of this effect is the result of cou ples ' practice of engaging in staggered shift
work in order to minimize the cost of paid chil dcare. Moreover, the data suggest that
couples tend to arrange shiftwork so that fathers are at work and mothers are at
home when children are present and awake (e.g., afterschool and early evening). See
id. at 73-76, 81 & tbl.3. These arrangements mean that men can spend more time at
home at leisure rather than engaging in childcare.
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labor but by reducin g the effort expended on pa1d labor.m The

pressure to wit hdraw from paid work is independent of efficiency
considerations, since it results from the vveaker party's de sire to recapture a greate r share of the marit al surplus by reducing her effort. But the woman ;,v ho chooses this avenue of cost-reduction
further 1,ve akens her bargaining position because she effectively
. ..
. nonmar k et \Vorte.
I
S'ne tnus mcreases marnagespec1atrzes
m
specific in·vestment and market opport unity cosrs, which \Videns the
divergence betwee n her expected extramarital utility and her husband 's. This strategy creates a vicious cycle in which v.,rithdrawal
from .rnarket vvork generates fresh pressure to ~;vithdra'N even more.
These pressures operate independently of lh e famed returns to
specialization tout ed by Gary Becker, which tend to increase role
division by en hancing marital surplus. 2cn H.ather, the increased role
division here is a matter of power loss wi thin a bargaining relationship due to t he divergence of thre at points an d has no necessary
connection to efficiency gains.
T he downward pressure on paid work has fa r-re aching consequences for women's well-being and social status as a group. First,
the prospect of encountering such pressures affects women's longterm incentives to prepare for market work, since women who anticipate t hat they will be forced to take on a greater share of unpaid
work and to withdraw from paid work will unde rinvest in labor
26 1
m arket capital.
Since high earning power only allevi ates, but
1

.

.

25 ' This cho ice betwee n cutting back on domestic work and scaling back pa id work
might refl ect variation in wom en's tastes for pa id work and do mestic wo rk. It might
also reflect in trasex differences in utilities a ttac hed to certa in types of risk, since
women's mark et work probably plays an importan t role as in surance against marital
breakdown. See su pra notes 191 -193 and accompanying tex t. That th ere is some
range of taste in th ese matters is suggested by data showing th at married wome n fall
into distinct camps based on their labor supply e lasticiti es, and that th ey differ in th e
magnitude and direction of incom e and substitution effects . Some studi es indicate
that married wo men with high labor marke t participation have elasticities close to
those o f marri ed me n, whereas women who work less are generally highly respo nsive
to factors that make work more or less lucra tive. See A lstott , supra note 6, at 2018-20
& n.75. ln light of these differences, one would expect that some hypo thetical
"egalitarian " coupl es might choose to strik e quite '' equaiitari an" deal s characterized
by similarity in marital roles, see supra Section ILC.l, whil e o thers would negotiate
for more rol e di visio n.
260
For a discussion of Becker's comparative advan tage argument, see supra note 187.
161
See Ok in, note 32, at 144; see aiso Maho ny, sup ra note 16, at 69-71 (describi ng
how a trad itio nal wo man "b urn s bridges " to a lternativ es to bei ng a homemaker);
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does not eliminate, the disparity in bargaining power, this effect
vvill operate apart from any other incentives to engage in labor
market capital investment. Second, the logic of disparities in bargaining power dictates that small initial inequalities of responsibility for household work inexorably tend to snowball. Although sex
differences in preferences, tastes, earning power, or comparative
advantage hel p to create initial bargaining disparities, those disparities unleash a set of forces that take on a life of their own. The
effects of barg2.ining inequality are then added to the other social,
personal, and labor market factors that militate against women's
full participation in the workforce, or in any other worldly endeavors-such as pohtics-that require large commitments outside the
home. 262 This contributes to the creation of a caste-like system in
'vVhich women as a group enjoy less economic and political power
and fewer of the benefits that economic and political power bring. 263

V. Is THERE

A CURE FOR BARGAINING IMBALANCE?

Suppose equal bargaining power is defined as the condition that
would allow the partners, regardless of sex, to negotiate an egalitarian marriage. What, if anything, could be done to attain that
ideal? How might v;e go about correcting the sexual imbalance in
bargaining power that marks the institution of marriage as it currently exists?
The sources of women's bargaining disadvantage are threefold:
differences in the premarital and evolving divorce threat advantage, differences in the intramarita l threat advantage, and differences in factors leading to weakness in the negotiating process.
Each of these sources of bargaining imbalance stems from the peculiar interplay of differences between men's and women's preferWilliams, supra note 3, at 2241 (discussing the rhetoric of choice: "women are really
equal, goes the argument, they just make different choices").
'"'See, e.g., Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman & Stanley Verba, The Public Consequences
of Private Inequality: Family Life and Citizen Participation, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
373, 382-83 (1997) (exploring possible links between spouses' control over family
money and free time and involvement in political activities); see also McCaffery, supra note 186, at 623 (noting that women planning to marry may have fewer incentives
to pursue education); Okin, supra note 32, at 138-39 (suggesting that women may
make themselves more vulnerable by an tici pating the division of labor within marriage).
"'See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2411 (1994)
(describing castes as resulting from "social and legal practices [that] translat[ e] highly
visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage").
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ences or social position with key features of the marital regime.
The most important features are fundamental to marriage itself:
Both legally and conventionally, marri age is understood to be an
exclusive, bilaterally monopolistic contract within which spouses
are committed to satisfying a host of mutual needs. T wo other key
features are the legal convention of marital privacy--which gives
rise to a strong formal rule against intramarital enforceability of
explicit contracts between spouses-and marriage's practical character as a complex rel ational contract-which makes the creation
and enforcement of explicit terms for the conduct of marriage as a
going concern highly infeasible. T he fina l feature of the marital
regime is the law of exit (or di lorce ). Divorce is made easy and is
accompanied by limited redist ribution of resources. The rules of
divorce are also sex-blind, in that they take no systematic notice of
the structural differences between men 's and women's fate following divorce. Consequently, men and women are forced to bargain
in the shadow of the markets for employment and for mates, where
those markets offer different prospects for men and women.
Any corrective for bargaining imbalance must deal adequately
both with men's exit threat advantage and their intramarital advantage. (It would also ideally come to grips with women's potential
weakness in the process of negotiation itself-a tall order.) Unfortunately, a measure that may correct or mitigate some sources of
imbalance will not necessarily address others, may exacerbate
them, or will produce other perverse effects. For this and other
reasons, a comprehensive solution to bargaining imbalance is hard
to come by.
A. Rules of Jl..1arriage and Divorce

The deep structure of marriage and the conditions of exit from
marriage appear most critical to the development of the bargaining
imbalance. The most obvious corrective is to abolish either marriage or divorce. Although the former has recently been pro265
posed,26~ and the latter actually implemented in the past, neither
is a feasible solution. Because a suitable marriage is a positive-sum

1"' See Fineman, supra note 3, at 228-30 (proposing that the legal institution of marriage be abolished).
265
See Lawrence Stone, The Road to Divorce: England 1530-1987, at 1-8 (1990).
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game, 1t 1s safe to predict that peopie will find a way to play it.
Thus, even if legal marriage we re abolished, people would continue
to couple up, to m ake relati onship-specific investm ents, and to lose
those investments through sex-skewed opportunistic defections
und er conditions that favor the strong at the expense of the weak,
ju t as they do today .266 The abol ition of legal marriage would at
most effect a deregulati on of a social practice that would continue
wit hout benefit even of the inadequate post-m ari tal safeguards
(such as child support and property division laws) that are currently in place.
As for ab olishing divorce. the problems of an absolute ban are
inherent in any change that makes divorce harder to obtain:
Women (and men ) who wo uld like to stay married would be favore d at the expense of women (and men ) who would not. In any
even t, some spouses would still abandon one another (and withdraw their marital contributions) , since no divorce rule can force
people to live together. Many more would stay together, but at the
cost of the worst type of marital inefficiency: Both partners would
be better off divorced. 26 7 Although the differential value of staying
married for men and women might mean that female winners from
a ban would outnumber the losers, there would still be a considerable number of women for whom marriage to a particular man would
no longer be worthwhile under any feasible bargaining scenario. 268

2' 6 See Amy L. Wax, T he Two -Pare nt Family in th e Libe ra l Sta te: The Case fo r
Se lectiv e Subsidies, 1 Mich. J . Race & L. 491 (1996) (disc uss in g Martha Fineman 's
proposal to abolish marriage, a nd predicting the eme rge nce o f " virtual" tradition a l
marriages even withou t legal recognition for marriage).
267 C f. E stin, supra note 4, at 534 ("[A]n 'ineffici e nt divorce' is one that occurs even
th ough husband and wife toget her e njoy a greater gain from marriage than they
wo uld fro m divorce.").
z~>S See supra text accompanying notes 174, 252-254 (discussing reasons why women
mi ght frequentl y initiate divorce despite appearing to have mo re to lose from marital
break up, including dissatisfaction with inequity as such, me n's " hard bargaining" pushing wome n past their reservation price, and the reducti o n o r destruction of a woman 's
share of '· marital capital " by irreconcilable conflict o r by th e husban d's misfeasance ,
such as abuse, noncoopera ti o n, or sex ual infidelity) . Whil e forec losing divorce weake ns men's bargaining positi on by precluding exit, it also weakens women's position by
depriving them of th e strategic ad vantage of threaten in g to lea ve. Even when conti nuing a particular marriage remains a positive-sum game , a woman may better her
bargaining position if her hu sba nd beli eves that she might "call hi s bluff" by acting on
he r own threats or forcin g him to act on his . On th e rol e of making credible threats
in positive-s um games , see s upra note 153.

,
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Short of a ban on divorce , rule changes have been proposed that
attempt to make exit m ore di fficult. Currently, all fifty states have
some variation of no-fau lt divorce, and the great maj o rity have
unilateral no -fault. 269 Although reintrod ucing fault or universalizing bil at eral consent rules would allmv -vvomen to block or impede
male-initi ated di vorce, it would not equ alize intra marital bargaining pmver. Exit t hreat is on ly one component of t he imb alance.
As t he foll owing discussion illustra tes, by trapp ing vvomen within
noncooperative or disharm onious marriages, sex-neutral im pe diments to exit would exacerbate the inequalities th at stem fr om intramarital differences in access to resou rces.
A rul e of bilateral consent would all eviate the bargai uing im bala nce created by the thre at of a husband 's de fection : 'Women who
wish to re m ain married despite their hus band 's d esire to divorce
woul d be given an effective property right to the marriage. If the
husband gained more from divorce than the wife gained from marriage, the husband could try to induce the wife 's consent by effecting a transfer that would make her indifferent between divorce and
270
continuing the marriage. But the buyout tactic is only open if the
initiating spouse's gains from divorce exceed losses to the other. If
Although there is some data to suggest that women initiate most divorces , see supra note 175, there is a paucity of information about the timing of divorce initiations
by men an d women. The bargaining model wou ld predict that most e arly divorces
wo uld be initiated by women , since women 's barga ining power a nd rema rriage prospects decline during the early years while men's are on th e rise. It is especially to a
woman's advantage, if things are not going well, to end a marriage before the birth of
children. Men , on the o ther hand , have much to gain from staying with a woman until both have reached middle age (since his position is on the rise relative to hers).
Thus, male-initiated divorces might begin to increase and perhaps even dominate as
middle age approaches , even though that is when women's bargaining position is
weakest. Cf. supra text accompanying note 253 (discussing why women might te nd to
initiate more divorces as their bargaining position deteriorates).
269
See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
~ 70 Ideally, the marriage would then only dissolve if divorce was Kaldor-Hicks efficient
(producing en ough gains to one or both spouses to allow a Pareto-superior redistribution). See, e .g. , Estin, supra note 4, at 541 (discussing Allen Parkman's argument
that "mutual consent ... permits a wife opposed to a divorce to demand compensation for all the nonfinancial losses that result from d ivorce"); see also Martin Zelder,
Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Pubiic Good s: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. Legal Stud. 503 (1993) (explaining that, by compelling a red istribu tion
that leaves both parties better off up on di vorce and discouraging di vorce unless there
are enough gains to improve both parties' positions relative to re maining married, the
bilateral consent rule promotes "efficient marriage " ). f or a discussion of "efficient"
alimony rules , see infra text accompan ying notes 316-317.
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th at condition does not obtain-or even if it does---the spouse
seeking a divorce might try to induce the other w ab andon the
marriage by destroying through his or her own conduct much of the
unique marital capital th at makes the marriage valuabie in the first
place. T here would no longer be a m arriage worth saving , or at
least the marriage would not be worth n early as m uch 2s be fore,
and it would thus be easier for the disgr untled spouse to pers ucl.de
'71
the otner to grant consent.T his point illustrates why reform of consent or fault rules cannot
provide the complete remedy to bargai ning imbalan ce . Rules that
regulat e exiT a dd ress o nly the compon enT of barg ai ni ng we akne ss that is attributable t o differential exit threat advant age . T hey
leave untouched other possible sources of bargaining V.feakn essspecifically, the h usband 's superior intramarital thre at position under the " burnt toast" scenario. If, as hypothesized, husbands on
average have a greater ability to make their \Vives miser a ble within
marriage than wives do their husbands, equalizing exit threat advantage alone will not solve the problem.
In any event, a bilateral consent rule will have consequences that
could hurt some women. By granting a property right in the marria ge to the husband that is symmetrical to the wife's, the rule adds
as much to men 's bargaining strength as to women 's. A wom an
who wanted to divorce might in turn be blocked by a husband who
might be able to extract concessions (such as the relinquishment of
property or custody rights) as the price for exit, thus making the
272
woman even worse off.
Although combining a bilateral consent
rule with a fault regime would discourage some forms of deliberate
marital misbehavior, women would still be stuck with undesirable
partners who fell short of the fault standard, and would lose protection if they were " at fault " themselves. m
In sum, reviving fault or consent rules can only be a partial solution to bargaining imbalance. Indeed, it helps some women at the
expense of others. For women whose marriage has lost its value or
•

"l

27 1
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 300 (" Because the la w can do little to enforce
the most meaningful and possibly onerous obligations of a marriage, it is possible for
a party to breach the contract. while remaining nominaily married." ).
272 See Mnookin & Korn hauser, supra note 89, at 963 -64.
m For a review of the general critique of fault rul es in divorce, see Estin, supra note
4, at 559-64; see also Ellm an, supra note 99 (general review of fault rul e ).
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worse, remaining married is nightm arish. For \vomen who dearl y
wish to hold onto their husbands and recoup their investment in
married life, abandonment is their greatest fear. Fault rules favor
the second group over the first, but both need help.
The limitations of fault and consent rules stem partly from trying
to find sex-blind and symmetrical soluti ons to a sex-specific problem. T he conservative commentator Irving Kristol has suggested
tha t unilateral no-fault divorce be made available on ly to women;
men would be req uired to prove wives ' misfeasance to obtain a di ssolution.m A lth ough this regime wou ld give wives co nsiderabl e
leverage, the solution would not be costless. Iviost notably, it
would hurt m en wh ose wives' re prehensible be havior falls short of
legal fault. The main drawback , however, is that the rule mi ght not
survive a constitutional challenge, since it makes an overt legal distinction between men and women. 275

B . Child Custody
O ne area in which the law long tolerated a sex-specific p reference (in favor of mothers) is child custody. But the law surrounding divorce shifted from formalistic and rigid rules (such as
"maternal preference" or "maternal presumption") to m ore fl uid
or egalitarian standards (the "best interests of the child" or "joint
custody"). 276 T he process of shaping the det ails of custody arrangements, as with other aspects of the law governing family relations , has become increasingly "privatized." 277 Child custody is now
determined primarily by interspousal bargaining.

"• Irvin g Kristol , Sex Trumps Gender, Wa ll St. J. , Mar. 6, 1996, at A20; see al so
Burggraf, supra note 81, at 136 (discussing Kri stol's proposal a nd response s) .
175 See United States v. Virginia , 518 U .S. 515 (1996); Califan o v. Goldberg, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U .S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S . 71
(1971); see also Alstott, supra note 6, at 2042 n.171 ("Constituti o nal precedent su ggests th a t the gender-n e utra l formul a tion would be necessary in th e Uni te d States .'' ).
276 See Maccoby & Mnookin, supra note 18, at 6-7.
271 See, e .g., id. a t 8-10 (" [C]ontemporary divorce law has increasingly recogn ized
the legitimacy of ' private ordering."'); Mnookin & Kornhause r, sup ra note 89, at 95256 (discussing th e shift to " priva te ordering"); id. at 963 -77 (discu ss in g the role of parental negoti ation in resolving child custody iss ues) ; id. at 977-84 (di scuss ing di ffe rent
child cu stody re gimes); see al so Jana B. Singe r, The Privatizatio n of Fa mily Law,
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443.
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Mnookin an d Kornhauser have explored the effect of negot iated
child custody arrangements on the welfare and position of participants following divorce. 278 But , as with all conditions that bear on
the spouses' "exit options ," the prospect of having to bargain ove r
custody at divorce also infl uences what goes on within "successful "
marri ages. The move from a maternal preference rule to negotiab ie
child custody arrangements an d joint custody can best be de scribed
as having a detrimental effect on women's intramarital bargaining
position. By awa rding the mother something she is likely to find
quite vaiuable (if only because of her limited re productive pote ntial and her larger investment in existing offspring), the oldfas hi oned matern al presumption or preference improved the
moth er's extramarital position and thus her exit advantage relat ive
to her husband's. To the extent some (if not many) fathers value
more than sporadic contact with their children, the matern al preference reduced those men's exit advantage by increasing the price
(loss of contact and control over children) attached to divorce.
An understanding of men's and women's respective bargaining
positions within marriage points the way to significant (and backwardlooking) reform in the law of child custody. Where bargaining
power is unequal, as it often is for husbands and wives within marriage and after divorce, private ordering will inevitably cause the
weaker party to lose out unless bargaining takes place against a
baseline that corrects for this imbalance. 279 Child custody should be
at least partly "deprivatized" by reviving a strong presumption for
maternal custody. Of course, a mother can always relinquish custody by private agreement, but she would do so against a baseline
entitlement that could only rarely be taken away. Moreover, the
rule should not take the form of a primary caretaker rule, which
looks to which parent provided the most "hands-on" care. A lthough
such a rule would favor women in most instances, it would undermine the bargaining position of working women who are the most
likely to share childcare responsibilities with their husbands and
paid caregivers but who, as we have seen , still suffer from unequal
bargaining power within marriage for other reasons. The purpose
of a return to maternal preference would only partly be to compen~·s M!iookin & Kornhauser, supra note 89, at 951 .
"' For a di sc ussion of "private ordering" solutions to bargainin g imbalance, see infra Sectio n Y.D.
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sate for the loss in barogaining omver that results when women tak e
on a disproportionate share of childcare within marriage. T he rul e
would also provide a crucia l counterweight for the structural advantage men possess by virtue of their longer reproductive life
(which makes their investmen t in each child, however large, less
important to them) and the marriage-market advantages th at flovv
from this biological fac t. M oreover, any legally enforce able paternal visitation rights sho ul d be conditioned on paymem of chil d
support. T his condition would strengthen the wife's han d within
marri age by taking away a possible bargaining chip from tbe fath er
in th e event of divorce ."so
As vvith so much else in divorce lav.;, post-divorce ch ild custody
rules are rarely discussed in light of their effects on the conduct of
marriages in which divorce is not (yet) an issue . Yet couples conduct their daily married life not just in the shadow of the market
but also in the shadow of everything that awaits them after m arriage dissolves. The lack of realism about the relationship between
married life and divorce, and an ill-advised quest for neutrality,
flexibility, and autonomy in divorce law, has resulted in rules that
hand men potent bargaining tools and deprive women of what little
power they have. Recent "reforms" in child custody rules have increased sex-based disparities in bargaining power within marriage.
~

L

C. Informal Social Norms and Self-Help

T raditionally, strong norms regulated many aspects of behavior
surrounding marriage and reproduction, ranging from th e division
of sexual responsibility within marri age to the social consequences
of premarital sexual conduct, adultery, spouse abandonment, and
d ivorce. tv1any of those norms have changed dramatically in recent
28 1
years. Is it possible to imagine any informal norm changes, un der
~ 80 This

quid pro quo rul e would make it harder for fathers who care little about
visitation to use their rights strategically by offering to reduce contact with the children if the mother would acce pt less money. But cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra
note 89, at 980-85 (criticizing a proposed lega i rule to deny noncustodial parents visitation rights).
1
"
See, e.g., Burggraf, supra note 81, at 112 ("Prior to the late 1960s, non marital sex
was a stro ng taboo in American cu lture .. . [and] th e soc ial sanctions were n' t tri vial. "); George A . Akerlof, Jane t L.Ye!len & Michael L. Katz, An Analys is of Out-ofWedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J. Econ. 277, 278 (1996) (notin g
the erosion of the custom of shotgun marri age in the 1970s); Amy L. Wax, Against
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bargaining power bet\veen men and women? In considering this
question , it is important to be mindful of the distinction between
norm ative conventions that are enforced by conspicuous extern al
sanctions and mechanisms, which are perhaps resisted by persons
expected to fo llow the norm, and internaiized norms, which are not
resisted btE adopted as values and preferences. In the aren a of
m8rital behavior, many conventions may have significant components both of external sanction an d in terna lize d t aste that are difficult to disentan gle. M oreover, some conventions may have an im-·
1
1
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Certainly , some of the problem of sexually skewed bargaining
power \vould go away if women and men shared the same average
preferences, tastes, drive s, outlook, and utilities respecting all functions interna l and external to th e family economy. ·w e have so far
treated observed preferences as exogenous, fixed, and largely uninfluenced by the very pressures that create bargaining disparities
283
and account for their feedback effects.
Although the notion that
men's and women's preferences are exogenous and impervious to
social expectations and choice-constraining pressures has repe at284
edly been challenged, and there is evidence that the challenge
235
may in some respects be justified, there is no obvious known
method for moving men's and women's preferences-if indeed
they are disparate-towards parity.
f'l
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Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. C hi. L Rev. 307, 347-48 & n.68
(1996) (book review) (noting erosion of social nom1s that imposed sanctions for divorce ).
" 2 See Wax , supra not e 281 , at 307-08.
~ 83 See su pra no tes 32, 233.
"~See su pra notes 32, 233.
"'A small study of " equa litarian " (ro le -sharing) married couple s is provocativ e on
this score. In describing the experience o f her sampl e, the author wrote:
The change to a more even sharing of domestic chores was not easy. Not o nly
did the wives hav e to contend with the husband's disinclination to do chores ,
they a lso had to cope with g uilt fee lin gs about aba ndoning th e ir tradition al ro le
a nd with the mi xed feel ings th e y had seeing their husbands do nontraditi o na l
tasks . As their strong interest in a profession consumed more a nd more of th e ir
mental and physical energy ov er the years, however, hou sework see m ed increas ingly tedi o us ra ther than ch a ll e nging. ln a ddition, the wo men's mov ement
led them to beii eve that doing double work is unfair and mad e them feel better
about sharin g domes tic chores with their husbands.
Haas, supra note 43, at 294.
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There is another set of preferences that are external to the marital economy but critically important to family bargaining power:
the preferences for partners, which operate on the marriage and
remarriage markets. As already discussed, men prefer younger
women and are indiffere nt to parity or mild inferiority of social
status. Women marry slightly older men and seem to prefer higher
status husbands.2x6 These patterns give men more currency on the
remarriage market and exacerbate disparities in earning power as
between couples.
Two tactics have been proposed to deal with the conditions that
create men's superior remarriageability. Concerned with neutralizing the effects of remarriage patterns on women's bargaining
weakness within marri age, 287 Rhona Mahony recommends that
women adopt a strategy of hypogamy-marrying down in status
and earnings. 288 Lloyd Cohen, on the other hand, recomm ends that
women marry much older men, on the theory that those men's
value on the marriage market will decrease with age. 289 Both Cohen's and Mahony's recommendations appear to be directed at
women only. The assumption seems to be that self-help is superior
to politics: People are more likely to change their own conduct to
advance their own interests than to get other people to change
their behavior to their detriment.
Mahony's proposal necessarily entails women marrying down in
age. She suggests that men married to higher- earning women will
choose to specialize in m arriage-specific capital as readily as women
married to higher-earning men, and thus will relinquish the exit
threat advantage conferred by better labor market prospects and
fewer marriage-specific investments. Mahony's suggestion is unlikely to work very well, for several reasons. First, a sudden shift to
a world in which women prefer younger and lesser-status men will
do little good so long as men's preferences do not change. It takes
q Status dispa riti es have bee n moderated in rece nt decad es by the rise in assortative matin g, which te nds to ma tch people of simil ar educational a ttainme nt and initial
occupatio nal poten ti al. See, e.g., Robert D . Mare, Five Decades of Educa ti onal Assortative Mating, 56 Am. Soc. Rev . 15 (1991) (documentin g th e dramati c rise in educati onal syngamy, or the tend e ncy to marry another with simil ar years of schooling,
espec ially among the co llege- educate d).
2s7 See Mahon y, supra note 16.
2&< See id . at 215-38.
289
See Cohen, supra note 4, at 293.
28
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two to make a marriage, and the match a woman can make is not
simply a function of her own tastes. R ather, it is determined by a
290
process of "pairwise-bargained allocation" in which various supply and demand curves, reflecting men 's and women's priorities,
meet. If men do not give priority to higher status wives, but continue
to see k the traits they have traditionally found desirable (youth,
beauty, and conventional femininity), there will be a serious mismatch
on the market, and fewer women may be able to find mates at all.
Second, Mahony's suggestion requires a coordinated and uniform change in women's preferences and practices. Even if a particular woman could find a man of lesser status to marry her, there
will be a steadily increasing pool of other women willing to marry
up to him as he gets older and earns more , and his wife will still
face a declining pool of men willing to marry her. Thus, fema le
hypogamy as an individual solution can only delay, but cannot
wholly solve, the problem of women's declining currency on the
marriage market.
The task of persuading all women to shun hypergamy (marrying
up) and embrace hypogamy (marrying down) presents all the formidable collective action problems entailed in trying to change an
existing norm, and in maintaining uniformity in the face of incen291
tives to defect from the norm.
But even if women could overcome their emotional attraction to men of higher status-which
may be just as deeply ingrained and difficult to alter as men's penchant for younger women-they may not gain much by marrying
down, for they will give up valuable tangible benefits by choosing
lower status men. A smaller piece of a larger pie (in the form of an
unfavorable marital bargain with a higher status man) may be
worth as much-or possibly more-than a larger piece of a smaller
one, in the form of an egalitarian marriage to a lower status man. 292
W hether women as a whole would be better off as more equal
See Rochford, supra note 56.
See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 32 (discussing the difficulty of a minority
faction changing existing norms).
292 See infra Section V.D.l. Departures from rationality due to information deficits,
cognitive distortions, and the tendency to discount the future- which have received
little discussion in this Article-probably play an important role in real-life decisionmaking in this area: The future losses from weak bargaining power are speculative
and painful to confront, but the current inadequacies of a marital candidate are vivid
and immediately apparent.
290
291
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partners to lower status men is a complex question that depends on
the state of the marriage market, and on whether the far-r eaching
secondary costs to women of the bargaining squeeze- costs that
wouid not be incurred in an egalitarian relationshio-are fullv
ta ken into account by women in their selection of mates on the cur3 T'
, unregu I ate d marKeV
1
. t.1e
1 aosence
'
rentiy
ne 1act t h at, m
o f enforceable bargains, the resources a man commands and his wife's
lever age over these resources in bargaining would probably continue to bear an inverse relationship suggests that women may not
gain much by marrying down.
Cohen's suggestion avoids one flaw in JV!ahony's p lan: Because
olde r men would probably be more than h appy to marry much
younger women, women 's collective decision to choose much older
men would not result in severe market mismatch of supply and
demand. But, as with the decision to marry younger men, marrying
much older ones would entail some loss in utility unless women
could overcome their market preferences for only slightly older
men (which may be no easier than adopting a desire for younger
mates). Even though a husband's death (as opposed to divorce)
leaves the surviving wife with an undivided claim on his assets, it is
still not clear that the increased bargaining power a woman enjoys
because of the reduced risk her husband will divorce her outweighs
her projected losses due to the risk of his dying earlier in the marriage. Finally, because intramarital bargains equilibrate with conditions on the marriage market-and, in th e absence of enforceable
bargair.s, do so, at least in theory, with no gain in effici ency or in294
crease in the size of the pie -Cohen 's ploy may only introduce
different trade offs rather than create absolute gains. Cohen tries
to argue that women's tendency to choose somewhat older husbands
already shows that "women realize that they have more reason to
be concerned with divorce than widowhood ." 295 It appears, however, that women have already balanced the risks of those unfortunate states in favor of husbands only somewhat older than themselves.
'

?')

J

£

293 Se e Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and D istrib ution , supra note 56, at 152-54
(describing equilibration of marri age market cond iti ons and intramarita! bargaini ng
possibilities whe n binding agreements are not feasible) .
29" See infra Sectio n Y.D. l.
29
; See Co hen , supra note 4, at 294.
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Mahony's and Cohen 's suggestions have this in common: They
implicitly recognize that, absent a change in the external rules defining the marital regime, a more balanced marital bargain can be
reliably secured only by choosing a man of the type that now has
lesser currency on the marriage market. ' Nhat lies behind the
lesser currency, however, is that these men offer fewer benefits to
their mates. Even if age and status ceased to be attractive to women
as a psychological matter, the sociological fact remains that those
traits con-e late in men wi th the ability to bring tangible benefits to
a marriage, and women continue to value those tangibl e benefits .
For these monosa ls to work, women vvould have to decide they do
not care about their husba nd's material wealth and earning power
after all.
T he prior discussion suggests th at, in the absence of a massive
transformation of taste , it is futile to attempt to change t he intramarital balance of power without recourse to an independent, external mechanism for fixing the costs and benefits of marriage-a
mechanism that does not depend on self-help by the person in the
weaker bargaining position. That self-help is futile under current
circumstances can be illustrated by considering another imaginary
scenario that relies on changing the social norms surrounding the
choice of mate. Suppose all women got together and decided to
demand an egalitarian division as a condition of getting married in
the first place or continuing in their current marriage. Suppose
such an initial coordination were possible. (Clearly, such an ultimatum would have little effect if not issued-and fo llowed-by
most women, since men would simply search for women who did
not demand such a condition.) This cartel would initially lovver
men's exit advantage by reducing the leeway for finding a better
marital bargain in the division of marital contributions. But the
removal from the market calculus of the availability of lopsided
marital bargains would still not completely eliminate men's threat
advantage: A husban d would still be able to look for a younger and
more attractive-albeit equally demanding-mate (and find one),
whereas a wife could not.
Women's awareness of men's greater ability to procure a rematch would doom the cartel. The temptation to defect would be
overwhelming, as individual women viewed bargaining concessions
as a way to hold on to what they have (on the view that this is the
"

l
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best they could ever get). That th e ultimatum could be issued as a
condition of agreeing to get married in the first place would not
matter: Women could not take effective advantage of their re lat ive
bargaining strength during their youthful period on th e primary
marriage market because any bargain they struck initially woul d be
subject to endless renegotiation throughout an intramarit al period
of rapidly eroding leverage. The lack of any external mechanism
for enforcin g the collective norm of issuing an equality ultim atum
is a pivotal defect. O nce married, every woman would be on he r own ,
and the temptati on to abandon the norm would prove irresisti ble .
D. Priva te O rdering: Contracting for Marital Terms
and Costs of Exit
1. Antenuptial Agreements

Comprehensive antenuptial contracts to regulate the conduct of
the marriage face two formidable obstacles, one legal and one
practical. First, as noted, the law will not enforce them during the
life of the marriage. 296 Second, the very nature of marriage as a relational contract means that such a fixed document cannot in reality ever be produced; "unknown contingencies or the intricacy of
the required responses may prevent the specification of precise
297
performance standards."
Thus, the complete, anticipatory regulation of marital relations, without provision for revision or renegotia tion , is a chimera.
Nevertheless, the subject of antenuptial contracting is provocative, at least from a theoretical point of view. Suppose we couid
reverse a key structural feature of the current marital regime: the
refusal to enforce contracts between spouses during th e life of the
marnage. Could privately negotiated antenuptial agreements cor-

~"' See

supra note 66 a nd accompanying text.
Goe tz & Scott, supra note 66, at 1092; see supra note 250; Sco tt & Scott, supra
note 21 0 (describing marriage as a paradigmatic re lational contract); see also Co hen ,
supra note 4, a t 298 (no ting th a t an e nforceable marital contract would have to tak e
into account '' the stage in th e marri age when the breach occurs, the circums ta nces of
the parti es at the tim e of marriage , a nd the circumstances at th e tim e o f breach") ;
O ii ve r E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance o f Contractu al
R e lation s, 2 J .L. & Econ. 233, 238 (1979) (observing th e replacement of neocl assi cal
processes by "adj ustm e nt processes of a more thoroughly transaction-specific, o ngo in gadmin istra ti ve ki nd " ).
~ 97
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rect the problems posed by inequality of bargaining power within
marriage? The short answer is no. Private bargaining cannot rectify inequality of bargaining power. Rather, the bargains struck
will simply reflect that inequality. The long answer is somewhat
more complex. Although private antenuptial contracting cannot
cure initi al disparities in bargaining power due to men's and
women's somewhat different average demand for marriage, it
could counter the progressive slide of women's bargaining position
by cutting off the possi bility for renegotiation during the course of
the marriage. T his should have the effect of reducing shirking, selfinsurance, and underinvestment in domesticity. T o remedy the
principal sources of bargaining power disparity, the contract would
ideally specify disposition of value following marital dissolution (to
modify exit threats). But it must also regulate intramarital behavior and be enforceable during the marriage to keep husbands from
capitalizing on their intramarital threat advantage. 298
The first objection to the use of antenuptial contracts is that they
present coordination and collective action problems: One bride's
demand for an antenuptial promise is unlikely to be met with assent when the default rule is no deal at all, and most women ask for
nothing more. In the absence of a universal norm of premarital
contracting, some men will simply search for women who will not
demand contractual protection against deteriorating bargaining
29l)
power.

An antenuptial contract might propose the incorporation of post-marital monetary compensation for any imbalances in costs and benefits that resulted during the
course of the marriage from one partner 's bargaining weakness. Even apart from
posing practical difficulties of valuation, such a rule would only compensate for imbalances in the event of divorce. It would not eliminate inequalities in the conduct of
an ongoing marriage. Only a rule of redistribution or specific performance that operated intramaritally could be expected to accomplish that goal.
"'Although courts will generally not enforce contracts intramaritally, antenuptial
contracts that specify some intramarital and post-marital conditions will be enforced
in many states upon dissolution. See Silbaugh, supra note 17, at 34; see also Laura P.
Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Act and Modern Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 1037 (1993) (detailing implications of approval of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act). The infrequency wit h which such contracts are drafted
might reflect adverse selection problems. In the absence of a coordinated or uniform
custom of prenuptial contracting, women who demand such contracts might be seen
as untrustworthy or otherwise undesirable. This problem, and the reluctance of
women to relinquish an advantage in competing for desirable spousal traits, which
298
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Even if that objection could be overcome, any attempt to arrest
the progressive decline in women's initial bargaining position by
private contract will have side-effects on the marriage m arket. As
noted, the marriage market is a complex process of " pairwisebargained allocation" 3m that matches men and women depe nding
on both the attributes they possess and the ones they are looking
for. The marriage market is not perfec:tly competitive, because
people are not perfect substitutes for one another. Two other important factors influence men's and -.,;,;omen 's currency and their
choice of mates on the marriage market: hmv well men and ~~vom:;n
do outside of marri2ge (determining hmv eager they are to marry),
and hmv satisfactory a deal they can strike withi n marriage (a function of their bargaining position as the marriage progresses).
As discussed above, men and women may not regard marriage as
equally valuable, perhaps because men can obtain more of what
they want outside of marriage (and can wait longer for what they
want within marriage). T his relative value of marriage is reflected
in the marriage market price of each person, which in turn determines how desirable a mate he or she can obtain under prevailing
baseline conditions-that is, where there are no intramaritally enforceable prenuptial deals. Under these conditions, each person
searches for the best mate he or she can get, and each can command a mate with certain qualities. The legal and practical obstacles to binding antenuptial deals effectively allocate to women
most of the risk of exploi tation through opportunistic renegotiation
during marriage and of potential expropriation of quasi-rents
through divorce. This allocation of risk is probably "priced into"
the market in the form of extra compensation to women for bearing that risk (and a lower "price" for men imposing it). In effect, a
woman will demand more compensation up front (in the form of a
higher quality husband) because the'risk of loss of her marital investment is so high. The man may be willing to pay more up front
for the privilege of reserving the potential to exploit. Thus, a particular woman may be able to find a more desirable man, and a
might have to be trad ed off against the security, certainty, and more fav o ra ble terms
of the marital bargain, combine to impede the development of a society-wide norm in
fav o r of premarital contracting. Newlyweds' refusal to conte mplate divorce and
women's dim awareness of t he structural sources of their bargaining power disadvantage may also lead women to und e restimate any benefits of such contracts.
300
See Rochford , supra note 56.
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man may be forced to settle (and will be willing to settle) for a somevvhat less desirable woman, in partial compensation for the genderbased allocation of risks imposed by the current marital regime. 301
Nevertheless, reducing or eliminating those risks contractually
by forcing parties to negotiate for binding terms on the semicompetitive primary marriage market should make for more efficient
marital agreements. This might allow some women to come out
ahe8.d. Eliminating the possibility of opportunistic renegotiation or
defection should reduce expensive, inefficient self-protective behavior and underinvestment, wh ich ought to increase the overall
.
"' h
. 1 ' . "'0' .
1
l
s1ze o:. tLe manta "ple. · - PreciSely 10'-11/ tnat extra surp us wou.o
be distributed, however, is unclear, because it depends on how a
marriage market that has equilibrated in the absence of binding
and enforceable contracts would adjust to their widespread adoption. If women could capture some of the increased surplus (and
they should be able to), much of the extra payoff would probably
come in the form of reduced risk: Although the average woman might
have a somewhat less desirable husband, she might be compensated not only by her greater bargaining power but also by enjoying a marriage of greater predictability, stability, and permanence.
Although antenuptial agreements face formidable practical and
legal obstacles and might shift the marriage market, this discussion
1

}

1

1

301
The interaction of the marriage market with the balance of power within marriage suggests that a woman should seek to maximize her marital payoff, in the absence of a binding premarital contract, by finding a man of such high quality (e.g.,
rich enough, attractive enough) that she obtains sufficient up-front benefits to compensate for the possibility of early defection and the threat of first performer losses.
But the fact that a woman wants to find a man whose very desirability insures her
against the actuarial risk of early desertion does not mean that she can find one: Her
currency on the market is determined by microeconomic forces that fix the "price" of
what she is offering, largely determined by her attributes and attractiveness, as well
as the market demand for those traits. On the marriage market, you cannot always
get what you want. Thus , many women will in fact be underinsured against the bargaining squeeze and undercom pensated for the risk of divorce. On the interaction of
marriage markets and marita l bargaining generally, see Becker, supra note 37; Gary
S. Becker, A Theory of Marriage (pt. 2), 82 J. Pol. Econ. Sll (1974); Bergstrom, supra note 56, at 1929-30; Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note
56, at 152-54.
302
See, e.g., Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 250, at 301 (describing the costs
of opportunistic behavior); see aiso Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 Vand. L Rev. 397 (1992) (discussing premarital agreements as a hedge
against marital opportunism).
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suggests why they might still be a good idea. It is true that some
women migh t have to lower their sights, but th at adjustment might
bring greater efficiency to marriage markets, with benefits to be
shared by women. It is the current marriage market that is distorted by its invitation to opportunism generally, and by the
gre ater potential for opportunism by men. It could be argued that
wom en now marry high er qua lity men than they rightly "deserve"
precisely because they pay on the back end rath er than the front .
U nder the current marital regime, wom en assume a greater risk of
a larger loss than they woul d if obligations could be fixe d ahead of
tim e. As a result, the variance in payoffs is greater. In effect, the
current marri age market is a high stakes game for women with big
winners (those who manage to hold on to high quality husbands)
and big losers (those left relatively destitute when their husbands
abscond). To the extent that the remote risk of divorce is notoriously discounted by most people, 303 th e current regime seems like a
good deal, but it may not be.
2. Dowry and Bride Price

Another variation on the theme of private contracts is the custom of dowry or bride price. 304 Dowry is money or property paid by
the husband or his family to the family of the bride to be held in
trust for her in the event of the husband's breach of the marriage
contract. So long (but only as long) as the marriage endures, the
money becomes part of the couple's estate. Dowry therefore functions as a performance bond on the husband. It moves bargaining
power towards parity by operating as a kind of tax on the husband's defection, which lowers his effective exit threat advantage.

303 See Baker & Emery, supra note 14, at 443 (noting th a t while marriage license
applicants who were surveyed estimated correct ly that half o f U.S. marriages would
end in divorce , their median res po nse was 0% when asked to assess the likelihood
th at their own marriages would suffer this fate).
J()J See generally Cohen, supra no te 4, at 292-93 (discussing the role o f bride price
" to all eviate some of the probl ems of appropri able quasi rents" in marriage); Ivy
Papps, The Role and Determinants of Bride-Price: The Cas e of a Palestinian Village,
24 Current Anthropology 203 (1983) (applyin g eco nomic theory to the payment of
brid e price); Melford E. Spiro, Ma rriage Payme nts: A Paradigm from th e Burmese
Perspective, 31 J. Anthropological Res. 89 (1975) (giving an overview of the customs
and economic rol e of dowry and bride price in so utheast Asian communities).
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A part from its inherent imprecision in estimating relative exit
threats, dowry has limited usefulness under current social conditions. First, earning power, not property, is the most important
source of marital wealth for most couples, and most people do not
have enough up-front resources to post an effective bond. (The
alternative-permitting the husband to borrmv the money against
future earnings-is in effect an alimony rule, which is discussed
below.305 ) Second, as with all devices that regulate exit threats, the
stability of the practice of dowry would depend on its adoption
across the board. But its adoption cannot be imposed by fiat. As
Lloyd Cohen states, dowry is "a cultural phenomenon that evolves
over a period of centuries. "'06 Third, the custom would have to incorporate an understanding that even women who do not assume a
traditional role and are not overtly financially dependent-and
who thus appear to have little labor market opportunity cost of
marriage-deserve a bond against the passive depreciation of their
marital capital. This would require a revolution in thinking about
marital relations. 307
Finally, dowry shares the limitation of any mechanism that does
not rely on intramarital enforcement: The marriage must end before
the remedy for unequal bargaining power is triggered. Intramarital
free rider strategies that push women to a point short of divorce
would continue unabated. If conditions grew poor enough to induce the wife to initiate exit, she could not claim the bond under
traditional dowry principles. Moreover, a fault component would
be needed to deal with the moral hazard of opportunistic exit by
the wife. 308 But traditional concepts of fault are too broad-gauged
to protect a wife from all possible efforts by the husband to destroy
or appropriate marital capital.

See infra Section V.E.2.
Cohen, supra note 4, at 292.
307
For a comparable discussion of new alimony rules, see infra notes 317-324 and
accompanying text.
308 See Cohen, supra note 4, at 292 (suggesting that dowry cannot work within a nofault system).
305
30

'
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E. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: !Handated Payment or
Transfer Rules

Tbe foregoing sections suggest that, if the world is to be made
safe for egalitarian marriage, the -way lies not in seif-help but in
politics. \Vomen cannot get a better deal by choosing a worse husband, an d they cannot rely on other 'Nomen's voluntarily standing
finn with them to insist on a better bargain. Likewise, private ordering cannot be a complete answer to inequality of bargaining
power, because an egalitarian deal cannot be expected to result
when men and wome n negoti ate from different premarital starting
points and vvhen the negoti ated deai equilibrates with <:m unregulated marriage market.
\Vould external regulation work? There are a number of possible measures that could be adopted. 309 Perhaps the law should al ter
or control the marriage contract by regulating intramarital relations or by fixing the terms of post-marital distribution. This Section will consider both possibilities.
1. Intramarital Payments or Transfers

Detailed regulation to equalize the precise terms of marital relations would be impracticable for the same reasons that relational
contracts for that purpose are infeasible. Nevertheless, the government can selectively intervene to redistribute some forms of
marital assets during the life of the marriage. Two proposals are
the assignment of a family allowance to the mother or primary
caretaker of a child 310 and mandated income sharing within marriage. 311

309 Various mixed public-private schemes are not discussed here.
One exa mple of
such a scheme would be taxing single men to try to equalize their premarital bargaining position with unmarried women, and then allowing the parties to negotiate
an enforceable prenuptiai deal privately. I owe the suggestio n to tax single men to
George Triantis. Interestingly , proposa ls for a "bachelor tax," or tax surcharge on
singi e marriageabl e men , were a stap le of Swedish politics at the turn of the century.
Their avowe d purpose, however, was to stem th e precipitous fall in the national
birthrate by encouragi ng men to marry earlier, not to provide women greater marital
leverage. See Allan Carlson, The Swedish Experime nt in Fam ily Politics 16 (1990).
310 For an extensive discussion of family allowances, :-;ee A lstott, supra note 6, at
2042-55.
11
·'
See Okin, supra note 32, at 180-83 (proposing income sharing within marriage).

a. Child A llmvcrnces
Many European countries now pay a uni versal family or child
allowance to fam ilies, prorated according to the number of children. Most countries pay the allmvance ei ther to the mother or to
a primary ca.retaker who is defined as the person providing most
312
care for the child within the family.
Hmv might a "Noman's control over this subsidy affect intramarital bargaining po\ver? ·u nder
the divorce threat model, the fact that the subsidy was assigned to a
mother within an intact marriage would not rna
arty difference
because it viould not in itself impro\'e the terrns of her exit.
1\, ·r
t•
1
1vloreover,
some nusoands m1gnt contmue to ,t<:~ve
tne
1everage
to
bargain away the benefits of a wife's control of excra income by
taking control of other valuable resources. ()nly if single or divorced mothers also received the subsidy-that is, only if the subsidv continued outside of marriage-vvould a woman 's exit threat
be "enhanced and her bargaining position improved.m But the intramarital threat model does predict that intramarit al assignment
of the allowance to mothers would improve \vomen's bargaining
power, because wives' and children's fallback position within a
314
conflict-ridden marriage would improve.
The child allowance
would be like income to the mother, \Vhich could be withheld from
her spouse without directly hurting the recipient or her children.
1

1

..,

•

1

•

b. Intramarital Income Sharing
It is not clear that legally enforced income sharing during marriage would help to improve many women's position. Like a child
allowance, income sharing would at best provi de only a partial solution to bargaining power inequality and could not be expected to
312 See Alstott, supra note 6, at 2042.
As Anne Alstott notes, a family allowance
expressly earmarked for mothers might present constitutional difficulties within t he
United States. See id. at 2042 n.l71.
mAs Anne Alstott suggests, the exit threat enhancement effect would result from
"a system of family aUowances paid only to single mothers," regardless of whether
married women were also paid. !d. at 2052. Note, however, that a system of exclusively intramarita l payments would have some effect on the husband's exit threat, because he would lose the ability to share in the all owance if he leaves the family. See
id. at 2052 n.213.
31 " See Lundberg & Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution, supra note 56, at 149
(noting that a separate spheres intramarital bargaining paradigm predicts enhancement of women's bargaining power from a child allowance assigned to mothers).
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tract and the duties spouses owe to one another.:; Any rule that
would govern alimony fo r the purpose of correcting an imbalance
in bargaining power must take into account remarriage prospects.
That would require a very different rul e fro m one ever seriously
proposed. For example, it would mandate sorne re adjustment in
favor of th e wom an-based on the actuari al chance of remarriage-regardless of whether she seemed to assume greater responsi bility at home or man aged to maintain earnings or career parity
'vvith her husband.319 Under current alimony practice, in contrast, it
would be rare for a woman 'Nith significant earning power and an
uninterrupted work record to receive alimon y on her own account.320 But any rule designed to equalize bargaining povver -would
need to focus as much on the role of passive depreciation in the marital balancing act as on active and measurable opportunity costs.
Such a post-divorce transfer rule has its limitations in addition to
difficulties in implementation. 32 1 A stringent alimony rule, like private prenuptial contracts, leaves the marriage market unregul ated.
The rule would have the predicted effects of any measure that
takes power away from men and reduces the risk of exploitation
fo r women. Some men's unwillingness to m arry on those terms

See, e.g., E llman , supra no te 63; Elisabeth M . La nd es, Econo mics of Alimony, 7
Legal Stud. 35 (1978); Parkman, su pra no te 40; Symposium on D ivorce and Fe min ist Legal Th eory, supra note 4; Symposium on Family Law, 1991 B YU L. Re v. 1;
Trebilcock & Kes hvani, supra note 4. For a co mpre hensive revi ew of th e subject, see
Estin, supra note 4, an d Estin , supra note 36. Alimony 's possibl e purposes include
holding co upl es to their long-te rm promises, promoting efficie nt in vestme nt , co mpensating for loss of a re li a nce inte rest, or deterre nce . The measure of alimony consiste nt with each purpose will ha ve different effects o n b a rgaining powe r as we ll as
other incid e nts of marriage, including stability .
319
Th e rule co uld be b ased on actuarial projections of rema rriage prospects (broken
dow n by parameters such as age, sex, income, and ed ucatio n). Alternatively, incom e
and assets could be di vi ded wi th a n upward adjustment upo n th e re marriage of o ne
spouse to compe nsate the unmarri ed spouse for the valu e of th e marr ie d spouse's
new partn er. Such a rul e would greatly disco urage re marri age and ne w fami ly forma ti on by both me n and women.
320
See Weitzm an, supra note 12, a t 147-50 (d escribin g the circu mstances un der
wh ich alimony is award ed und er the current no-fault syste m).
32
' Recognizing long-t erm pos t-m arit al cl aims by o ne spouse on the othe r's income,
which would be required to ma ke th e rule work, would disco urage labo r mark et participation and hard work through a substitution effect, or wou ld d1ive wo rkers into
the und erground econ omy. See , e.g. , B urggraf, supra note 81 , at 133. The most pronounced effects would be felt o n the low end of th e income scal e, where labor market
participation is tenuous .
318
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v;oul d tend to produce a decline in marriage rates frorn current
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have to settle for lower quality men. On the other hand, as with
antenuptial contracts, 323 a rule creating a more enforceable longterm comract should le ad to a deeper and more efficient level of
intramarital investment ancl more st able and predictable m arital
relationships. l he diminution in the payoff from opportunistic de fe ction should create a larger "marital pie," shares of wh ich com pensate the average woman for ot her marriage market e ffec ts. For
persons of both sexes seeking stability and a reliable re turn on investment , this effect would increase the incentive to get marri ec1.J 24
.. an a l'1mony n.ue
' Lh at seeks
.
.
., .
J:-many,
to compensate .,1or rntangwle
losses through monetary transfers would function in a fashion th at
discriminated against the poor. Because people at the lower end of
the income scale would be pushed below the subsistence leve l by
any interspousal transfer of income, they will rarely initiate divorce
under a rule that really takes into account all forms of prospective loss.
Contrast the complete-internalization rule with a regime that has
been proposed by some commentators: post-marital equal sharing
of income. 325 Income splitting has the virtue of simplicity. It does
not require case by case evaluation and adjustment for the tangible
or intangible components of relative contribution, sacrifice, benefit, or opportunity cost during the marriage. But in its very simplicity lies its weakness as an instrument for equalizing bargaining
power. A pure division of partners' income is a very blunt instrument for bringing about equalization of bargaining positions within
~ ·

322 For a discussion of marriage market effects of private contracts, see supra Section V.D .
"'For a discussion of the effici e ncy of antenuptial contracts, see supra Section
Y.D.1.
"' Jana Singe r has suggested that a simp le post-divorce income-sharing requirement
mi ght have the effect of "encourag[ing] husbands to increase their investm ent in
famil y care , 'since the fina ncial consequences of such an investm e nt strategy wo uld
not be so devastating in th e event of a divorce, and th e benefits of investing so le ly in
one's own career wou ld not be so complete."' Singer, Alimony a nd Efficiency, supra
note 187, at 2455 (quoting Jana B. Si nger, Divorce Reform and Gender Ju st ice, 67
N.C. L. Rev . 1103,1121 (1989) [herein after Singer, Divorce Reform]).
325 See, e .g., Burggra f, supra note 81 , at 131-33, 254; Martha L. F ineman , Implementing Equality: ideology, Contradictio n and Social C hange, 1983 Wis . L. Rev. 789;
O kin , supra note 32, at 180-83; Singe r, Alimony and Efficiency , supra note 187, a t
2454-60; Singer, Divorce Refo rm, supra note 324, at 1114-21.
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marri age. It fails to take into account the individualized, intangible
benefits and costs of a marriage and its alternatives-including average differences by sex. Although this lack of flexibility would
help some women by raising their exit advantage to near parity or
beyond, it would hurt others (by und ercompensating them), and it
would also unfairly hurt some men (by overtaxing them).
Moreover, if a background of no-fa ult divorce is assumed, a rigid
income-sharing rule would apply regardless of who initiated divorce and wou ld dictate the same allocation regardless of how
much better or worse off each partner would be following divorce.
As such, it would often fail to tak e into account "what, in many
cases, may be the most significant loss associated with divorce: the
loss of the marital status itself. " 326 Such loss is somewhat greater
for women and grows with age. The person who can remarrymore often the man-will gain a share of a new marital surplus and
perhaps a second income. The income-splitting rule provides no
special compensation for this differential in threat advantage, and
thus may often (as when earnings are similar) undercompensate
the wife. In addition, because the income-splitting rule looks only
to earnings disparity and not to the remarriage chances of divorced
spouses, such a rule could severely penalize some higher-earning
women, imposing even greater pressure on them to make marital
concessions to forestall the loss of their husbands.
Finally, adoption of a post-divorce redistribution rule that assigns
one partner an enduring share in a former partner's future income
regardless of any notion of breach or fault creates an opportunity
for strategic behavior on the part of a nonearning or lower-earning
spouse. If, for reasons unrelated to her husband's misfeasance or
hard bargaining, a lower-earning wife feels she would be better off
outside the marriage-perhaps because she has found a better prospective husband-then she gains a windfall by initiating divorce.
(This would, at the very least, create a disincentive for men to
marry women without independent income or to consent to a
wife's withdrawal from paid employment.) Alternatively, if the
marriage remains marginally valuable to her absent income redistribution, but is worth leaving if she can gain an equal share of her
husband's post-divorce income, the income-sharing rule will induce

326

Singer, Alim o ny and Efficiency, supra note 187, at 2448.
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her to leave even if it would make her husband worse off. Put another way, a rigid income-sharing rule creates a moral hazard by
encouraging divorce in cases in wh ich divorce is not Pareto superior to staying married and thus ends up imposing deadweight
losses on one spouse. 327 That problem bears directly on bargaining
power: The spouse in danger of bearing the costs of divorce will be
at a bargaining disadvantage within the marriage.m
The ideal complete-internalization rule suggested above, in contrast, does not present this particular danger. A spouse wo uld not
seek a divorce unless that partner would be so much better off outside the marriage that he or she could afford to transfer enough assets to make the other partner better off as well. There would be
no deadweight loss and no opportunism. Many couples would stay
married rather than divorce when one partner wanted out, because
the mandated transfer would make that partner worse off than he
or she would be by remaining married.
The complete-internalization rule has its own difficulties, however, which are characteristic of all alimony rules that are triggered
As Michael Trebilcock and Rosemin Keshvani write:
In constructing the hypothetical contract at the time of marriage, would the two
parties agree that the wife should share in the husband's economic returns both
where there is no marriage dissolution and where there is? ... [N]o insurer
would write such a policy because the wife may well be rendered largely indifferent to sustaining or terminating the marriage, given the assumption that her
entitlements on divorce are not contingent on proof of absence of fault on her
part for the marriage dissolution.
Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 4, at 557; see also H. Elizabeth Peters, Marriage
and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting, 76 Am. Econ. Rev.
437, 443-44 (1986) (discussing moral hazard in the context of marital relationships).
m Jana Singer argues that the moral hazard endemic in post-divorce income splitting is overstated because "income sharing after divorce is not likely to improve a
lower wage earner's financial position." Singer, Alimony and Efficiency, supra note
187, at 2457. She explains that "given the added expense of maintaining two households, divorce is likely to result in a net decrease in both spouses' financial wellbeing," id., and that "a lower wage earning spouse is likely to have invested disproportionately in marriage-specific human capital, ... [thus] reduc[ing] a spouse's incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior during marriage." Id. at 2458.
Although Singer's observations are va lid, her analysis suffers from a failure to consider the full range of scenarios that could obtain if income sharing were available. A
"predatory wife" might marry with an eye towards gaining a partial claim on a future
husband's income. Or a fragile but "efficient" marriage might become worth more
dead than alive to a lower earning spouse. By giving one spouse the chance to improve her position at the ex pense of the other, the sharing rule might result in a decrease in total well-being overall.
"
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by the desire to exit rather than by breach of a well-defined promise or fault :' 29 The very scenario that cre at es the greatest difficulty
for an inflexible income-sharing rule-t:hat of th e lower-earning
spouse who nevertheless would like to le ave the marriage-also
exposes the practical fla ws inherent in the less rigid rule. Once
again, the bedrock presumption of th e inte rnalization rule is that
the party who seeks the di vorce has judged that he or she will be
better off outside the marriage, taking.... into account both tangible
and intangible benefits, and regardless of ~m y apparent decline in
financia l well-being. T hus, if a lower-earning \Vife seeks a divorce
and her husband resists, the presumption ·would apply, and the
transfer rule will mandate th at, if anything, assets wi ll flow from
her to her husband to compensate him for his losses. In practice,
the application of the pres umption gives rise to the objection already discussed, which stems fro m the monetization of marital
value inherent in any rul e of compensation: It favors the party with
money or the ability to generate it. A lower-earning wife who has
invested primarily in marital capital and who has little labor market value may be so miserable that she feels she is better off without her husband, but she m ay lack the means to pay for the privilege of exit. 330 This wouid mean that, as a practical matter, higherearning spouses (mostly men) would be abl e to buy their way out
of loveless or irksome marriages more often than traditional wives.
The complete-internalization rule is also not free of the potential
to elicit strategic behavior. Alt hough it neutralizes the predatory
wife problem posed by the income-sharing rule (by barring transfers to the one initiating divorce), it fails to de al adequately with a
disturbing alternative scenario: the miserable wife married to the
bad or exploitative husband. If the husband makes the marriage
undesirable or worthless to the wife through infidelity, misfeasance, or noncooperation-if he uses his superior intramarital
threat advantage to destroy or appropriate a large share of marital
assets, even to the point of pushing the wife below a reservation
price already made quite low by poor extramarital prospects, large
marriage-specific investments, and the burden of children-then
the husband could effectively sidestep the obligation to pay ali~

'"See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 4, at 6-9, 49-5 3, 74-81.
See Zelder, supra note 270, at 506 (pointing out th at many o f the assets of marriage are tied up in children, who are neither liquid nor d ivisible).
330
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mony through his own misdeeds.311 In effect, he could use his other
sources of bargaining power adv antage to torment his wife so much
that divorce would ent ai l a net utility gain for her, thus relieving
him of the obligatio n to provide her with any compensation upon
exit. A rule that ignores the husband's capacity to engage in this
loss-making strategy cannot hope to accomplish a comprehensive
equalization of mari ta i bargaining power. T his is just another way
of saying that the alimony rule fu nctions poorly if it allows payment to a spouse despite "fau lt. " A fault conception, however,
would only work well if it v.ras sufficiently sensitive to take into account the full range of strategies, fro m annoying to egregious, for
inducing the other spouse to initiate divorce.
The prime strategy for driving the other to initiate divorce is to
take advantage of intramarital threat potential. Thus, adjusting
exit threats through monetary allocations would not suffice: The
rule would have to be combined with some form of direct intramarital intervention or redistribution to neutralize shortfalls from
differences in intramarital threat potential and chronic negotiating
weakness.332 But, as we have seen, direct intramarital regulationwhether by contract or by rule--would be infeasible and transform
the nature of the institution beyond recognition.
One way to mitigate- if not entirely negate-the perversities of
the wealth effect and the potential for strategic appropriation of
marital capital would be to suppiemen t an alimony rule based on
complete internalization wi th a requirement li ke the one proposed
See the discussion of parall el pro bl e ms \vith the rul e req uiring bilateral conse nt
fo r divorce, supra Section V.A . The most extreme example would be physical abuse
or th e threat of abuse, which is not uncommon . See, e.g., Demie Kurz, For Rich er,
For Poorer: Mothers Confron t Di vorce 52-56, 64-75 (1995) (describing the rol e of
physical violence for a sa mp le of divorcing couples). The rule co uld be written to
make a n exception for thi s type of beh:1vior, but that would leave untouched the consid erable portion of me n's in tra ma rital threat advantage th at does not stem from or
require resort to physical viole nce.
332 An alim ony rule, lik e an ante nu ptial bargaining term , could be designed to in clud e pos t-marital mon etary compensa tion for any imbala nces in costs and benefits
that resulted from intramarital bargain in g weakness. As with the antenuptial term ,
such a rule would oniy compensa te for imbalance in th e eve nt of divorce, but would
have little effect on the condu ct of a n ongoing marriage. See supra note 298; cf. Ell man, supra note 4 (rejectin g on feas ibility grounds any a lim o ny rule that atte mpts to
adjust for inequities during th e life of the marriage) ; E llm an , su pra note 63, at 280
(argu ing aga inst adop ting an al imo ny rule that provid es "a reme dy for unfair exchanges during the marri age").
33 1
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by Ira Ellman, which seeks to compensate the spouse who has investe d disproportionately in marriage-specific capital. Ellman
proposes that alimony reflect such a spouse's opportunity cost in
the form of forgone investment in market human capital or other
tangible or clearly quantifiable sources of potential financial gain. 333
In the event an unhappy low-earning wife initiates a divorce that is
not mutually agreeable, that supplemental principle would usually
have the effect of converting her indetermin ate debit into a credit ,
at least insofar as she could demonstrate th at her greater investment in domestic pursuits entailed a personal financial sacrifice.
Eve n a wife with conside rable earning pmver might be able to argue for forgone opportunity and escape hav ing to pay for the
privilege of divorce if she could demonstrate a greater in-kind contribution to the maintenance of th e household.
3. W elfare payments

An alternative way to increase women's well-being outside of
marriage, and thus reduce men's marital threat advantage within
marriage, is for the government to make payments to ex-wives or
custodial mothers directly. Until recently the United States had
AFDC, a means-tested federal family-allowance program. 334 Before the repeal of the program, AFDC paid benefits not just to exwives but also to never-married single mothers. Persons qualifying
for A FDC often received supplemental benefits such as Medicaid
or Food Stamps. These benefits might have had the effect of
making some women with low earnings capacity virtually indifferent as between marriage and non-marriage. Because the package
of aid was sometimes as or more valuable than full-time wages at
the bottom of the income scale, 335 federal poverty programs set
women up as the equivalent of non-working wives to phantom
husbands. To be sure, some real-life husbands supply extras in the
See Ellman , supra note 4, at 49-53.
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1994). The program was repealed in 1996 and replaced
with a block grant program known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF" ).
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105,2112 (1996). Under TANF, however, some states
have continued ben e fits programs similar to those in place under AFDC.
335
See, e.g. , Michael Tanner, Stephen Moore & David Hartman , Cato Institute, The
Work vs. Welfare Trade-Off: An Analysis of th e Total Level of Welfare Benefits by
State, Sept. 19, 1995; Michael Tanner & Naomi Lopez, Cato Institute, The Value of
Welfare , Jun e 12,1996.
m
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form of emotional support and partial sharing of household responsibilities, but other husbands may impose net costs that partially
offset the income they provide. AFDC may be more attractive
than these husbands by supplying the income without the costs.
These poverty programs would tend to put poor women in a
powerful bargaining position with respect to low-earning husbands.
But such programs would also probably destabilize existing marriages among eligible populations or deter marriage altogether.
Marital instability and low rates of marri age among the most poorly
educated and least employable groups are consistent with these
predicted effects, although th ey clearly have other causes as well.m
F. Informal Social Norms R evisited
As the previous discussion suggests, there are two important parameters that must be considered when trying to correct bargaining
imbalance between husbands and wives: intramarital threats and
divorce exit threats. There are in turn two important elements to
be considered in any attempt to adjust men's and women's divorce
exit threats: each spouse's relative value of leaving the marriage
compared to the other's and the absolute value of the exit threat
for each spouse. The latter affects the incentive to marry and stay
married. If exit threat is to be set equal as between the sexes, there
are three possible permutations: raise one spouse's threat point so
both are high, lower the other's so both are low, or establish some
point between the extremes. Federal poverty programs may have
had the effect of raising some women's well-being outside of marriage to a level virtually equivalent to, or perhaps greater than,
their well-being within most marriages they potentially could make.
Because women could have children out of wedlock without losing
welfare benefits, the expected costs to a welfare-eligible woman of
remaining or becoming single was brought within the range of the
costs to a man, with costs being rather low for both. In effect, the
threat advantage for both potential partners was rendered quite high,
with a predictable destabilizing effect. A complete-internalization

33 6 See, e.g., Daniel T. Lichter, The Retreat from Marriage and the Rise in Nonmarital Fertility, in Dep't of He alth & Human Servs., Report to Congress on Out-ofWedlock Childbearing 137, 138 (1995) (discussing ev id e nce that recent declines in
marriage have been greatest among least-educated women).
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alimony rule would, in contrast, adjust one spouse's exit threat upward (the payee) and the other's downward (the payor). T he hope
is that the adjustment would, at worst, have a negligible effect on
marital stability, and at best would decrease insta bility by forcing
the would-be defector to internalize some of the losses imposed on
the spouse who would be abandoned.
Perhaps the most pro-m arriage rule of all, however, is one that
insures t ha t both spouses' exit -prospects
are simil arlv un <:rttr8.C ti',.re .
·
Before about 1960, divorce carried a stigma in American society
that had real reputational and economic consequences. Those included difficu lties in remarrying, ineligibility for higher political office , and possible derailment of promising professional or business
careers-all consequences ·with potenti ally greater impact on men.
T he informality of the stigma allowed for gradations in response
depending on circumstance and perceived fault. 337 To be sure, all
divorced persons were suspect, and women who abandoned their
fam ilies or were otherwise thought to have contributed to their
own difficulties were judged harshly. But because it was understood that dependent wives had more to lose from divorce than
men , a man's defection invited special opprobrium.
The insights of bargaining theory reveal that remarkable wisdom
informed the informal customs that made the post-divorce state
unpleasant for all concerned. Other defunct social norms that
made the unmarried state unattractive for men, such as the taboo
against casual premarital sex and the expectation of marriage foliowing out-of-wedlock pregnancy ("shotgun marriage") , also
helped even the playing field between men and women within marriage. 338 But those norms, although supplemented by religious
~

..;

337 See , e.g., Joseph Ade!son , Splitting Up, Commentary, Sept. 1996, at 63; F rank F .
Furstenberg, Jr. , History and C urrent Status of Divorce in the United States, 4 Futme
of Children, Spring 1994, at 29; Richard Epstein, Enforcing Norms: Whe n th e Law
Gets in the Way, Responsive Community, Fall 1997, at 1, 7 ("W hen divorce was regarded as socially unacceptable, divorcees found it difficult to ge t jobs, join cl ubs, or
run for publi c office. "). See generally Jonathan Rauch , Live and Let Lie, New Re pu blic, Sept. 22, 1997, at 24 (describing bygone in forma l social contro ls s urrounding
marriage , adultery, and divorce).
33
' See, e.g., Burggraf, supra note 81, at 112; David Popenoe, Modem Marriage : Re vising the 0Jltural Script, in Promises to Keep: Decl ine and Renewal of Marriage in
America 261 (David Popenoe, Je an Bethke Elshtain & David Blan kenhorn eds.,
1996) (" Under the old system .. . if a man wanted regular sex (other than with prostitutes) he had to marry. " ); see also Akerlof, Yellen & Katz, supra no te 281, at 284
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scruples, have ultim ately proved highly unstable. Grea ter mobility,
women' s increasing fi nancial independence, and ch angi ng attitudes
about th e role of sex, relationships, and marriage have contributed

tbl.II (n oting declin e in shotg un weddings from 1965 to 1984) Bargaining theory
pre clicts th a t the srigm 2. att ache d to pre marital sex would stren gthe n women 's hand
within ma rriage by ma king sex harder to obtain. The shotgun marriage practice
would also kr.d to have t his effect, since it imposed severe pe na lti es on me n who
a lx~ndon e d or refused to marry a pregna nt girlfriend.
Acco rding to Ak eriof and hi s co-authors, shotgun marri ages occ urred because
women customa rily e licited a promi se of marriage in the event of pre gnancy in ex change for agree in g to en gage in prentarital sex, and men ro utin e ly !nade go od on
thilt pro rnisc tc avoid the soc ial and reputationa l costs of re:; eg ing. ld . at 297 -304.
With th e ad vent of the bi rt h control piil and lega lized abo rtio n, the ma rke t was
flooded with wome n who -...-vere wiiling to take contraceptives or abort , and thu s these
women had less of an ince ntive to extract a promi se of marriage as the price of engaging in premarital sex . This devel opment destabili zed the "pro mi se " norm by putting women who insisted on a provisional promise of commitm e nt at a compe titive
disadvantage in attracting yo ung men. Id. at 307-10.
According to the authors, the increased availability of sex without a promise of
marriage led to an increase in the out-of-wedlock birth rate. Id. Some women (mostly
those in the lower socioeconomic classes) who found themselves pregnant-an d who
previously would have been good candidates for shotgun brides-decided to go
ahead with their pregnancies even if the fathers refused to marry th e m. If one of the
important reasons me n marry is to have their own children, then the reported increase d wi llingness of some women to bear children o ut-of-wed lock would be predicted to increase their prospective mates' well-being outside of marriage as well.
This would not only decrease these men's willingness to marry, but might also increase me n 's leverage within those marriages that are contracted .
The dramatic recent in crease in the age of first marriage for both men and wome n .
see supra note 1, is co nsiste nt with the contemporaneous increase in the avail a bility
of prem arital sex in all social classes. The ease of obtaining sex o utside of marriage
decreases the costs of delayed marriage for both sexes, but especially for men, who
are always faced with greater scarcity of sexual opportunities. See Akerlo f, Ye ll en &
Katz, supra note 281, a t 309 (noting the erosion over the past three decades of th e
taboo against premar ital sex except as a prelude to marriage). But the lifetime marriage ra tes a mong higher socioeconomic classes has not dropped nearly as much as
among th e less ed ucated. See Lichter, supra note 336, at 138-39. T his pattern may be
due partly to the practical unavailability to high e r status men of having their own
children outside marriage . In contrast, out-of-wedlock birthrates have exploded
a mong the relatively poor and less well-educated: More men in those groups can now
o btain bo th sex and ch ildre n outside the marital union. See Wax, supra note 266, a t
493 n. 6 (citing statistics on rates of extramarital chi ldbearin g, which indicate that
rates declin e steep ly among white women as education and income rise). Interestingly, single motherh ood through artificial insemin a tion or adoption does not have
the effect of giving identifiable men their own children. To th e extent that well-off
white women favor ihose methods, o ut-of wedlock chi ldbearing (w hich occurs infrequently in this group any way) will make little contribution to men 's ex tramarital wei fare or their disincentive to marry.
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to the erosion of the infor mal social sanctions. 339 The steep rise in
the divorce rate to a near-majority phenomenon has m ade it more
difficult to treat divorced persons as deviant and socially m argin al
or to impose meanin gful reputational costs. 3 A s a result, the social sti gma that once attached to divorce has all but disappeared in
mos t qu arters. Finall y, informal sancti ons against divorce carried a
social price. By imposing additional and onerous transaction costs
on divorce , the fear of social disapproval held so me people in otherwise negative-sum unions. In addition, spouses were locked in to
inefficient relationships in which one spouse had more to gain from
divorce than the other had to lose-a problem better solved wi th
post-divorce red istributi on . O n the other hand, the social stigma of
di vorce was particularly effective in protecting the well-being of
third parties-most notably, childre n-whose interests in th e continuation of an unhappy marriage did not precisely coincide with
their parents '.
-l()

VI.

CON CLUSION

While not solving the puzzle entirely, this account of marital
bargaining provides an important missing piece in the search for
explanations of why women occupy a lower social status and
perform th e lion's share of less valued work. More specifically,
it helps to explain why married women-still the majority of
women-appear on average to work harder and longer and for
fewer rewards than their husbands. The standard account says that
women are doin g what they want to do: They like it this way, and
wo uld not change it if they could. A lternatively, women just appear to do worse. There are hidden compensations and consolations that make them just as well off as men. When different preferences and utilities are factored in, equality reigns.

339
See, e.g., Barbara D afoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture (1997) (documenting
th e rece nt des ti gmatiza ti on of divorce); see also Toni M. Massaro, Shame, C ulture,
and Am erican Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1916 (1991) (discussing forces o f
modernity, mobility, and ano nymity that contribute to the erosion o f social norms).
340 See D ani ei Patrick Moynihan, Definin g De viancy Down, 62 Am. Scholar 17
(1993) (discussin g gene ral difficulty of maintaining socia l stigma against behaviors as
they be co me more common); Sun ste in, Social Norms, supra note 32, at 929-30
(discussing the costs of policing social norms); Wax, supra note 266, at 508-25 , 533-37
(discussing erosion of norms stigmatizing ill egitim acy) .
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Although bargaining theory cannot definitively refute this account, it shows why the re is no reason to credit these stories and
good reason not to. Women probably do not like it that way and
would change it if they could. But they cannot, because they lack
the leverage to do so. The reasons behind this dilemma lie deep
within the structure of marriage itself. The bilateral and monopolistic institutional framework-in which each woman is forced to
bargain with one man with little outside help or intervention-is an
effective mechanism for turning women's differences to women's
disadvantage. To be sure, the scope for "private" bargaining within
the marital relationship is affected by baseline rules of domestic
law (supplemented by custom), which in turn determine the rights
and obligations that spouses have towards each other. These factors can strengthen or weaken women's hand. But domestic law
has been increasingly deregulated and privatized. 341 By imposing
fewer and fewer specific obligations on spouses and leaving more
matters to be worked out between the parties, recent changes have
forced women to rely on the not-so-tender mercies of a bargaining
game undertaken from a baseline of unequal starting points and
bargaining strength. The key structural features of our current
marital regime-exclusivity, minimal and sex-blind barriers to exit,
no intramarital enforcement of promises or contracts, and little
post-marital redistribution of resources-insure that the institution
operates very much in men's favor. But even though some of these
features represent fairly recent innovations and reforms that could
be abandoned, there are limits to what law or custom can do to
strengthen women's bargaining position, given marriage's fundamental nature. Conflict and power cannot be wished out of marriage. Nor can the disparity between men's and women's positions.
That disparity is not just a contingency of the institution, a superficial cultural gloss that can be discarded in some times and at some
places. R ather, it is of the essence: a consequence that springs
from the deep and defining nature of marriage as a monopolistic
institution marked by the expectation of exclusivity, fidelity, and
cooperation for living. :Marriage has always been a two-person
bargain at its core, insofar as many key matters between husband
and wife, including divisions of labor and reward, have always been
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regarded as "something to be sorted out privately rather than made
a su bj ect of public inte z- ';e ntion. ":"'z T o the extent the spouses must
work out the m ost important terrns of their life together and then
rely largely on self-he lp to m ake those terms stick, marri age must
continue to be an institution in which " th e balance between freed om of action and security . . . [re mains] dependent on shrewdness,
negot iating skill , and the preexisting di stribution of wea lth, power,
and legal entitlements. " ~
·
h"
· not tne
1
.lp IS
T o b e sure, t h.e struct ure or tne rnanta11 re 1at10ns
only culpri t responsible fo r women's disadv antage. Such diverse
4
factors as the rigidities of the labor market;' " the pro-breadwinner
bias in the tax co de , ~; the cultttral eo uation o.f manliness with occupational success, 3" 6 the eroticizatio'n of men's domin ance ove r
women/"' the stigma of m ale domesticity, 3"'': the "iron law of childcare, " 3~9 and the residue of job discrimination and sexual harassment all are important. \Nomen' s own outlook and aspirations also
play a role. Such putative traits as women's greater concern for
children, for compromise over cont1ict, and for caring rather than
ruling would put them at a competitive disadvantage in the wider
world even if marriage could somehow be radically transformed or
even extinguished as a social norm. vv'omen's preferences still
might lead to systematic specialization even within a marital institution structured to achieve a more egalitarian balance; in turn,
women might hold fewer positions of worldly power, and women's
interests might be slighted. T here is no sim ple solution to this
problem, and the abolition of all traces of sexual caste would
3 3

r

'

·

3
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110 Harv. L. Rev . 1657, 1674 (1 997) (discussin g th e idea that wome n 's relative lack of
power in private relationships-as opposed to the public sphere-is a significant
source of women's inequality).
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clearly require :radical an d far-re2.c:hing ch<lnges (which in turn
would entail some very re al costs).
Nonetheless, marriage as cv.rrently structured remains a critical
and important component of 'Nomen's inequality. There is a disparity between the promise of equal partnership that marriage represents and the means to enforce that promise. Neither legalistic
measures nor private contracts provide the complete solution to
the problem of bargaining irni::;c:dance within marriage. Nevertheless,
marriage generaily performs its ~-ocial functions best when enduring
as a long-term contr2ct in which p articipants honor their reciprocal
1"
.
T •
1
oo11gatiOns.
un!ortunately,
rew man tal oo_Igatwns are e1tect1ve.y
enforced either formall y or informally. A deliberate decision has
bee n made to give divorcing couples a clean break . Thus, the final
accounting ord ained by current law and custom does little to make
good on the types of long-term promises that are the source of
most of the institution's unique social benefits. The failure to enforce the promises implicit in the marital relationship, although
certainly not the exclusive source of men's and women's inequality
within marriage, contributes to it by opening the way for rampant
opportunism that disproportionately harms women and children.
Proposals that attempt to make marit al promises stick-such as the
revival of alimony , fault, and consent requirements-have some
potential to strengthen women's hand within marriage. But the
sex-neutral form that these proposals most often take undermines
that potential by strengrhening men's position as well.
There is no panacea for women's age-old dilemma in marriage.
It is difficult to redistribute power in relationships that depend, in
important part, on voluntary choices and voluntary contributions
between unequals, and it is difficult to transform a vital social institution that, in its transformation, would be destroyed. The relative
powerlessness of women within marriage that is d escribed in this
Article-and the sense of being overpowered in a relationship central to human existence and happiness-marks out an important
but pooriy understood locus of dejection at the heart of feminine
experience. The resignation that characterizes \Vomen's outlook
on relationships with men an d the persistence of the "woman question" in general can be traced in large part to the basic intransigence of the problem of marriage as a relationship that aspires to
be between equals, but is not. Indeed, it could be argued that the
1
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gulf between aspiration and reality (or between aspiration and
structure) is a source of frustration for bot h sexes, since men must
also learn to live within an institution rigged to their own advantage but not of their own making.
Finally, the built-in structural in equ alities of marriage, which
may once have been thought to be a source of strength for the institution, may now have come to represent a fatal weakness. The
evidence would suggest that wom en are increasingly dissatisfied
with marriage as it currently exists. More and more women are turning their backs on their marria ge, oft en seemingly at great cost to
themselves and their children . O ne possible expl anation for this
otherwise puzzling behavior is that 'vVome n, as weak bargainers , are
losing out in the marital give and take to the point where th ey perceive themselves as better off outside marriage than within it. Or
perhaps they are repelled by the imbalance in their "positive-sum"
bargain and have come to see that imbalance as fundamentally unfair. Can women's sense of injustice and the desire for a fair deal
be suppressed forever, even for their own and their children's
sake? Must the chronic imbalance in such a key relationship-one
so central to social life and to the fate of individuals-inevitably
generate rebellion? 350 Women's growing distaste for marital inequality-coupled with men's unsurprising desire to maintain itmay represent the most potent and ominous threat to the institution
of marriage so far.
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